دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 An Examination and Critique of Bottom-Up Causation in the Interpretation of Free Will, Focusing on the Non-Reductionist Approach بررسی و نقد علیِّت از پایین به بالا در تفسیر اراده آزاد با تکیه بر رویکرد غیرتقلیل‌گرایی 1 20 28865 10.22108/coth.2024.142146.1918 FA طیبه غلامی دانش آموخته دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران زهرا خزاعی استاد گروه فلسفه وکلام، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران 0000-0009-0009-0009 Journal Article 2024 07 17 In the reductionist view, humans are considered entirely physical beings, and therefore, their behaviors must be subject to the laws of nature. Consequently, this perspective concludes that humans cannot be free, autonomous, or morally responsible. The issue of free will, according to reductionists, is primarily based on neurobiology, and their approach is grounded in bottom-up causation. However, are human behaviors truly fully determined by the laws of physics or neurobiology? This study aims to examine and critique bottom-up causation in the interpretation of free will through a descriptive-analytical approach and from the perspective of a non-reductionist approach. The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate the insufficiency of this theory in explaining free will and to offer a path to affirming human free will through a holistic view of humans, top-down causation, and the emergent self-governance theory. With this approach, it can be argued that humans, as complex beings with multiple dimensions, are capable of making free choices and acting autonomously, and this freedom cannot be simply reduced to the laws of physics and biology. Keywords: Non-reductionism, Free Will, Reductionism, Bottom-up Causation, Top-down Causation, Emergentism. Introduction The text delves into the philosophical debate surrounding reductionism and free will, tracing the origins of reductionist thought to ancient Greek philosophers, notably Leucippus and Democritus, who proposed that matter is composed of indivisible atoms. This atomic theory laid the groundwork for later philosophical and scientific inquiry. The study contrasts reductionism with the concept of free will, asserting that free agents can influence their surroundings through thoughtful decision-making. Key figures in this discourse include Harris, a staunch advocate of determinism, who argues that free will is incompatible with natural laws, positing that human desires and actions are ultimately products of prior causes beyond conscious control. Conversely, Dennett (1984) presents a more nuanced view, suggesting that free will can coexist with scientific understanding. He emphasizes the importance of deliberation, choice, and moral responsibility, arguing that free will is not only possible but essential for ethical accountability. The study aims to scrutinize the reductionist perspective on free will and to examine critiques from non-reductionist philosophers. It ultimately advocates for a more integrated understanding of human agency, suggesting that acknowledging the complexities of free will can enrich our comprehension of moral responsibility and the human condition. This exploration emphasizes the necessity of reconciling scientific insights with philosophical inquiries into the nature of free will and human autonomy. Materials and Methods This study employs a qualitative research design to investigate the interplay between reductionism and free will as understood by key philosophers. Primary materials include scholarly articles, philosophical texts, and contemporary analyses of reductionist theories, sourced from databases such as JSTOR and Google Scholar. Participants in the study include notable philosophers, whose views on free will and reductionism have significantly influenced contemporary discourse. A purposive sampling method was utilized to select texts that encompass a range of perspectives, including those of Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett. Data collection involved a systematic literature review, focusing on published works from the last two decades to ensure relevance. Key themes were extracted through thematic analysis, allowing for a nuanced understanding of the arguments for and against reductionism in relation to free will. To enhance the rigor of the analysis, triangulation was employed by comparing different philosophical positions and synthesizing insights from various texts. Additionally, peer feedback from academic colleagues was sought to validate interpretations and strengthen the overall argument. The findings will be presented through a narrative synthesis that highlights the contrasting views on free will and reductionism, ultimately contributing to the ongoing philosophical debate on human agency. Research Findings This study critically evaluates upward causation in the interpretation of free will through a non-reductionist lens. Our analysis reveals that reductionists, relying on physical and neurological laws, often view free will as an illusion or, at best, a semblance of free will. We found that this perspective necessitates a fundamental reassessment of free will: if reductionism holds true, human free will is non-existent, leading to a deterministic framework. Our examination of philosophical literature and contemporary critiques highlights the shortcomings of reductionist arguments regarding human agency. Notably, the idea that one cannot exercise free will is challenged by the everyday necessity of presuming free will during decision-making. For instance, when faced with choices such as ordering coffee or lemonade, the assumption of free will becomes essential; to suggest that one’s choice is merely a product of predetermined neural pathways undermines the very act of decision-making. Furthermore, we argue that reductionism detrimentally impacts both free will and higher human capacities, including rationality. Our findings suggest that a holistic approach—considering top-down causation—affirms that human behavior can reflect an exercise of control over neural processes, allowing for a genuine experience of free will that transcends mere biological determinism. Thus, embracing non-reductionism provides not only a coherent account of free will but also a foundation for moral responsibility. Discussion of Results and Conclusions We classified physicalism into two branches: reductionism and non-reductionism. Reductionist physicalism posits that humans are nothing more than their physical bodies, and all mental phenomena, including will, are linked to the body. The problem with this type of physicalism is that it negates the potentials and functions attributed to the soul. In contrast, non-reductionist physicalism does not adhere to such a notion; instead, it seeks to prove that all potentials are dependent on the body in relation to the world, culture, environment, and God. Non-reductionists believe that a serious challenge faced by reductionists is how to understand free will and moral responsibility. Reductionists argue that if humans are physical beings, their behavior must be determined by the laws of nature; thus, humans cannot possess free will or moral responsibility. In this study, we aimed to critique reductionism from the perspective of non-reductionist physicalists. Non-reductionists have presented arguments against causal reductionism, fundamentally undermining the reductionist notion of bottom-up causation, and have subsequently defended top-down causation. Moreover, non-reductionists, considering the differences between humans and other animals, from simple to complex, strive to demonstrate self-agency by combining these capacities, portraying humans as self-directed beings whose behaviors reflect top-down causal control over their neural systems. Non-reductionists place significant emphasis on human reason, as they do not regard humans merely as biological robots or machines, unlike some reductionists like Dennett. They argue that if reductionism were true, no rational person would exist. As we elaborated in detail, according to non-reductionists, if cognitive processes are well-developed and language—an essential element in human cognitive growth—empowers them, while also interacting with the social environment, they create potentials that enable humans to evaluate and assess their behaviors and to lean toward specific goals. In some cases, these re-evaluations of goals may lead to changes in them, guiding human behavior toward rationality, freedom, and ethics. Furthermore, humans take moral responsibility for their actions. It is not the neural networks that control individuals. Contrary to reductionists like Harris, who view neurons as the primary determinants of human activities and regard mental phenomena such as free will as mere illusions reducible to neural processes, humans are aware of the reasons behind their actions and evaluate them using language. Due to evolutionary development, humans can reflect on themselves and create opportunities for reorganization when confronted with new ideas and beliefs. Ultimately, based on their relative sense of freedom, humans take responsibility for their actions concerning their environment and other conditions. در تصویر تقلیل‌گرایان، انسان موجودی کاملاً فیزیکی در نظر گرفته می‌شود و به همین دلیل، رفتارهای او باید تابع قوانین طبیعت باشند؛ ازاین‌رو، این نگرش به این نتیجه می‌رسد که انسان نمی‌تواند آزاد، مختار و اخلاقاً مسئول باشد. مسئله اراده آزاد در تفسیر تقلیل‌گرایان عمدتاً مبتنی بر زیست‌شناسی اعصاب است و نگرش آنها بر پایه علیت از پایین به بالا شکل می‌گیرد؛ اما آیا واقعاً رفتارهای انسان کاملاً متعین به قوانین فیزیک یا زیست‌شناسی اعصاب‌اند. در این مقاله، تلاش شده است با نگاهی توصیفی‌تحلیلی و از منظر رویکرد غیر تقلیل‌گرایانه، به بررسی و نقد علیت از پایین به بالا در تفسیر اراده آزاد پرداخته شود. هدف از این بررسی، نشان‌دادن ناکافی‌بودن این نظریه در تبیین اراده آزاد و همچنین، ارائه راهی برای اثبات اراده آزاد انسان ازطریق دیدگاه کل‌گرایانه نسبت به انسان، علیت نزولی و نوخاسته‌گرایی خودفرمانی است. با این رویکرد، می‌توان استدلال کرد انسان به‌عنوان موجودی پیچیده و دارای ابعاد مختلف، قادر به انتخاب و عمل آزادانه است و این آزادی به سادگی به قوانین فیزیک و زیست‌شناسی تقلیل‌پذیر نیست.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28865_54b266828b8ac188d18a7445e5c36841.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 Analytical investigation of the patrimonial law and inheritance of women in Sassanid era marriages بررسی تحلیلی حق ارث و میراث زن در ازدواج‌های عصر ساسانی 21 36 28823 10.22108/coth.2024.139759.1862 FA پروین داوری دانشجوی دکتری تاریخ ایران قبل از اسلام، گروه تاریخ و ایران شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران اسماعیل سنگاری دانشیار گروه تاریخ و ایران شناسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2023 11 13 In the Zoroastrian religion, marriage has a special importance and position, and every Zoroastrian is obliged to get married and form a family in order to keep the name (nāmagānȋh) and the heart of the family alive. In addition, the preservation of family property is also very important, and family members should be diligent in preserving family property from generation to generation and keep it safe. In Sasanian Iran, the issue of inheritance became very important and the Zoroastrian was obliged to leave behind a male child so that the child would inherit the family’s name, hearth, and property. Surrogate marriages were performed when there was no male child, and the children of these marriages were also recognized as heirs. Based on library sources, this study investigates the share of inheritance of heirs under various marriage conditions and their obligations towards the deceased. Investigations indicate that the benefit of the heirs from the estate varied. The root of such a difference lies in the type and manner of marriage of women and girls. In the second place, there was an idea about the importance of a male child as a bridge-building factor for the smooth crossing of the Chinot bridge and keeping alive the religion of the ancestors, which led to the creation of different classes of heirs. Thus, in Zoroastrianism, we face different types of heirs. Keywords: Sasanians, Sassanid Woman, Marriage, Heritage, Patrimonial Law. Introduction In Zoroastrianism, marriage holds a special significance, and every Zoroastrian is obligated to marry and start a family to ensure the continuation of the family name and the household’s sacred fire. Additionally, the preservation of family assets is paramount, and family members must strive to safeguard these assets through generations. How would their assets be divided if an individual died without children or heirs? Studies show that the inheritance share of heirs varies. Firstly, these differences were rooted in the type and nature of the woman’s/daughter’s marriage. Secondly, a belief existed regarding the importance of a male child as a bridge-builder for the soul’s passage across the Chinvat Bridge and as a means of preserving ancestral traditions, which led to the creation of various classes of heirs. Researchers such as Macuch (2004), Shaki (1971, 1999), and Hjerrild (1993) have briefly examined certain types of inheritance divisions in different marriages. Materials and Methods This research, conducted using a descriptive-analytical method and based on library resources, examines the share of heirs in different marital conditions and their responsibilities toward the deceased. In this study, in addition to referring to Pahlavi texts remaining from the Sassanian and post-Sassanian periods, such as the Mādayān ī Hazār Dādestān, the narration of Ādhar Farnbagh Farrokhzādān, the narration of Omid Ashvahishtan, the Dādestān ī Dēnīg, the eighth Dēnkard, and others as the primary sources of Zoroastrian jurisprudential data, works of modern researchers, including Matsukh, Pirkhaniān, and Yerild, were also reviewed. This research aims to answer the study’s main question by correlating and analyzing the data extracted from the mentioned Pahlavi texts and interpreting them based on the latest research findings. Research Findings What prompted us to examine inheritance and the amount of heirs’ share in Zoroastrianism is the fact that none of the previous studies have thoroughly and independently addressed all aspects of inheritance in full detail. In most studies, the inheritance share in the pādixšāyī marriage (royal marriage) has often been explained, while less attention has been paid to the topics mentioned in other classes. Thus, we aimed to demonstrate how women received their inheritance in different forms of marriage and how the diversity of marriage types could influence their inheritance share and sometimes deprive them of their legal rights. A comprehensive examination of the legal rules discussed earlier strengthens the view that, in Zoroastrianism, heirs could either jointly share in the family property or divide the assets among themselves, with each individual receiving their share. Those who received the assets bore responsibilities and duties toward the deceased. However, their responsibilities were not uniform; sometimes, they were obliged to pay debts and preserve the family property. Discussion of Results and Conclusions A comprehensive examination of the legal rules mentioned earlier strengthens the view that, in Zoroastrianism, heirs could either jointly share in the family property or divide it among themselves, with each individual receiving their portion. Those who inherited the property bore responsibilities and duties toward the deceased. However, their responsibilities were not the same; at times, they were required to settle debts and maintain the family property. Sometimes, their responsibility was to provide a male heir and successor for the deceased without children. Depending on the marriage class in which the individuals were involved, their share of the deceased’s estate varied. In some cases, the person receiving the inheritance was considered only a trustee, and upon the male heir reaching maturity, the property would be transferred to him, ending the trustee’s responsibility. These jurisprudential and legal findings show that the type of marriage and the position of the woman/daughter within it could significantly influence the amount of their inheritance share, and the type of marriage could even affect the inheritance share of children born from proxy marriages. Therefore, no women/daughters could inherit equally, and the difference in their inheritance shares was substantial. Additionally, as the Zoroastrian community coexisted with Muslims, religious leaders enacted new laws according to the circumstances of the time to meet the needs of that era’s society. در دین زردشتی ازدواج از اهمیت و جایگاه ویژه‌ای برخوردار است و هر زردشتی موظف است ازدواج کند و تشکیل خانواده دهد تا بتواند نامگاه و اجاق خانواده را زنده نگه دارد. افزون بر این، حفظ اموال و دارایی خانواده نیز از اهمیت بسزایی برخوردار است و می‌بایست افراد خانواده در حفظ و نگه‌داری اموال خانواده نسل به نسل کوشا باشند و آن را محفوظ دارند. در ایران عصر ساسانی نیز مسئلۀ ارث در دین زردشتی اهمیت بسزایی پیدا کرده بود و هر فرد زردشتی موظف بود فرزند پسری از خود باقی گذارد تا آن فرزند میراث‌دار نام، اجاق و اموال خانواده باشد. زمانی که فرزند پسری در میان نبود، برای تأمین جانشین ازدواج‌های نیابی صورت می‌گرفت و فرزندان حاصل از این ازدواج‌ها نیز به‌عنوان ارث‌بر شناخته می‌شدند. این پژوهش به‌صورت توصیفی‍تحلیلی و براساس منابع کتابخانه‌ای به بررسی میزان سهم‌الارث وراث در شرایط گوناگون ازدواج و وظایف آنان نسبت به‌متوفی پرداخته است. بررسی‌ها حاکی از آن است که بهره‌مندی وراث از ترکه متغیر بود. در وهلۀ نخست، ریشۀ چنین تفاوتی در نوع و نحوۀ ازدواج زن/دختر نهفته است. در وهلۀ دوم، اندیشه‌ای در باب اهمیت فرزند پسر به‌عنوان عامل پل‌سازی برای عبور روان از پل چینوت و زنده‌نگهداشتن آیین نیاکان وجود داشت که ایجاد طبقات گوناگون وراث را به دنبال داشته است که بدین‌سان، ما در دین زردشتی با گونه‌های مختلف وراث روبه‌رو می‌شویم.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28823_cc6ea9c8004d9cb12b090039bc89b333.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 A Comparison of Tylor's and Marett's Views on the Original Form of Religion مقایسۀ دیدگاه تایلر و مارت در باب صورت آغازین دین 27 52 28977 10.22108/coth.2024.140818.1891 FA قربان علمی دانشیار گروه ادیان و عرفان، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران سیده سوزان انجم روز استادیار ادیان و عرفان تطبیقی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران. Journal Article 2024 02 27 The present descriptive-analytical study compares the theological approach of Tylor and Marett, two anthropologists of religion. Although both of them introduce human beings as the starting point and origin of the formation of religious experience, Tylor’s approach to defining and explaining religion is rationalistic and Marett’s approach is emotionalistic. Tylor emphasizes belief in the definition of religion and considers the first form of human religion to be animism, while Marett emphasizes the psychological components of feeling and, by stating that religious activities and rituals precede beliefs and opinions are rooted in human emotions, he presents a new theory called "animatism" or the experience of Mana about the form of the first religion. By rejecting the existing Tylorian definition of religion based on belief in spiritual beings, Marett started with his minimal definition of religion which includes the taboo-mana formula, where taboo is the negative aspect of the supernatural and Mana is its positive and positive aspect. Marett interprets religious consciousness as Mana or "sacred matter". Mana is the feeling of the presence of a wonderful and mysterious power or force that forms the essence of primitive religion. Mana is a mixture of fear, wonder, and attraction that creates awe in humans, which indicates a submission that is accompanied by wonder, hope, and even love. In fact, awe is formed in the relationship between man and the supernatural, and the supernatural is nothing but Mana. Keywords: Tylor, Marett, Science of Religion, Animism, Animatism. Introduction Paying attention to religion, its essence, and its explanation has always been one of the issues of concern to philosophers, theologians, and scientists of religion. In this regard, various theories have been presented by scientists, especially anthropologists of religion, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries. Anthropology of religion is one of the branches of cultural anthropology. It studies man as a being who enters into a relationship with what he considers to be superior to nature, and through this relationship, he begins to create and transform symbols. Anthropologists have focused most of their attention on small and homogeneous societies and have studied the so-called "primitive" religions, which can indicate the origin and initial form of religion. Anthropologists of religion look at religion from two perspectives and deal with these issues: one group considers the origin of religion to be human feelings and emotions, and the other group considers human reason as the cause of human inclination towards religion. Tylor and Marett's views on religion and its origin are rationalistic and emotionalistic, respectively. This study compares the scientific approach of these two influential anthropologists in the history of the study of religion and explains why and how religion appeared in human civilization. Materials and Methods The approach of this study is comparative. Comparative research method is a type of scientific study that seeks to compare two or more groups of people or things based on certain characteristics. Therefore, this research describes, analyzes, and explains the similarities and differences between the scientific views of Edward Tylor and Marett, two anthropologists of religion, the former explained religion with a rationalist view, and the latter with an emotionalist view. It especially aims to answer this research question: What was their point of view about the first initial form of religion and why and how religion emerged in human civilization? Research Findings The first generation of anthropologists always paid attention to the role of religion as an integral part of a cultural field. The part that gives meaning to tradition, written works, and art. Anthropologists such as Tylor and Marett believed that anthropology can be a full-view mirror of the contemporary society and those who want goodness and truth in the refinement of contemporary civilization can get good help from ethnography. Tylor and Marett consider religion as the most important cultural institution and explain it. In explaining why and how human religion appeared, they consider human beings the starting point and origin of the formation of religious experience; therefore, they state that even if the motivation of religion is from outside - from God and through revelation, or from the world and through awe-inspiring its wonders - still the source of the formation of this experience is man himself and he is the agent. It is a matter of religious experience. But in explaining religion, Tylor considered the root of religion in primitive man's belief in the "soul" and believed that primitive man believed in the existence of a soulmate (soul) in his physical experience in states such as trance and sleep, and the experience of death as the separation of the soul from the body. In its development, this belief leads to the generalization of the concept of soul or ghost to all beings, including objects, animals, plants, and natural phenomena, and to the belief in the existence of spirits of ancestors and the worship of them. Primitive man believed that his fate is in the hands of spirits who are present everywhere and in everything; some of them are good and some are evil, but all of them have the power to change his life. In the continuation of this evolutionary movement, Tylor points to the creation of a kind of harmony between the transcendental and unseen spirits and powers (gods) and finally believes that this is the course of evolution that ultimately leads to monotheism. But Marett, by criticizing Tylor's theory that early religion believed in spirits, put forward the theory of pre-animism and belief in a power called Mana, and he believes that in Mana we have evidence of a pre-animist stage; the stage in which the feeling dominates the thought or in which the thought is still not separated from the feeling. Marett considers the origin of the emotions that rule ritualistic religious behavior to be the presence of an amazing and mysterious power or force from primitive peoples, which he calls Mana. Thus, the origin of religion is an emotion that is a mixture of fear, respect, and amazement and causes awe in humans, which is the most important component of religion and religiosity. Discussion of Results and Conclusions Marett accepts Tylor's explanation of animism but rejects it as the first form of religion. In his opinion, animism is the next evolution of the motivations that first arose from the emotions resulting from the experience of Mana. The stage where religion and magic are not clearly distinguished from each other and their common element is Mana. He presented a new theory called "animatism", the main ingredient of which is the supernatural, which is a matter of feeling, not reason. According to Marett, it was the idea of Mana that moved the place of religious nature for primitive man from the realm of reason (belief) to the realm of feeling. Mana is the feeling of the presence of a wonderful and mysterious power or force that forms the core of primitive religion. Mana is awe-inspiring and its place in his theology is so bold that it summarizes the whole diverse and heterogeneous combination of special religious feelings in one word "Awe", a term that indicates a submission that is associated with wonder, hope, and even love. In the evaluation of Marett's theory, it should be said that Taylor's claim regarding animism as the first form of religion can be criticized in this regard, just like Marett's claim regarding animism because there is no clear evidence on both claims. Although animatism itself is born of "pure direct religious feeling", compared to animism, it has little intellectual maturity. این مقاله، به روش توصیفی و تحلیلی است و به بررسی مقایسه‌ای رویکرد دین‌شناختی تایلر و مارت، دو انسان‌شناس دین می‌پردازد. هرچند هر دو انسان را نقطه شروع و منشأ شکل‌گیری تجربه دینی معرفی می‌کنند، رویکرد تایلر در تعریف و تبیین دین عقل‌گرایانه و رویکرد مارت عاطفه‌گرایانه است. تایلر در تعریف دین بر باور تأکید کرده است و نخستین صورت دینی انسان را آنیمیسم می‌داند؛ در صورتی که مارت بر مؤلفه‌های روان‌شناختی احساس تأکید کرده و با بیان اینکه فعالیت‌های دینی و مناسک بر باورداشت‌ها و عقاید مقدم بوده است و در عواطف انسان ریشه دارد، نظریه جدیدی به نام «آنیماتیسم» یا تجربه مانا را دربارة صورت نخستین دین ارائه می‌دهد. مارت با رد تعریف تایلری موجود از دین، مبنی بر اعتقاد به موجودات روحانی، به تعریف حداقلی خود از دین پرداخت که شامل فرمول تابو - مانا است که تابو جنبه منفی و سلبی ماوراءالطبیعه و مانا جنبه مثبت و ایجابی آن است. مارت از متعلق آگاهی دینی به مانا یا امر قدسی تعبیر می‌کند. مانا احساس حضور یک قدرت یا نیروی شگفت‌انگیز و رمزآمیز است که گوهر دین ابتدایی را تشکیل می‌دهد. احساس مانا آمیزه‌ای از هراس، اعجاب و جاذبه در انسان ایجاد می‌کند که موجب هیبت او می‌شود و نشان‌دهندة انقیاد، تسلیم و سرسپردگی است که با حیرت، امیدواری و حتی عشق همراه است. درواقع، هیبت در ارتباط انسان با ماوراءالطبیعه شکل می‌گیرد و ماوراءالطبیعه نیز چیزی به‌جز مانا نیست.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28977_f138472500de575f78922b4d6ed6d3f8.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 A Comparative Study of the Relationship Between Humans and God in the Philosophy of Ibn Bajja, Plato, and Farabi بررسی تطبیقی رابطه انسان و خدا در فلسفه ابن‌باجه و افلاطون و فارابی 53 70 28889 10.22108/coth.2024.141258.1897 FA حسن عباسی حسین آبادی دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه پیام نور، تهران، ایران مستانه کاکائی دانش آموخته دکتری فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات فارسی و زبان های خارجی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2024 04 23 In the field of anthropology, Ibn Bajja was influenced by the Greek philosophers, especially Plato, and by the Islamic philosopher, Farabi. One of the problems of Ibn Bajja's philosophical anthropology is the relationship between man and God. In this study, using a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, the authors examine the relationship between man and God in Ibn Bajja with the influence of Plato and Farabi. The study aims to answer this question: what influences did Ibn Bajja get from Plato and Farabi in this matter? The findings showed that Ibn Bajja was influenced by Plato on the connection of active reason in the discussion of human levels. In the issue of the connection to active intellect and grace, he was influenced by Farabi. The conclusion is that the relationship between man and God in Ibn Bajja and Farabi is through connecting to the active intellect and receiving grace, and in Plato through dialectics. Keywords: Human, God, Ibn Bajja, Plato, Farabi. Introduction Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Yahya bin Saigh known as Ibn Bajja (1095-1138), is more known as Avempace in the west. In the field of anthropology, he was influenced by Greek philosophers, especially Plato, and in Islamic philosophy by Farabi. Ibn Bajja's anthropology has been affected by Plato, Aristotle, Farabi (872-950), and Avicenna (980-1037) in the socio-political and philosophical dimensions. In this study, the main issue is the philosophical anthropology of Ibn Bajja. The authors specifically address the issue of the relationship between humans and God from Ibn Bajja, Plato, and Farabi’s perspectives. Ibn Bajja explains the relationship between humans and God through "conjunction to the active intellect" and since the conjunction to the active intellect is linked to illumination, expression, and reception, the problem of the relationship between humans and God is divided into two axes: "conjunction to the active intellect" and "grace and reception". This study intends to first express Plato's opinion about human levels in the seventh book of the Republic, then Farabi's opinion about the conjunction of the active intellect and grace. Then, it will discuss Ibn Bajja's opinion about the issue of conjunction, and in a comparative analysis, it will also state the commonalities and differences in order to find out the influence of Ibn Bajja on Plato and Farabi. Materials and Methods This study was written using a comparative approach and a descriptive-analytical method. In this regard, the research is the result of the comparison of three philosophers on the issue of the relationship between humans and God, and since the cases of comparison were different, Plato and Ibn Bajja were compared in terms of human levels, and Farabi and Ibn Bajja were mentioned in the comparison “conjunction to the active intellect" and “Grace”. The research is designed in two parts: in the first part, by studying this issue in the works of the three mentioned thinkers, with a descriptive method, the theories of each one are expressed by referring to the related sources; in the second part, it analyzes their theories in comparison with each other. Research Findings There are several differences between Plato and Ibn Bajja. First, the human levels are not clearly stated in Plato. In addition, most of the growth and promotion of humans is in stages rather than categorization in a group of humans. However, his steps to reach the true philosopher are first through imagination, reasoning, and finally understanding and seeing forms and ideas. In Ibn Bajja, we clearly have the triple ranking of the populace, Nazar, and the blessed one (Soaada), which are consistent with the Platonic human stages in terms of their coordinates. To Plato and Ibn Bajja, the stages of reasoning and seeing real images and concepts are the same as Soada. To Plato, a person achieves forms and understandings, but there is no mention of conjunction and union. From Ibn Bajja’s perspective, conjunction is possible during the mentioned stages along with paying attention to the Quran and the tradition of the prophets to achieve God's pleasure. According to Farabi, Avicenna, and the Neo-Platonists, "Grace" is the source of "emanation" and "production". Farabi spoke about the chain of intellects and considered the active intellect as both the form and the last stage of intellect. Ibn Bajja incompletely took the theory of Grace and emanation proposed by Farabi and Avicenna and reflected on it in an ambiguous way in his writings. Discussion of Results and Conclusion The discussion about the relationship between humans and God in Ibn Bajja in comparison with Plato, according to the allegory of the cave that is a common text between Plato and Ibn Bajja, is that Ibn Bajja agrees with Plato during the ascending stages that progress in a dialectic from sensible issues to intelligible notions. However, the difference between Ibn Bajja and Plato is that, in Plato, the conjunction of the active intellect is not discussed. Basically, the issue of conjunction and unity is not mentioned in Plato; however, he spoke about the guide and the old human to lead the person out of the cave. This elder and guide in Ibn Bajja can be the Quran and the tradition of the prophets. Ibn Bajja did not mention any helper and guide other than the Quran and the tradition of the prophets. In the discussion of the relationship between humans and God in Ibn Bajja in comparison with Farabi, which in this research is limited to only two issues of "grace" and "conjunction to the active intellect", there is an overlap in their ways and methods. However, their difference is in the clarity and ambiguity of their speech. Ibn Bajja incompletely took the theory of grace and emanation proposed by Farabi and Avicenna and reflected on it in an ambiguous way in his writings. To him, the tenth intelligence and even intermediate intelligence are not mentioned for their creation. He also talks vaguely about the second intelligence. However, based on the sources we mentioned in the text, Ibn Bajja vaguely spoke of grace in the sense of producing and imparting knowledge and existence to the human intellect and forms to all creatures. For humans, grace is the primary ability to receive perfection. By receiving gifts and grace, the human intellect reaches the stage of perfection and conjunction with the active intellect. However, it clearly introduces the conjunction with the active intellect as the only way for human perfection and emphasizes the efforts of human and the transcendent dialectic that are through the steps of 1) understanding sensible matters, 2) understanding self-evident and intelligible issues, 3) understanding the reality of the objects themselves, and 4) understanding their truth. Therefore, Ibn Bajja is influenced by Farabi in the issue of conjunction. ابن‌باجه در زمینۀ انسان‌شناسی از فیلسوفان یونان به‌طور مشخص. افلاطون و از فلاسفۀ اسلامی از فارابی تأثیر گرفته است. یکی از مسائل انسان‌شناسی فلسفی ابن‌باجه رابطۀ انسان و خدا است. در این نوشتار با روش توص.یفی تحلیلی و تطبیقی، تأثیرپذیری ابن‌باجه از افلاطون و فارابی در رابطة انسان و خدا را بررسی می‌کنیم و در پی پاسخ به این پرسش هستیم که ابن‌باجه در این مسئله از افلاطون و فارابی چه تأثیراتی گرفته است. همچنین، این یافته‌ها دست به دست آمد که ابن‌باجه در رسالۀ اتصال فی عقل فعال در بحث از مراتب انسانی از افلاطون تأثیر گرفته و در مسئلۀ اتصال به عقل فعال و فیض از فارابی تأثیر پذیرفته است. درنهایت، به این نتیجه می‌رسیم که ارتباط انسان و خدا در ابن‌باجه و فارابی ازطریق اتصال به عقل فعال و دریافت موهبت و فیض و در افلاطون ازطریق دیالکتیک است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28889_c860a13384da990549e39fc1b7099046.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 A Critical Entry to the Concept of Farrah-e Izadi: Essence or Acquisition by Relying on the Concept of Šāhī Ārmānī درآمدی انتقادی بر مفهوم فره ایزدی؛ ذات یا اکتساب (با تکیه بر مفهوم شاهی آرمانی) 71 88 29015 10.22108/coth.2024.140850.1892 FA احمد عزیزخانی استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران سعید غضنفری دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد تاریخ ایران باستان، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2024 03 10 Revisiting the fundamental concepts of Šāhī Ārmānī in ancient Iran is essential. The oral traditions of ancient Iranian civilization, the richness of Iranian mythology, and the literary transmission of ancient teachings—often laden with metaphor—have all contributed to the challenges in achieving a clear and accurate understanding of these core concepts. One such concept, Farrah-e Izadi (Divine Glory), remains particularly ambiguous due to these factors. Furthermore, grasping the political, cultural, and social dynamics of ancient Iran is intricately linked to this idea. Farrah symbolizes the sacred legitimacy of Šāhī Ārmānī. However, this association has led to various misinterpretations, obscuring the original meaning of Šāhī Ārmānī in ancient Iranian thought. The intangible nature of Farrah has caused many to perceive it solely as a divine gift, often overlooking its earthly and acquired dimensions. This study, employing a descriptive-analytical approach and utilizing primary sources, explored the earthly and acquired aspects of the concept of Farrah. Through an analytical narrative, it sought to reinterpret this concept within the framework of Šāhī Ārmānī, emphasizing its acquired dimensions and aiming to strengthen the nuanced understanding of subjectivity in ancient Iran from this perspective. Keywords: Farrah, Šāhī Ārmānī, Ancient Iran, Avesta. Introduction A review of interpretations surrounding the concept of Farrah-e Izadi reveals that many scholars and historians view it primarily as a divine force. This perspective suggests that when bestowed by the dove of fortune, Farrah grants an individual the legitimacy to rule. However, such a narrow interpretation risks undermining the importance of moral values, political virtue, and agency in ancient Iran. While this viewpoint has often been predominant, the present study critically examined the concept of Farrah, challenging this prevailing notion through an analytical lens. This research sought to answer two central questions: 1) What is Farrah-e Izadi? and 2) Is a king's possession of Farrah solely a matter of divine will (innate), or must the individual also create the necessary conditions (acquired)? Although Farrah-e Izadi is frequently referenced in the Avesta, Bundahišn, Dēnkart, and other Pahlavi texts, there is no explicit mention of the concept as being acquired. Despite numerous studies addressing Farrah, most researchers have concentrated on defining the term and exploring its various dimensions, often overlooking the distinction between innate and acquired Farrah. This study aimed to investigate this crucial aspect by drawing on primary sources and related research. Materials & Methods This study employed a descriptive-analytical methodology alongside a critical approach to examine primary sources, including Pahlavi, Avestan, and Old Persian inscriptions, as well as relevant later texts. The aim was to investigate the earthly and acquired dimensions of the concept of Farrah. By utilizing an analytical narrative, the research sought to reinterpret this concept within the semantic framework of Šāhī Ārmānī with particular emphasis on reevaluating its acquired aspects. Research Findings A key focus of this research was the relationship among wisdom, Farrah, and Šāhī Ārmānī within the political philosophy of ancient Iran. This study posited that, in ancient Iranian thought, the source of all goodness and the bestowal of Farrah resided within the individual. Therefore, Farrah was viewed as a consequence of virtues rather than their origin. Given that aspects of wisdom in ancient Iranian thought were considered acquired and that the manifestation of wisdom in a king was essential, it could be inferred that the concept of Farrah-e Izadi within Šāhī Ārmānī encompassed an acquired dimension. According to ancient Iranian teachings, wisdom existed in two forms: first, innate wisdom, which was inherent to all individuals, and second, acquired wisdom, which was cultivated through piety and personal experience. From this perspective, a comprehensive understanding of wisdom in Šāhī Ārmānī required considering both the innate and acquired aspects of Farrah. Another significant topic addressed in this research was the connection between Farrah and Xwēškārīh (duty). This concept emphasized that every individual, regardless of social class or status, had to fulfill the responsibilities associated with their position. Xwēškārīh signified a commitment to one’s duty, ensuring that everyone recognized their role and acted accordingly. In this context, Farrah served as a stabilizing force: those who honored their duties were endowed with Farrah. Discussion of Results & Conclusion Based on the analyses presented in this research, it could be concluded that while Farrah possessed an otherworldly and spiritual essence, its meaning shifted to an acquired one when viewed through the lens of individual agency. The crucial factor lay in the individual's capacity to choose between good and evil or light and darkness, which in turn attracted divine and spiritual influences, such as Farrah. This perspective underscored the active and central role that ancient Iranians attributed to individuality. The ideal king portrayed as the epitome of kingship in Iran was depicted as a person imbued with all virtues, who, through these qualities, had succeeded in garnering divine favor. According to a fundamental principle linking Farrah to virtuous and dutiful individuals, this king became endowed with Farrah and thus deserving of rule. This notion was so deeply ingrained that it persisted even after the advent of Islam in Iran and neighboring regions, manifesting in concepts, such as the "shadow of God" (Zell-Allah) across various ruling dynasties, including the Umayyads, Fatimids, Abbasids, and Ottomans. This provided these rulers with a potent means of legitimizing their authority. Regardless of historical evaluations, the concept of the acquired nature of Farrah-e Izadi—implying the selection of a reformer for governance—reflected the grandeur and sophistication of ancient Iranian thought. بازخوانش مفاهیم بنیادین شاهی آرمانی ایران باستان، ضرورتی انکارناپذیر است. وجه شفاهی تمدن ایران باستان، فربهی اسطوره‌های ایرانی و انتقال ادیبانۀ آموزه‌های باستانی همراه با وجوه استعاره‌ای، ازجمله موانعی است که خوانش صحیح و شفاف آن مفاهیم بنیادین را با چالش مواجه ساخته است. «فرّه ایزدی» یکی از مفاهیمی است که به دلایل فوق در هاله‌ای از ابهام است و از طرفی فهم مناسبات سیاسی، فرهنگی و اجتماعی ایران کهن، پیوستگی زیادی با این مفهوم دارد. مفهوم «فرّ» نماد حقانیت قدسی شاهی آرمانی است؛ اما این ویژگی باعث شکل‌گیری نوعی کج‌اندیشی دربارۀ این مفهوم و درنهایت سوءفهم در اصل شاهی آرمانی ایران باستان شده است. وجه فرامادی «فرّ» بسیاری را بر آن داشته است تا آن را عطیه‌ای قدسی تلقی کنند و از وجوه اکتسابی و زمینی آن غفلت ورزند. این پژوهش به شیوۀ توصیفی‌تحلیلی و با استفاده از منابع دست اول نگاشته شده و وجه زمینی و اکتسابی مفهوم فرّ، بررسی و با کاربست روایتی‌تحلیلی، ضمن بازخوانش این مفهوم در شاهی آرمانی، وجوه اکتسابی آن، برجسته و از این منظر تلاش شده است هیکل نحیف سوبژکتیویته در ایران باستان کمی فربه شود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29015_f52f47f55879778fef203699c5c19bc1.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 Examining the Views of Muslim Philosophers about Psychological (Intrinsic) Egoism بررسی دیدگاه فیلسوفان مسلمان پیرامون خودگرایی روانشناختی (ذاتی) 89 102 29075 10.22108/coth.2024.141692.1903 FA سید جابر موسوی راد استادیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران 0000-0009-0009-0009 Journal Article 2024 06 01 Psychological egoism means that all human actions are done for the purpose of his own benefit and it is impossible for a person to do something only for the purpose of benefiting others. In this study, it is proved that the rule of "returning the purpose to the subject" accepted by Muslim philosophers is a kind of acceptance of psychological egoism. Then, in the next stage, this view is criticized and it is clarified that although the purpose of many human actions is the benefit that comes to himself (worldly or hereafter benefit), doing something only for the purpose of others cannot be considered logically impossible. In the case of God, although attributing the "ego" to God is not correct, it is possible to propose a kind of intrinsic egoism and intrinsic altruism regarding the divine nature. Based on this meaning, in this research, it is explained that Muslim philosophers have accepted a kind of intrinsic egoism concerning God, and based on this, they have considered it impossible for God to do something intrinsically to bring good and benefit to creatures. This idea is also explained in this study and it is criticized in such a way that it is never impossible that the act of God has a purpose outside of the essence that benefits only the creatures. Keywords: Psychological Egoism, Psychological Altruism, the Purpose of Divine Action, the Purpose of Actions. Introduction The purpose of this study is to investigate psychological egoism and psychological altruism from the perspective of Muslim philosophers. Although none of the Muslim philosophers have directly addressed this issue, it seems that one of the principles they accepted and used is the ultimate goal always refers back to the agent and implies a form of acceptance of psychological egoism. Acceptance of this principle means that all the actions of individuals are aimed at a benefit that ultimately returns to themselves, and people, by their very nature, cannot perform an action inherently with the goal of benefiting others. This principle is also discussed in relation to the goal-oriented nature of God's actions. Although it is clear that God does not have a psyche, by considering the essence of God, two viewpoints emerge between the theologians defending the justice of God and Muslim philosophers. Both groups agree that the necessity of divine wisdom entails the creation of the world and its creatures. The point of difference, however, is that the theologians believe divine wisdom requires God to perform actions whose benefit is solely directed to the creatures. This theory contrasts with the view of philosophers, who argue that it is impossible for God to perform an action inherently aimed at the benefit of creatures. The study will demonstrate that this view of the theologians (which contrasts with the perspective of Muslim philosophers) can be seen, in a certain sense, as a form of intrinsic altruism concerning God. Materials and Methods This research employs a qualitative methodology, utilizing an analytical-critical approach to examine the writings of prominent Muslim philosophers, such as Mulla Sadra, Allameh Tabatabai, and Shahid Sadr. The analysis involves a comprehensive review of philosophical texts and relevant literature concerning psychological egoism and altruism. Key themes are identified and synthesized to highlight the philosophical arguments surrounding the nature of human actions. Data are collected from primary and secondary sources, ensuring a thorough understanding of the subject matter. The methodology is designed to facilitate a critical evaluation of the philosophical positions and their implications for understanding human motivation. Research Findings The findings of the study showed that Muslim philosophers predominantly endorse a form of psychological egoism, arguing that all human actions are ultimately self-directed. For instance, Allameh Tabatabai (1983) asserts that even acts of charity are motivated by a desire to alleviate personal discomfort upon witnessing suffering. Conversely, some theologians argue for the possibility of genuine altruism, suggesting that actions can be performed for the benefit of others without self-interest. Additionally, the analysis highlights a philosophical tension between these views, indicating that while self-interest may often guide actions, there exists a conceptual space for altruistic motivations under specific conditions. Discussion of Results and Conclusion Psychological egoism, in relation to human beings, is incompatible with the internal perceptions and intuitions of humans. Although in many cases a person takes into account the benefit they will gain from their actions, there are instances where a person realizes that they can perform an action inherently to benefit others. Therefore, psychological altruism is logically possible, even though the actions a person undertakes based on altruism may be fewer. In this regard, the statement by Muslim philosophers that all human actions are motivated by self-interest lacks a strong foundation, because, although in many cases a person considers their own benefit, there are times when they may not take this benefit into account. Regarding God, it can be argued that the view of philosophers who believe it is impossible for God to perform an action for the benefit of others is not acceptable. Rather, it can be said that although the perfection of the divine essence necessitates the creation of beings and the bestowing of good upon them, this perfect essence has eternally willed to bring good to its creatures. There is no doubt that the essence and perfection of God necessitate the delivery of good to the creatures. However, accepting this does not contradict the truth that God performs actions for the benefit of creatures, because, contrary to the mindset of Muslim philosophers, performing an act for the benefit of others does not imply that the agent (God) receives any benefit or becomes more complete. خودگرایی روانشناختی به این معنا است که غایت تمام افعال انسان، خودش است و محال است انسان کاری را ذاتاً به هدف رساندن نفعی به دیگران انجام دهد. در این مقاله اثبات می‌شود قاعدۀ «بازگشت غایت به فاعل» که فیلسوفان مسلمان پذیرفته‌اند، به‌نوعی پذیرش خودگرایی روانشناختی است. سپس در مرحلۀ بعد این دیدگاه، نقد و روشن می‌شود گرچه غایت بسیاری از کارهای انسان، نفعی است که به خودش می‌رسد (نفع دنیوی یا اخروی)، به لحاظ عقلی، انجام کاری ذاتاً به هدف دیگران را نمی‌توان محال عقلی دانست. دربارۀ خداوند نیز می‌توان خودگرایی و دگرگرایی ذاتی را به این معنا مطرح کرد که آیا غایت تمام افعال خداوند ذاتش است یا اینکه ممکن است خداوند فعلی را به غایتی غیر از ذاتش انجام دهد. بر اساس این معنا، در این مقاله تبیین می‌شود فیلسوفان مسلمان نوعی خودگرایی ذاتی را نسبت به خداوند قبول کرده‌اند و بر این اساس، غایت فعل الهی را اصالتاً ذات الهی دانسته‌اند. این انگاره نیز در این مقاله، تبیین و بدین صورت نقد شد که هرگز محال نیست فعل خداوند غایتی خارج از ذات داشته باشد که نفع آن ذاتاً به مخلوقات برسد. این مقاله با روش تحلیلی - انتقادی، دیدگاه فیلسوفان مسلمان درباره خودگرایی ذاتی (روانشناختی) دربارۀ خدا و انسان را تبیین و بررسی و نقد می‌کند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29075_152218171928b98da98a4aa6ce82d483.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 Typology of Critical Thinking and its Representation in Islamic-Iranian Civilization (from the Late 3rd Century to the Early 7th Century AH) گونه‌شناسی «تفکر انتقادی» و واکاوی آن در تمدن اسلامی ـ ایرانی (از اواخر قرن 3 تا اوایل قرن 7) 102 128 28911 10.22108/coth.2024.140616.1886 FA مسعود مطهری نسب استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت (ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان اصفهان، ایران عبدالرسول مشکات استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت (ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان اصفهان، ایران محمد بید هندی دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل البیت (ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2024 02 06 The purpose of this study is to explain the true meaning of critical thinking and its role in the ups and downs of civilizations. In this research, using the descriptive-analytical method, at first two types of positive (i.e. accepting and constructive critical thinking), and negative approaches (i.e. confrontational and destructive critical thinking) were recognized. It was further shown that positive critical thinking, unlike its negative type, is always accompanied by a type of tolerance and creativity and is considered one of the tools for the progress of human societies. The results obtained from this research show that one of the important factors in the flourishing of Islamic civilization (from the third century to the middle of the fifth century AH) was the existence of an atmosphere of freedom of thought combined with positive critical thinking. In this period, the mutual relationship between politics and science resulted in synergy, and scientists and rulers (especially Samanian and Al-Boyeh) played their roles well in the growth of Islamic civilization in a two-way interaction. On the other hand, in the following centuries, due to the creation of an atmosphere with monologue and dogmatic logic, we witness the decline of this brilliant civilization. The mentioned civilizational background and reflection on it can be a light on the way to the realization of modern Islamic-Iranian civilization in the future. هدف این مقاله تبیین معنای درست تفکر انتقادی و نقش آن در فراز و فرود تمدن ها است. در این پژوهش با استفاده از روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی در ابتدا دو گونه رویکرد ایجابی یا «تفکر نقّادِ پذیرنده و سازنده»؛ و رویکرد سلبی یا «تفکر نقّادِ ستیزنده و مخرّب» از هم بازشناسی شد. در ادامه نشان داده شد که تفکر انتقادی ایجابی، بر خلاف نوع سلبی آن، همواره توأم با گونه‌ای از تساهل و خلاقیت است و از لوازم پیشرفت جوامع بشری محسوب می شود. نتایج بدست آمده از این پژوهش نشان می دهند یکی از عوامل مهم شکوفایی تمدن اسلامی (از قرن سوم تا اواسط قرن پنجم) وجود فضای آزادی اندیشه توأم با تفکر انتقادی ایجابی بوده است. در این دوره رابطه متقابل نهاد سیاست و نهاد علم موجب هم افزایی شد و دانشمندان و حاکمان (به ویژه سامانیان و آل‌بویه) در تعاملی دوسویه نقش خود را در بالندگی تمدن اســـلامی به خوبی ایفا کردند. در نقطة مقابل در قرون بعدی بواسطه ایجاد فضایی با منطق تک‌ گفتاری و جزمی، سیر نزولی این تمدن درخشان اتفاق افتاد. پیشینة تمدنی مذکور و تأمل در آن می‌تواند چراغ راهی در مسیر تحقق تمدن نوین اسلامی ـ ایرانی در آینده باشد

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28911_13d863faf6e9a24fede14f86b56a84c3.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 A Critique of Pope John Paul II's Approach to the Role of Fundamental Option in Human Perfection نقد و بررسی ره‌یافت پاپ ژان پل دوم نسبت به نقش انتخاب اساسی در کمال انسان 129 146 29307 10.22108/coth.2025.140181.1871 FA مهاجر مهدوی راد استادیار گروه معارف، دانشکده اقتصاد و مدیریت، دانشگاه علوم و فنون دریایی، خرمشهر، ایران 0009-0003-3239-4948 سید اکبر حسینی قلعه بهمن دانشیار، گروه ادیان، موسسه آموزشی پژوهشی امام خمینی ره، قم، ایران Journal Article 2024 01 28 This study examines Pope John Paul II's approach to the concept of the "fundamental option" in relation to human perfection within Catholic theology. The fundamental option theory posits that an individual's general inclination towards good signifies their soul's perfection and status before God, asserting that specific sins do not alter this fundamental orientation. While Pope John Paul II acknowledges the fundamental option, he rejects some of its implications. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method, drawing upon authoritative texts of the Catholic faith and the Pope's own statements to analyze his perspective. The results of the research reveal that Pope John Paul II's acceptance of the fundamental option is rooted in the importance of following Christ, adhering to fundamental principles, and the role of reason and free will in achieving perfection. However, he raises significant objections, including concerns about disregarding free will, diminishing ethical responsibility, ethical relativism, alienation, and inconsistencies with core Catholic teachings. Ultimately, the study argues that the Pope's approach faces challenges, such as overlooking the cumulative effects of sins, the uncertainty of conscience, and the incompatibility of predetermination with ethical responsibility and free will, suggesting a lack of full reconciliation between his principles and the theory of the fundamental option. نظریۀ گزینۀ اساسی یکی از نظریه های مرتبط با سعادت انسان است که مدعی است رویکرد کلی به سوی خیر نشان‌دهندۀ کمال و موقعیت روح انسان در نزد خداست و گناهان نمی توانند در گزینۀ اساسی تغییر ایجاد کنند؛ اما پاپ ژان پل دوم با وجود پذیرش گزینۀ اساسی، لوازم آن را نمی پذیرد. این مقاله به روش توصیفی تحلیلی و با استناد به متون معتبر مذهب کاتولیک و بیانات پاپ درصدد است تا ره‌یافت ایشان نسبت به نقش گزینۀ اساسی در کمال انسان را نقد و بررسی کند. نتایج به‌دست‌آمده عبارت‌اند از پیروی از مسیح، تعهد به پایبندی به اصول بنیادین، تأثیر عقل و اختیار در کمال و مبانی پاپ در پذیرش گزینۀ اساسی به عنوان تعهد. پاپ اشکالاتی از جمله نادیده گرفتن اختیار، برداشتن مسئولیت اخلاقی، نسبی‌گرایی اخلاقی، ازخودبیگانگی و ناهماهنگی با آموزه های بنیادین را بر این نظریه وارد و همچنین، استدلال اساسی این نظریه را رد می‌کند. ره‌یافت پاپ دارای ملاحظاتی از جمله نادیده گرفتن آثار بسیاری از گناهان، عدم قطعیت قضاوت های وجدان، نقص در پاسخ به استدلال، ناسازگاری از پیش تعیین‌شدگی با مسئولیت اخلاقی و عقل و اختیار، انعطاف‌ناپذیری در مسائل جدید و بی ثمر بودن این نظریه در اخلاق است که عدم توفیق ره‌یافت پاپ را در جمع کردن میان مبانی خویش و این نظریه نشان می‌دهد

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29307_0ed08120bcf88ef7ce05883be6ede571.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 Revisiting the Concept of “God-born” in the Testaments and The Manner of Confronting It بازخوانی پندار «خدازادگی» در عهدین و شیوۀ رویارویی با آن 147 162 29385 10.22108/coth.2025.141806.1906 FA ابوالفضل خوش‌منش دانشیار گروه علوم قرآن و حدیث، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران نوشین اله‌مرادی دانشجوی دکتری گروه علوم قرآن و حدیث، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0000-0001-9417-1617 Journal Article 2024 06 10 The word "God-born" meaning claiming or thinking of being the child of God and being from his generation can be seen in some of the ancient texts left over from different human civilizations, the Testaments and the Holy Quran. These records show the interests and attractions that have been continuously present in human thought. Humans have kept this idea alive every time with a new method. The present research has analyzed the concept of "God-born" and the explanation of the types of "God's Children" in the Testaments. In order to achieve this goal, first the background of this idea has been investigated, then the types of these divine children have been introduced, and finally, the way the Testaments faced them has been stated. The Bible has not shown a serious determination to violate and refute such an idea. Keywords: God-born, the Testaments, "God's Children". Introduction In the Bible, the one God is repeatedly spoken of, and God identifies Himself with attributes such as fulfilling covenants and destroying oppressors, based on which He is pleased with the justice and submission of servants to Himself and becomes angry with their oppression and disobedience. However, alongside this omnipotent and eternal God who is also a source of blessing, the names of some gods and “Godborn” figures appear in the text of the Torah and the Gospels. Regarding the background of this topic, no written text with the title of re-examining or analyzing the concept of “divine birth” was found. In a remotely related study, an article titled The Concept of ‘Children of God’ in the Bible and the Holy Quran (Tofighi, 2011, pp. 73-98) has mentioned verses in which the names of the children of God appear in the Holy Quran and a few translations of the Bible. Two articles titled The Idea of Attributing "Child" and "Birth" to God, and Criticizing its Accessories Based on the Verses of the Qur'an (Shokr et al., 2021) and The Holy Quran and the Alleged Children of God; A Discursive Analysis of the Marginalization of an Old Discourse (Farrahi, 2023) have examined the concept of the children of God and what relates to them in the Holy Quran present the difference between the Quran and the Old and New Testaments on this topic. This research aims to analyze the notion of “divine birth” in the Old and New Testaments and tries to explain the question of what method the Bible has adopted to confront such a notion and deal with God-born. Materials and Methods Relying on an analytical method based on gathering data and referring to library resources, the present study, in addition to finding types of “God-born” figures in the text of the Old and New Testaments, has addressed the background of this notion and stated the method of the Old and New Testaments in dealing with it. For this purpose, first, the historical background of divine birth was examined, and examples of it in ancient civilizations were presented in chronological order. Then, with reference to the text of the Old and New Testaments, the types of God-born figures were identified separately. Considering the belief of Christians that Jesus (AS) is the son of God, this notion was carefully examined. Then, the method that the Old and New Testaments used to face this notion was extracted from their verses. Considering that the Holy Quran also mentions god-born figures, after examining some verses, the divine guidance and educational goals and His method in this regard were determined. Accordingly, after stating the impotence of the gods, the Holy Quran explains the divinity and lordship of God and also provides strategies to deal with the false notion of divine birth, which is not addressed in this research. Research Findings After reviewing various sources, it has been determined that the concept of God having a son dates back to ancient ciilizations, including Mesopotamia, Greece, and Egypt. Divine families, composed of at least three members (father, mother, and child), are very prominent in their mythologies. In the Old Testament, while a mother goddess is not explicitly named, a diverse range of divine offspring are present. In the New Testament, the designation of “Son of God” is primarily associated with Jesus Christ, with this attribution expressed in various ways. It has also been found that the term “Son of God” was first applied to Christ at the Council of Nicaea (325 AD) and subsequently incorporated into Christian doctrine. According to the Gospels, God-born in Christianity holds a profound meaning, signifying the divinity of Jesus and the delegation of all divine authority to him. While the Quran also uses the phrase “Kalimat-u- Allah” (Word of God), it refers to the creation of a phenomenon to indicate God’s sacred essence and does not attribute divinity to a created being. In the four Gospels, no evidence was found to support the divinity of the Holy Spirit (considered the third person of the Trinity in Christianity and held as sacred). However, historical sources reveal traces of trinitarian concepts in ancient civilizations, from Sumer, Egypt, and India to Greece, each showing similarities to the Christian Trinity, though not entirely congruent. In the discussion of the Old and New Testaments’ confrontation with the idea of a divine offspring, the justificatory and reporting nature of the scriptures is evident. Discussion of Results and Conclusions The concept of “divine sonship” has appeared in various forms in people’s minds, prompting them to engage in discussions and actions that this limited research cannot fully explore. The belief in trinitarian gods was prevalent among the earliest human civilizations in the mythologies of Sumer, Babylon, and Assyria, and was abundantly represented in the cultures of Greece, Rome, and Egypt. When considering the nature of the Trinity in relation to Jesus (AS), it can be suggested that this belief derives from the teachings of Paul (a disciple of Christ), who was of Greek origin and a pagan before embracing Christianity. However, the texts of the Gospels ultimately indicate a dualistic interpretation. The research has shown that none of the believers in the Old and New Testaments accept a biological son (as commonly understood) for God. Instead, the title of the “sons of God” in the Old Testament is attributed to individuals with exceptional honor and respect or to the children of a servant in relation to their master. Although the title of “Son of God” is not exclusive to Jesus (AS) in the four Gospels, it does have the highest frequency in a single religious text among the world’s major faiths. Interpretations surrounding this claim reveal that most Christians intend to express the prophetic nature of Jesus, his intimate relationship with God, and a special state that grants divine blessings, which also extends to his followers. In the confrontation with this idea in ancient sacred texts, there is no evidence of opposition to divine offspring, and accounts of them are presented in the form of reports. This approach continues in both Testaments, particularly in the New Testament, where, aside from one instance prohibiting the worship of idols, no such expressions are used. ترکیب «خدازادگی» به معنای ادعا یا پندار فرزند خدا و از نسل او بودن (نه لزوماً با این لفظ) در برخی از متون کهنِ برجای‌مانده از تمدن‌های مختلف بشری و نیز در عهدین و قرآن کریم دیده می‌شود. این سوابق نشان از منافع و جذابیت‌هایی دارد که پیوسته در اندیشۀ بشر وجود داشته و وی برای جذب و جلب آنها به کارهایی مختلف دست یازیده و هر بار با روشی جدید این پندار را زنده نگه داشته است. پژوهش حاضر پندار «خدازادگی» و گونه‌های «خدازادگان» در عهدین را واکاوی و تبیین کرده است. برای دست‌یابی به این هدف، ابتدا پیشینۀ این پندار بررسی شده است و سپس گونه‌های این فرزندان الوهی معرفی شده‌اند و در نهایت شیوۀ مواجهۀ عهدین با آنها بیان شده است. از این بررسی به دست می‌آید که چگونه چنین تصوری ابتدا پدید آمده و سپس به‌تدریج در اذهان رسوب کرده است. همچنین، کتاب مقدس عزمی جدی برای نقض و ابطال چنین پنداری از خود نشان نداده است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29385_9a38a57688a6327baacb7b38d4dd9697.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 16 1 2025 05 22 Allah’s Infinite Existence from Ahl al-Bayt’s Perspective وجود نامحدود خدا از دیدگاه اهل بیت 163 182 29369 10.22108/coth.2025.143170.1941 FA روح‌الله سوری استادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکدۀ ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران. محمد شیروانی استادیار گروه معارف، دانشکدۀ الهیات و ادیان، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2024 10 25 Most Islamic thinkers consider Allah infinite. However, they differ in their interpretations of His infinitude, each attributing their perspective to Islam. Infinitude has various meanings, including numerical, extensive, intensive, and comprehensive infinity. Different schools of thought accept some of these meanings while rejecting others. But what is Islam’s perspective on this matter? The present study, employing a descriptive-analytical method, seeks to examine Ahl al-Bayt’s sayings regarding Allah’s infinite existence and to ascertain their perspective as the most eminent sages of their time. The key findings of this study are as follows: Ahl al-Bayt views Allah’s infinite existence as nearly self-evident and sees its denial as equivalent to denying Allah. They assert that finitude necessarily entails being created and that pure monotheism is founded upon divine infinitude. In addition, they have formulated a unique argument for Allah’s infinite existence, unparalleled in philosophical texts. Many of these points are also in Mulla Sadra’s ultimate philosophical outlook, highlighting the fundamental congruence between Sadrian mystical thought and Ahl al-Bayt’s perspective. Keywords: Allah’s Infinite Existence, Infinitude, the Negation of Limits, Indeterminacy, Ahl al-Bayt (AS). Introduction The Islamic tradition’s theologians, philosophers, and mystics consider divine existence infinite. Theologians regard only Allah’s actions as infinite, whereas philosophers extend this infinitude to His essence. Some philosophers, however, limit divine infinitude to the intensity (perfection) of His essence while confining His existential openness to a specific domain. Some others, following the mystics, consider His existential openness infinite; namely, His existence has no boundaries and encompasses all realms of being. Mulla Sadra, in particular, considers both His intensity and existential openness infinite and sees this as a foundation for the individual unity of existence. Each of these intellectual traditions attributes its interpretation to religious texts. But what do the leaders of Islam, namely Ahl al-Bayt (AS), say on this matter? Do they affirm Allah’s infinite existence? If so, do they extend this infinitude to His essence? And if they do, how do they conceptualize the infinity of the divine being? This study seeks to answer the above-mentioned questions. As far as the author knows, this study has no direct precedent. However, related studies include 1) comparisons between existential and quantitative infinitude, 2) investigations into the concept of infinity in Islamic theology and philosophy and its application to Allah, 3) discussions on Allah’s infinite existence based on the principle of basit al-haqiqa (Simple in Nature): its challenges and responses, and 4) misconceptions regarding infinity. The last of these studies presents a view contrary to the one proposed in this study, originating from the writings of theologians such as Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, ‘Aḍud al-Din al-Iji, and Sharif al-Jurjani. Allah’s infinite existence and the individual unity of existence are closely related. While the latter has received extensive scholarly attention, the former remains neglected. The scarcity of research on this topic underscores the need for further study. Moreover, none of the existing works examine divine infinitude from the perspective of Ahl al-Bayt, making the present study all the more necessary. The author has previously explored infinity based on mystics and transcendent philosophy. This study is dedicated exclusively to Ahl al-Bayt’s perspective. Given the complexity of this subject, a comprehensive examination of the philosophical, mystical, and theological dimensions of divine infinitude requires multiple studies rather than a single paper. Materials and Methods This study is foundational in its objective, aiming to uncover Islamic religious leaders’ views on Allah’s infinite existence. It adopts a problem-centered rather than text-centered approach, gathering data from religious texts and software and analyzing the information through a descriptive-analytical method. Among the hadith collections that record the sayings of the Ahl al-Bayt, two books—Tawhid al-Sadūq and the section on Tawhid in Usūl al-Kafi—stand out for their reliability in both content and chain of transmission, making them the primary focus of this study. The research proceeded in four stages: A line-by-line examination of Tawḥid al-Ṣadūq and the Tawḥid section of Uṣūl al-Kafi to collect relevant narrations, supplemented where necessary with hadiths from other sources; Categorization of the collected narrations into three groups: explanation, proof, and implications; Comparative analysis within each category, leading to a final synthesis of findings; A comparative evaluation of the Islamic doctrinal position with Mulla Sadra’s ultimate philosophical stance. Although this study primarily focuses on Ahl al-Bayt’s sayings, its approach is not narrative: their sayings are analyzed for their ontological significance rather than merely their religious sanctity. In other words, Ahl al-Bayt are regarded as the greatest sages of their time, and this study examines their philosophical perspective on Allah’s infinite existence. Research Findings In Ahl al-Bayt’s perspective, Allah’s infinitude is so self-evident that its denial amounts to His rejection, a misunderstanding of His nature, or an act of blasphemy. Several religious texts employ divine infinitude to negate deficiencies such as corporeality, spatial limitation, and being born. In logical reasoning, the middle term of a syllogism must be more evident and intelligible than the conclusion. Therefore, if Allah’s corporeality is untenable, His infinitude must be even more apparent. The clarity of Allah’s infinity is such that it sometimes forms the foundation of monotheism: reason testifies that every finite being is created. If Allah’s existence is infinite, there is no other being besides Him; if no other being exists, assuming a second god is impossible. This use of divine infinitude as proof of absolute monotheism represents a rigorous and refined theological argument. For Ahl al-Bayt, anything finite must be a creation, so Allah must be infinite. They affirm that divine infinitude is not exclusive to Islam; previous prophets also emphasized this point. One might ask: Given the abundance of textual evidence, why do some theologians continue to resist attributing infinitude to Allah’s existence? The answer lies in their attempt to avoid the requisite, i.e., individual unity of existence, by rejecting its prerequisite, Allah’s infinite existence. They argue that negating limits from Allah refers only to negating quantitative limitations. Since Allah is not corporeal, He has no quantity; thus, quantitative limitations do not apply to Him. This is akin to negating blindness from a wall, which does not imply that the wall can see. Being finite and infinite is treated as a privation (ʿadam) and acquisition (malakah), both of which can be negated in a subject that lacks the relevant attribute altogether. However, this response is flawed. Words are assigned to meanings in a conceptual sense, not to specific instances. The meaning of limit is finitude, but finitude takes on a meaning appropriate to each entity. Theologians have interpreted finite and infinite only in a quantitative sense and deemed their negation from an immaterial referent permissible. However, the term limit also has immaterial and existential meanings, which are contradictory and cannot be negated. Thus, Allah’s existence is either finite or infinite. Since finitude entails numerous invalid implications, Allah must be infinite. Discussion of Results and Conclusions Ahl al-Bayt (AS) regards the infinity of Allah’s existence as self-evident and considers its denial equivalent to denying Him. They also view infinite existence as the foundation of divine monotheism. The clarity of infinity has sometimes led to its use as a middle term to negate certain deficiencies attributed to Allah. They have also associated finitude with being created, excluding Him from finitude. Additionally, sayings emphasizing the indeterminacy, simplicity, and absolute purity of Allah’s existence, upon deeper reflection, also imply His infinity. The Ahl al-Bayt have proven Allah’s infinity through a unique argument not found in the works of other philosophers. They have also outlined its implications, such as the individual unity of existence, the negation of incarnation and interpenetration, the incomprehensibility of Allah’s essence, the reinterpretation of essential monotheism, and the transcendence of the divine essence over Allah’s name. Among the intellectual groups in the Islamic world, the mystical perspective of Mulla Sadra aligns most closely with Ahl al-Bayt’s views. Although this alignment is not absolute, minor inconsistencies do not detract from the overall harmony. بیشتر اندیشمندان اسلامی خداوند را نامحدود می‌شمارند؛ اما در تفسیر نامحدودبودن او اختلاف دارند و هر یک دیدگاه خود را به دین اسلام نیز نسبت می‌دهند. عدم تناهی معناهایی گوناگون مانند عِدّی، مُدّی، شِدّی و سِعی دارد که هر یک از گروه‌های فکری برخی را می‌پذیرند و برخی را نفی می‌کنند. به‌ راستی، دیدگاه اسلام در این باره چیست؟ پژوهش پیشرو با روش توصیفی ـ تحلیلی می‌کوشد سخنان اهل بیت (ع) را دربارۀ وجود نامحدود خدا بررسی کند و دیدگاه ایشان را، به‌ عنوان برترین حکیمان روزگار، به دست آورد. مهم‌ترین دستاوردهای پژوهش از این قرار است: اهل بیت (ع) وجود نامحدود خدا را قریب به بدیهی می‌دانند و انکار آن را به معنای انکار خداوند می‌شناسند. ایشان محدودبودن را ملازم با مخلوق‌‌بودن می‌دانند و توحید ناب را بر عدم تناهی استوار می‌کنند. همچنین، برهانی بر وجود نامحدود خدا برپا کرده‌اند که همانندی در متون فلسفی ندارد. بیشتر این نکته‌ها در نگاه نهایی ملاصدرا نیز دیده می‌شود که این نکته هم‌خوانی کلان نگاه عرفانی صدرا با دیدگاه اهل بیت (ع) را نشان می‌دهد.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29369_684691bcd288edde9cbb4dcd5d3e20cc.pdf