A comparative analysis of the concept "good" in Mullāhādī Sabzevari and R. M. Hare’s view

Abstract
The concept of "good" is one of the basic concepts in the areas of philosophy, psychology, and the value of ethical judgments. Carefully review and solve its complexities can open up many issues and misunderstandings. Both HajMullāhādī Sabzevari and R. M. Hare are two philosophers who have presented some good ideas about the concept of 'good' on the basis of their thinking framework. These two thinkers have revised their predecessors’ views according to the time in which they lived, and added complementary and effective points to them, then they removed its shortcomings. The late Sabzevari reasoned against the Asharite who argued that theories of good and evil couldn’t form demonstrative syllogism because they were not self-evident, that they can be applied not only in the accepted domains but also in the realm of certainty. Thus, these theorems provide the basis for the demonstrative syllogism. From the point of view of Haji Sabzevari, the intellect of all human beings can be aware of the theories of a good ethical concepts. It makes the theorems have the truth value and truth value false. Also, in his view, anything that is admired or condemned by the necessity of, or true argument of the wisdom; is also admired and condemned in the thing in itself. So, besides the rational validity of human beings, he believes in the vas of the essence of a thing for being knowledgeable and truthful and false. On the other hand, R. M. Hare disagrees with any schools of emotion, because they reduced ethical propositions to imperative propositions and, as a result, found these propositions not to have rational validity and reasoning. But Hare, by implying the introduction of the demonstrative, makes the demonstrative related to the concept of "good" rational and arguable. But since the ethical sentences are command and compositional in prescriptivism and have no logical truth and falsehood, thereby his view remains non-cognitivism. But what highlights the significance of this article is the analytical and comparative view of these two thinkers’ opinion, which we are going to discuss now.
Ontologically, Haji Sabzevari summarizes the notion of "good" in the intellectual alignment of human beings (although it considers as a descriptive and knowledgeable perception, it does not have the exploration aspect of the reality), an non-realistic, and he is considered as a realist because he regards the good and the bad in the thing in itself admired or condemned. But on the other hand, Hare does not consider the propositions related to the ethical concept of "good" as a descriptive and exploratory issue about the world around it, so it takes on a prescriptive and non-descriptive aspect. So, his opinions can be described as an non-realistic one.
From the epistemological aspect, both thinkers have considered being arguable and rational of the demonstrative related to the ethical concept of "good". For Haji Sabzevari, the propositions of the concept of good are self-evident and certainty; and based on the validity of human rationality one can attain its truth value and truth value false. This is because whatever is considered praised and condemned by human beings is also put in thing in itself, and thus corresponds to God’s sentences. His view about it, is therefore cognitive, but in Hare’s opinion, the propositions related to the ethical concept of "good" are neither descriptive nor epistemic. So they are not self-evident and certainty. In Hare’s view, ethical propositions including the concept of good are imperative sentences with the aim of promoting prescriptivism. Also, people's recommendation to one another may change based on the personal experiences and situations. Thus, it can be said that Hare’s prescriptivism is classified under the following ethical non-cognitivism.
In moral semantic, both thinkers consider the analysis of the concept of "good" as an admirable issue. And they make sense the rest of the meanings in the domain of its value and ethical meanings, namely praise and admiration aspect. However, Haji Sabzevari returns the first two meanings of the concept of "good" (in the realm of objects and verbs) to its third meaning i.e. deserving the admiration and praise, if optional. Hare also interprets the meaning of the concept “good” (both in the realm of human acts and things), in its value sense i.e. being admirable. But however, Mohaghegh Sabzevari considers the criterion of the 'good' concept or admiration of something, whether it is the discernment of the intellectual community or God.
In a whole and brief summary, it can be said that from the perspective of Sabzevari, the theories of the concept of good are self-evident and deterministic; so, his view is cognitive in this aspect. But Hare’s prescriptivism is classified as ethical non-cognitivism. Haj Mullāhādī is also considered as moral realistic and non-realistic, in two different readings of the “good” concept. But Hare is merely an moral realistic. Both thinkers, on the other hand, interpret the concept of "good" as an admirable issue; and the rest of the meanings in the realm of its value and ethical meanings i.e. praise and admiration. However, Haji Sabzevari returns other meanings of the 'good' concept to being praise and admiration senses, if optional. Hare also interprets the meaning of the “good” concept in the sense of its value i.e. being admirable.