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<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Investigating the Nature of Orientalism from a Philosophical-Historical Point of View Based on the Relationship between Subject and Object</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Investigating the Nature of Orientalism from a Philosophical-Historical Point of View Based on the Relationship between Subject and Object</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>20</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28494</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.140309.1872</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
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<Author>
					<FirstName>Ghorban</FirstName>
					<LastName>Elmi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate professor, Department of Religions and Mysticism, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Alireza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Nahri</LastName>
<Affiliation>M.A. Student of Comparative Religions and Mysticism, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

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					<Year>2024</Year>
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		<Abstract>This article examined the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern thought, tracing its origins from the Renaissance period through the Enlightenment. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, it explored the philosophical foundations of Orientalism and the underlying principles it shared with modernity. The analysis revealed that the rise of the human subject in the modern era was accompanied by a shift in perspective. Pre-Renaissance religion and culture were approached with an &quot;objective understanding&quot; by the modern subject. This same subject then went on to apply an &quot;Orientalist understanding&quot; when engaging with non-Western cultures and belief systems. The nature of Orientalism could be located in this novel relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. The &quot;objective understanding&quot; embodied the Kantian epistemology, wherein the subject, relying solely on its own prior information and independent of any external or divine referent, did not recognize anything beyond itself. By subsuming objects within its own framework, the subject imposed its own understanding upon them. This process of objectification and imposition characterized the Orientalist worldview, which emerged as a core feature of modern thought. The article thus elucidated the deep historical linkages between the ascendance of the autonomous human subject, the principles of modernity, and the rise of Orientalist modes of understanding non-Western cultures and belief systems.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;em&gt;:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; Orientalism, Principles of Modernity, Subject, Object, Religion.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article investigated the nature of Orientalism as the outward-facing manifestation of modernity&#039;s engagement with non-Western religions and cultures. The essence of Orientalism is rooted in the particular relationship it establishes between the subject and the object of knowledge. In the current post-modern historical context, understanding the fundamental nature of Orientalism is a crucial first step towards moving beyond its limiting paradigm of objective research and inquiry. To this end, the article traced the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern philosophical thought, dating back to the Renaissance period. Despite the significance of this topic, there was a dearth of independent research specifically devoted to elucidating the essential character of Orientalism. This analysis aimed to fill that gap, providing a nuanced examination of how the rise of the autonomous modern subject gave rise to the Orientalist mode of engaging with non-Western civilizations and belief systems. By excavating the philosophical foundations underpinning Orientalism, the article lay the groundwork for a more critical and self-aware approach to the study of cultures and religions outside the Western ambit. This foundational understanding was a necessary precursor to transcending the limitations of the Orientalist epistemic framework.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article employed a descriptive-analytical-critical approach to examine and elucidate the philosophical and historical foundations of Orientalism. Particular emphasis was placed on the relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge, as well as Kant&#039;s critical perspective on this dynamic.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the most fundamental philosophical problems - the relationship between the mind and the object - underwent a profound transformation in the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. This shift in the subject-object dynamic gave rise to a new understanding of truth, the world, and all forms of existence.&lt;br /&gt;The most significant change in the subject-object relationship was encapsulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy, which he described as a &quot;Copernican revolution&quot; in philosophy. This issue lay at the very heart of modern culture. Modernity&#039;s engagement with the religious and cultural pasts of Europe and non-European civilizations was centered around this reconfigured subject-object dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;In Kantian epistemology, the understanding of the subject does not involve a direct apprehension of objects. Rather, the subject imposes its own a priori information and categories upon the objects it seeks to know. This type of knowledge, by its very nature, entails the domination and possession of those objects. In other words, it exemplifies the logic of &quot;objective understanding.&quot; It was through this Kantian framework of the subject-object relationship that the essential character of Orientalism could be grasped. The Orientalist worldview arose directly from the epistemic posture formulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Orientalism constructs and identifies cultures and religions as &quot;the Orient&quot; - ascribing an essential, reified quality to them. Through its scholarly endeavors, Orientalism effectively reshaped and repackaged the religions, cultures, and literatures of non-Western societies into a modernized, ostensibly &quot;objective&quot; form. Beyond simply collecting historical information about these non-Western civilizations, Orientalists also imparted upon them a particular mode of thinking and perceiving religion, the world, history, and culture. They encouraged non-Westerners to view their own pasts through a Western lens. In the context of this supposedly &quot;objective&quot; research, the religious, cultural, and historical truths of non-Western societies became subsumed under the Orientalist scholar&#039;s own frameworks of understanding. The essential nature and spiritual truths of these religions and cultures were effectively obscured and occluded. This dynamic was rooted in the philosophical principle encapsulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy - that the understanding of the subject could never directly apprehend objects as they truly were. Rather, the subject necessarily imposed its own a priori forms of cognition upon the object, effectively dissolving the object into the subject&#039;s own prior knowledge and conceptual categories. It was this Kantian epistemology that underpinned the Orientalist mode of engagement with non-Western religions and cultures. Orientalism, at its core, reflected the subject&#039;s inability to know the object outside of the forms and frameworks it projected upon that object. The truth and essence of the non-Western &quot;other&quot; became filtered through and distorted by the Orientalist subject&#039;s own preconceptions and intellectual dispositions.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">This article examined the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern thought, tracing its origins from the Renaissance period through the Enlightenment. Using a descriptive-analytical approach, it explored the philosophical foundations of Orientalism and the underlying principles it shared with modernity. The analysis revealed that the rise of the human subject in the modern era was accompanied by a shift in perspective. Pre-Renaissance religion and culture were approached with an &quot;objective understanding&quot; by the modern subject. This same subject then went on to apply an &quot;Orientalist understanding&quot; when engaging with non-Western cultures and belief systems. The nature of Orientalism could be located in this novel relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. The &quot;objective understanding&quot; embodied the Kantian epistemology, wherein the subject, relying solely on its own prior information and independent of any external or divine referent, did not recognize anything beyond itself. By subsuming objects within its own framework, the subject imposed its own understanding upon them. This process of objectification and imposition characterized the Orientalist worldview, which emerged as a core feature of modern thought. The article thus elucidated the deep historical linkages between the ascendance of the autonomous human subject, the principles of modernity, and the rise of Orientalist modes of understanding non-Western cultures and belief systems.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;em&gt;:&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; Orientalism, Principles of Modernity, Subject, Object, Religion.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article investigated the nature of Orientalism as the outward-facing manifestation of modernity&#039;s engagement with non-Western religions and cultures. The essence of Orientalism is rooted in the particular relationship it establishes between the subject and the object of knowledge. In the current post-modern historical context, understanding the fundamental nature of Orientalism is a crucial first step towards moving beyond its limiting paradigm of objective research and inquiry. To this end, the article traced the emergence of the human subject as the central focus of modern philosophical thought, dating back to the Renaissance period. Despite the significance of this topic, there was a dearth of independent research specifically devoted to elucidating the essential character of Orientalism. This analysis aimed to fill that gap, providing a nuanced examination of how the rise of the autonomous modern subject gave rise to the Orientalist mode of engaging with non-Western civilizations and belief systems. By excavating the philosophical foundations underpinning Orientalism, the article lay the groundwork for a more critical and self-aware approach to the study of cultures and religions outside the Western ambit. This foundational understanding was a necessary precursor to transcending the limitations of the Orientalist epistemic framework.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials &amp; Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This article employed a descriptive-analytical-critical approach to examine and elucidate the philosophical and historical foundations of Orientalism. Particular emphasis was placed on the relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge, as well as Kant&#039;s critical perspective on this dynamic.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;One of the most fundamental philosophical problems - the relationship between the mind and the object - underwent a profound transformation in the Renaissance and Enlightenment periods. This shift in the subject-object dynamic gave rise to a new understanding of truth, the world, and all forms of existence.&lt;br /&gt;The most significant change in the subject-object relationship was encapsulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy, which he described as a &quot;Copernican revolution&quot; in philosophy. This issue lay at the very heart of modern culture. Modernity&#039;s engagement with the religious and cultural pasts of Europe and non-European civilizations was centered around this reconfigured subject-object dynamic.&lt;br /&gt;In Kantian epistemology, the understanding of the subject does not involve a direct apprehension of objects. Rather, the subject imposes its own a priori information and categories upon the objects it seeks to know. This type of knowledge, by its very nature, entails the domination and possession of those objects. In other words, it exemplifies the logic of &quot;objective understanding.&quot; It was through this Kantian framework of the subject-object relationship that the essential character of Orientalism could be grasped. The Orientalist worldview arose directly from the epistemic posture formulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results &amp; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Orientalism constructs and identifies cultures and religions as &quot;the Orient&quot; - ascribing an essential, reified quality to them. Through its scholarly endeavors, Orientalism effectively reshaped and repackaged the religions, cultures, and literatures of non-Western societies into a modernized, ostensibly &quot;objective&quot; form. Beyond simply collecting historical information about these non-Western civilizations, Orientalists also imparted upon them a particular mode of thinking and perceiving religion, the world, history, and culture. They encouraged non-Westerners to view their own pasts through a Western lens. In the context of this supposedly &quot;objective&quot; research, the religious, cultural, and historical truths of non-Western societies became subsumed under the Orientalist scholar&#039;s own frameworks of understanding. The essential nature and spiritual truths of these religions and cultures were effectively obscured and occluded. This dynamic was rooted in the philosophical principle encapsulated in Kant&#039;s critical philosophy - that the understanding of the subject could never directly apprehend objects as they truly were. Rather, the subject necessarily imposed its own a priori forms of cognition upon the object, effectively dissolving the object into the subject&#039;s own prior knowledge and conceptual categories. It was this Kantian epistemology that underpinned the Orientalist mode of engagement with non-Western religions and cultures. Orientalism, at its core, reflected the subject&#039;s inability to know the object outside of the forms and frameworks it projected upon that object. The truth and essence of the non-Western &quot;other&quot; became filtered through and distorted by the Orientalist subject&#039;s own preconceptions and intellectual dispositions.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Historical Analysis and Adaptation of the Issue of Good and Evil in Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai Wisdom</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Historical Analysis and Adaptation of the Issue of Good and Evil in Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai Wisdom</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>21</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>44</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28604</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.139008.1848</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Somayeh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Karimi</LastName>
<Affiliation>M. A. Graduate of Mujtahedeh Higher Institute and MA in the Logic of Understanding Religion, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Ahl al-Beyt Faculty of Theology and Education, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Jafar</FirstName>
					<LastName>Shanazari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Ahl al-Beyt Faculty of Theology and Education, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>04</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sadra.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Good, Evil, Iranian Wisdom, Ishraqi Wisdom, Sadrai Wisdom (Philosophy of Sadra).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Knowing and studying the historical development of the periods of philosophy in the world will clarify the origin of thought in the history of Iranian wisdom among philosophers. What can be obtained from old works and contemporary Western researchers is that, before there was a philosophy in Greece, there existed a philosophy in the east of Iran, Babylon, Egypt, Lebanon, and the islands of Sicily, as Mulla Sadra wrote in &lt;em&gt;Risalah al-Haduth&lt;/em&gt;. He considers the origin of philosophy and wisdom from Adam and his children Seth, Hermes, Idris, and Noah and introduces Hermes as the father of the wise. Some scholars consider philosophy to be a historical miracle born in Greece, while Mulla Sadra believes that wisdom had no history in ancient Rome and Greece, and Prophet Ibrahim (Peace Be Upon Him), taught them the science of monotheism, and the sages of ancient Greece acquired philosophy from divine prophets. In the introduction of &lt;em&gt;Hikmat al-Ishraq&lt;/em&gt;, it is stated that you should not think that there is no wisdom because wisdom was before the predecessors and the world has never been free of wisdom and of people who have mastered wisdom. In addition, in the book &lt;em&gt;The Path of Wisdom in Iran and the World&lt;/em&gt; (Khamenei, 2010), &lt;em&gt;Advanced Greek Philosophy and Ancient Iran&lt;/em&gt; (Nikolaynalov, 2014), and &lt;em&gt;Iranian Wisdom and Transcendental Wisdom&lt;/em&gt; (Khamenei, 2018), there is documentation that Islamic wisdom is derived from the wisdom of ancient Iran, not Greece.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The comparative analytical method has a special place for analyzing theoretical problems, diagnosing, and solving scientific problems in the eyes of researchers. This method has two important pillars that should be considered throughout the comparative study: 1) Knowing the phenomenon or the point of view that is the goal of the comparative study; 2) Understanding and explaining the positions of disagreement and agreement between the matters to be compared and compared. In fact, this approach is a process that starts from the definition of the problem and has four stages of limiting the scope of adaptation, obtaining the maximum aspects of similarity and distinction, passing from apparent similarities and differences to real ones, and explaining them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It seems that the importance and influence of Iranian wisdom on the two wisdoms of Sadra and Ishragi cannot be ignored because according to some philosophical researchers, the lines of ancient Greek wisdom such as the wisdom of Plato, Plotinus, and Pythagoras can be seen, which has many similarities with the teachings and foundations of Zoroastrian philosophy in ancient Iran and the wisdom of Khosravani. In addition, the available reports prove that ancient Greek philosophers and Alexandrian scientists had communication and scientific interactions with the philosophers of Iran and India. This claim is stated in the introduction to the translation of Mullah Sadra&#039;s book &lt;em&gt;Mufatih al-Ghaib&lt;/em&gt;. In addition, in the book &lt;em&gt;Hekmat al-Ishraq&lt;/em&gt;, Sheikh Eshraq points out the secrets of Iranian wisdom that is the reason for the establishment of the rule of Eshraq based on light and darkness, and he considers it the method of Persian sages such as Jamasb and predecessors such as Kiyomarth, Tahmurth, Keikhosrow, and Zoroaster.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the description of good and evil in Iranian wisdom (Ishraqi and Sadrai), it can be said that the philosophy of creation is the same in Iranian and Islamic wisdom. In &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;, God is a light that is eternal, and Satan and evil are from darkness. This period is expressed in the same way in both Iranian wisdom and Islamic philosophy with a different language. In Islamic wisdom, God is the Almighty, and in Iranian wisdom, Ahura Mazda is the only creator. This creator has not created anything but goodness and beauty.&lt;br /&gt;The concept of good and evil in Iranian wisdom is interpreted as light and darkness. As Suhravardi considers light and darkness to be the basis of his philosophy. Sadr al-Mutalahin also recognizes the truth of human existence as light, which has levels of doubt, strength, weakness, perfection, and imperfection. Man&#039;s discretion in the existence and emergence of good and evil in the wisdom of Iranians is such that a wise man chooses good or bad by his own free will. Shaykh Ishraq has put forward human discretion through practical reason and control over human powers, and Mulla Sadra considers the need for balance and human development to be a good property in human existence, which provides the basis for human growth and development. It is achieved through theoretical and practical reasons. In Iranian wisdom, angels are immortal good spirits who oppose the demons. Sheikh Eshraq has also referred to the rule of Ashraf and the Lord of Kindness and has referred to the category of angels, their help and assistance. In Sadra&#039;s wisdom, the presence of angels and Satan play an important role in human happiness and error.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Accurate knowledge and correct analysis of the thoughts and opinions of Islamic sages are dependent on identifying the contexts and factors of the emergence of thoughts and their effectiveness from the wisdom of their predecessors. Anthropology is one of the wisdom heritages of ancient Iran, whose essence can be seen in the opinions of Muslim sages and their philosophy (Masha philosophy, Ishraq philosophy, and philosophy of Sadra). Therefore, the philosophical analysis of good and evil in the field of anthropology is based on the meaning of good and evil in the wisdom of ancient Iran, which was very important in order to confirm the truth of this statement. In the present study, the authors analyze and apply the philosophical foundations derived from good. There is evil in Iranian wisdom with Islamic wisdom. The result is proof of the existence of common philosophical points in the historical application of Iranian, Ishraqi, and Sadrai ruling bases. Commonalities include the commonality of the concept of good and evil (light and darkness), the existence of human agency and his free will in finding good and evil, and the fact that angels are examples of good and demons are examples of evil. This is complete proof of the historical course of the thought of good and evil in terms of ontology and epistemology from Iranian wisdom to Sadra.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Good, Evil, Iranian Wisdom, Ishraqi Wisdom, Sadrai Wisdom (Philosophy of Sadra).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Knowing and studying the historical development of the periods of philosophy in the world will clarify the origin of thought in the history of Iranian wisdom among philosophers. What can be obtained from old works and contemporary Western researchers is that, before there was a philosophy in Greece, there existed a philosophy in the east of Iran, Babylon, Egypt, Lebanon, and the islands of Sicily, as Mulla Sadra wrote in &lt;em&gt;Risalah al-Haduth&lt;/em&gt;. He considers the origin of philosophy and wisdom from Adam and his children Seth, Hermes, Idris, and Noah and introduces Hermes as the father of the wise. Some scholars consider philosophy to be a historical miracle born in Greece, while Mulla Sadra believes that wisdom had no history in ancient Rome and Greece, and Prophet Ibrahim (Peace Be Upon Him), taught them the science of monotheism, and the sages of ancient Greece acquired philosophy from divine prophets. In the introduction of &lt;em&gt;Hikmat al-Ishraq&lt;/em&gt;, it is stated that you should not think that there is no wisdom because wisdom was before the predecessors and the world has never been free of wisdom and of people who have mastered wisdom. In addition, in the book &lt;em&gt;The Path of Wisdom in Iran and the World&lt;/em&gt; (Khamenei, 2010), &lt;em&gt;Advanced Greek Philosophy and Ancient Iran&lt;/em&gt; (Nikolaynalov, 2014), and &lt;em&gt;Iranian Wisdom and Transcendental Wisdom&lt;/em&gt; (Khamenei, 2018), there is documentation that Islamic wisdom is derived from the wisdom of ancient Iran, not Greece.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The comparative analytical method has a special place for analyzing theoretical problems, diagnosing, and solving scientific problems in the eyes of researchers. This method has two important pillars that should be considered throughout the comparative study: 1) Knowing the phenomenon or the point of view that is the goal of the comparative study; 2) Understanding and explaining the positions of disagreement and agreement between the matters to be compared and compared. In fact, this approach is a process that starts from the definition of the problem and has four stages of limiting the scope of adaptation, obtaining the maximum aspects of similarity and distinction, passing from apparent similarities and differences to real ones, and explaining them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It seems that the importance and influence of Iranian wisdom on the two wisdoms of Sadra and Ishragi cannot be ignored because according to some philosophical researchers, the lines of ancient Greek wisdom such as the wisdom of Plato, Plotinus, and Pythagoras can be seen, which has many similarities with the teachings and foundations of Zoroastrian philosophy in ancient Iran and the wisdom of Khosravani. In addition, the available reports prove that ancient Greek philosophers and Alexandrian scientists had communication and scientific interactions with the philosophers of Iran and India. This claim is stated in the introduction to the translation of Mullah Sadra&#039;s book &lt;em&gt;Mufatih al-Ghaib&lt;/em&gt;. In addition, in the book &lt;em&gt;Hekmat al-Ishraq&lt;/em&gt;, Sheikh Eshraq points out the secrets of Iranian wisdom that is the reason for the establishment of the rule of Eshraq based on light and darkness, and he considers it the method of Persian sages such as Jamasb and predecessors such as Kiyomarth, Tahmurth, Keikhosrow, and Zoroaster.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the description of good and evil in Iranian wisdom (Ishraqi and Sadrai), it can be said that the philosophy of creation is the same in Iranian and Islamic wisdom. In &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;, God is a light that is eternal, and Satan and evil are from darkness. This period is expressed in the same way in both Iranian wisdom and Islamic philosophy with a different language. In Islamic wisdom, God is the Almighty, and in Iranian wisdom, Ahura Mazda is the only creator. This creator has not created anything but goodness and beauty.&lt;br /&gt;The concept of good and evil in Iranian wisdom is interpreted as light and darkness. As Suhravardi considers light and darkness to be the basis of his philosophy. Sadr al-Mutalahin also recognizes the truth of human existence as light, which has levels of doubt, strength, weakness, perfection, and imperfection. Man&#039;s discretion in the existence and emergence of good and evil in the wisdom of Iranians is such that a wise man chooses good or bad by his own free will. Shaykh Ishraq has put forward human discretion through practical reason and control over human powers, and Mulla Sadra considers the need for balance and human development to be a good property in human existence, which provides the basis for human growth and development. It is achieved through theoretical and practical reasons. In Iranian wisdom, angels are immortal good spirits who oppose the demons. Sheikh Eshraq has also referred to the rule of Ashraf and the Lord of Kindness and has referred to the category of angels, their help and assistance. In Sadra&#039;s wisdom, the presence of angels and Satan play an important role in human happiness and error.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Term ‘Ebda’ in the Comparative View of Fakhr Razi and Allameh Tabatabai</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Term ‘Ebda’ in the Comparative View of Fakhr Razi and Allameh Tabatabai</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>45</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>60</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28484</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.137633.1832</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad</FirstName>
					<LastName>Bahrami</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of Quran and Social Studies, Institute of Civilized Islam, Islamic Sciences and Culture Academy, Qom, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>02</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The term Ebda (innovation) as one of God’s attributes has attracted the attention of a group of philosophers, theologians, and Quranic commentators, while others have shown less interest in it. Among the Quranic commentators, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Allameh Tabatabai have given special attention to the term Ebda, considering it one of God’s actual attributes and deeming its application to contingent beings incorrect. They identify creation, lack of precedent, timelessness, placelessness, and instantaneous realization as components of Ebda. They do not view Ebda as merely a term and provide rational and narrative reasons to prove its instantaneous nature. Allameh and Fakhr Razi differ in their views on the distinction between Ebda and creation (Khalg), Ebda and origination (Ijad), and Ebda and invention (Ekhtera). The main objective of this research is to uncover Fakhr Razi and Allameh’s perspectives on the term Ebda and their differences and similarities. The aim of this study is to compare their views on the term Ebda and to pave the way for organizing Imami and Ashari terminology based on conceptual relationships, facilitating transfer and education, simplifying translation, indexing, and categorizing God’s attributes. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical method and a library-based approach. In this method, the term Ebda is explained, its similarities and differences with other terms are examined, and its components are stated.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Fakhr Razi, Allameh Tabatabai, Innovation (Ebda), Invention (Ekhtera), Creation (Khalg), Development.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In human knowledge, certain terms acquire specialized meanings, forming a system of concepts. Theology and philosophy, like other sciences, contain a set of terms intertwined with their understanding. The ambiguity in understanding one side leads to ambiguity in the other, complicating the compilation, dissemination, translation, summarization, storage, and organization of theological and philosophical texts.&lt;br /&gt;Ebda is a Quranic and narrative term rooted in Bada and appears in various forms in &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt; and Hadith. The use of the term Ebda and its derivatives in the verses of revelation and narrations has necessitated a terminology of Ebda by some commentators, philosophers, and theologians. Some offer a broad definition with several conditions for Ebda, while others provide a minimal definition, identifying the lack of precedent as its sole criterion. Some see Ebda as approximately synonymous with creation, formation, invention, etc., while others do not accept this equivalence. Fakhr Razi and Allameh Tabatabai have pursued the terminology of Ebda and integrated philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives. This research examines their views on Ebda, highlighting their similarities and differences, and identifies shortcomings in each of their approaches.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical and library-based. This study explains the term Ebda, examines its similarities and differences with other approximate synonyms and presents the characteristics of Ebda. The research aims to explore Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi’s perspectives on the term Ebda in light of their philosophical, theological, and exegetical works.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The findings of this research are summarized as follows:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Evidence Utilization:&lt;/strong&gt; Allameh Tabatabai uses both rational and narrative evidence to support the concept of Ebda, while Fakhr al-Din al-Razi mainly relies on Quranic verses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Scope of Ebda:&lt;/strong&gt; Allameh Tabatabai believes that all creations, including human actions and relationships between objects, are forms of Ebda. He holds that all beings are Badi (created without precedent), whereas Fakhr Razi emphasizes the non-material aspects of entities.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Attributes and Will:&lt;/strong&gt; Both Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi agree that Ebda depends on God’s will, but they differ on whether Ebda pertains exclusively to non-material entities or includes all creation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Theological and Philosophical Synthesis:&lt;/strong&gt; Despite methodological differences, both scholars significantly contribute to the theological and philosophical understanding of Ebda, bridging gaps between philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study investigates the perspectives of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Allameh Tabatabai on the term Ebda. The research questions focus on identifying their views on the concept, examining the similarities and differences, and understanding the implications of these perspectives in theological and philosophical contexts. The hypotheses suggest that both scholars see Ebda as a unique attribute of God, distinct from other forms of creation.&lt;br /&gt;The findings confirm that both al-Razi and Tabatabai consider Ebda an act of God without precedent, supported by rational and scriptural evidence. However, they diverge in their methodologies: al-Razi predominantly uses Quranic verses, while Tabatabai incorporates both rational and scriptural proofs. Additionally, while al-Razi emphasizes the non-material aspects of creation, Tabatabai extends Ebda to all creations, including human actions.&lt;br /&gt;The study reveals a shared understanding of Ebda as dependent on God’s will, reflecting a common theological stance. Despite methodological differences, both scholars significantly contribute to the theological and philosophical understanding of Ebda, aiding in bridging gaps between various schools of thought.&lt;br /&gt;In conclusion, the research highlights the need for a systematic approach to categorizing and interpreting divine attributes, emphasizing the importance of integrating philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives to enhance the comprehension and teaching of Islamic theology.&lt;br /&gt; </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The term Ebda (innovation) as one of God’s attributes has attracted the attention of a group of philosophers, theologians, and Quranic commentators, while others have shown less interest in it. Among the Quranic commentators, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Allameh Tabatabai have given special attention to the term Ebda, considering it one of God’s actual attributes and deeming its application to contingent beings incorrect. They identify creation, lack of precedent, timelessness, placelessness, and instantaneous realization as components of Ebda. They do not view Ebda as merely a term and provide rational and narrative reasons to prove its instantaneous nature. Allameh and Fakhr Razi differ in their views on the distinction between Ebda and creation (Khalg), Ebda and origination (Ijad), and Ebda and invention (Ekhtera). The main objective of this research is to uncover Fakhr Razi and Allameh’s perspectives on the term Ebda and their differences and similarities. The aim of this study is to compare their views on the term Ebda and to pave the way for organizing Imami and Ashari terminology based on conceptual relationships, facilitating transfer and education, simplifying translation, indexing, and categorizing God’s attributes. This study adopts a descriptive-analytical method and a library-based approach. In this method, the term Ebda is explained, its similarities and differences with other terms are examined, and its components are stated.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Fakhr Razi, Allameh Tabatabai, Innovation (Ebda), Invention (Ekhtera), Creation (Khalg), Development.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In human knowledge, certain terms acquire specialized meanings, forming a system of concepts. Theology and philosophy, like other sciences, contain a set of terms intertwined with their understanding. The ambiguity in understanding one side leads to ambiguity in the other, complicating the compilation, dissemination, translation, summarization, storage, and organization of theological and philosophical texts.&lt;br /&gt;Ebda is a Quranic and narrative term rooted in Bada and appears in various forms in &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt; and Hadith. The use of the term Ebda and its derivatives in the verses of revelation and narrations has necessitated a terminology of Ebda by some commentators, philosophers, and theologians. Some offer a broad definition with several conditions for Ebda, while others provide a minimal definition, identifying the lack of precedent as its sole criterion. Some see Ebda as approximately synonymous with creation, formation, invention, etc., while others do not accept this equivalence. Fakhr Razi and Allameh Tabatabai have pursued the terminology of Ebda and integrated philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives. This research examines their views on Ebda, highlighting their similarities and differences, and identifies shortcomings in each of their approaches.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The methodology of this research is descriptive-analytical and library-based. This study explains the term Ebda, examines its similarities and differences with other approximate synonyms and presents the characteristics of Ebda. The research aims to explore Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi’s perspectives on the term Ebda in light of their philosophical, theological, and exegetical works.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The findings of this research are summarized as follows:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Evidence Utilization:&lt;/strong&gt; Allameh Tabatabai uses both rational and narrative evidence to support the concept of Ebda, while Fakhr al-Din al-Razi mainly relies on Quranic verses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Scope of Ebda:&lt;/strong&gt; Allameh Tabatabai believes that all creations, including human actions and relationships between objects, are forms of Ebda. He holds that all beings are Badi (created without precedent), whereas Fakhr Razi emphasizes the non-material aspects of entities.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Attributes and Will:&lt;/strong&gt; Both Allameh Tabatabai and Fakhr Razi agree that Ebda depends on God’s will, but they differ on whether Ebda pertains exclusively to non-material entities or includes all creation.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Theological and Philosophical Synthesis:&lt;/strong&gt; Despite methodological differences, both scholars significantly contribute to the theological and philosophical understanding of Ebda, bridging gaps between philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study investigates the perspectives of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and Allameh Tabatabai on the term Ebda. The research questions focus on identifying their views on the concept, examining the similarities and differences, and understanding the implications of these perspectives in theological and philosophical contexts. The hypotheses suggest that both scholars see Ebda as a unique attribute of God, distinct from other forms of creation.&lt;br /&gt;The findings confirm that both al-Razi and Tabatabai consider Ebda an act of God without precedent, supported by rational and scriptural evidence. However, they diverge in their methodologies: al-Razi predominantly uses Quranic verses, while Tabatabai incorporates both rational and scriptural proofs. Additionally, while al-Razi emphasizes the non-material aspects of creation, Tabatabai extends Ebda to all creations, including human actions.&lt;br /&gt;The study reveals a shared understanding of Ebda as dependent on God’s will, reflecting a common theological stance. Despite methodological differences, both scholars significantly contribute to the theological and philosophical understanding of Ebda, aiding in bridging gaps between various schools of thought.&lt;br /&gt;In conclusion, the research highlights the need for a systematic approach to categorizing and interpreting divine attributes, emphasizing the importance of integrating philosophical, theological, and exegetical perspectives to enhance the comprehension and teaching of Islamic theology.&lt;br /&gt; </OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Fakhr Razi</Param>
			</Object>
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			<Param Name="value">Allameh Tabatabai</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Innovation (Ebda)</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Invention (Ekhtera)</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Creation (Khalg)</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Development</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Anthropology of Fear of God Based on Allameh Tabatabai's Perspective: A Psychological Approach</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Anthropology of Fear of God Based on Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s Perspective: A Psychological Approach</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>61</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>76</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28469</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.138860.1844</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mahmood</FirstName>
					<LastName>Khaliliyan Shalamzari</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of Clinical Psychology, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0004-9222-5545</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>07</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The difference in researchers’ attitudes towards human nature is not only the background and foundation of describing and explaining personality traits but also a platform for identifying and introducing new emotional states in humans. The purpose of this study is to identify the features of anthropology from Allameh Tabatabai’s point of view on the emergence of fear of God. The research method is qualitative. The qualitative analysis of the content of religious texts with a focus on description, explanation, and analysis has been used. The findings of the research showed that fear of God is a normal issue. In addition, fear of God has two types, fear in balance with hope and fear of divine position. Moreover, the phenomenon of fear of God is based on four characteristics in humans: 1) purposefulness, 2) the existential characteristics of man, 3) man with the motivation to avoid harm, and 4) the levels of man&#039;s knowledge of monotheism. The results showed that the origin of fear of God is not only external natural factors (such as lightning); rather, it is dependent on some characteristics of the disabled nature of the human being, the principle of orientation, and the lack of independence of an individual.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Fear of God, Purposefulness of Man, Existential Weakness, Motivation to Avoid Harm, Allameh Tabatabai.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In psychology, fear is an avoidance reaction combined with the motivation of protection. Some psychologists (e.g. Freud, 1983) and philosophers (e.g. Russell, 1970) believe that external natural factors (such as thunder and lightning) are the main cause of fear in humans. They introduce fear as a factor in turning to God. On the contrary, in Allameh Tabatabai’s view, the origin of fear is within man. Man is the effect of God and God, as a true being, is the cause of the causes of other beings.&lt;br /&gt;Since the type of philosophical attitude towards human quiddity is the basis for explaining human personality and psychological states (Parvin and John, 2002), considering the difference in the views of Allameh Tabatabai and some Western psychologists and thinkers regarding the origin of fear (the inner essence of man or external natural factors), as well as the difference in the ontological system of Allameh in the analysis of the phenomenon of fear (the real God versus the God created by the mind), the purpose of this study is to explain the anthropology of fear of God based on Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s point of view. The meaning of fear of God is a person&#039;s concern about the threat of the goal, which strengthens the motivation of the person to achieve the goal and prevents him from committing and being close to the source of the threat (Khaliliyan Shalmazari et al., 2018). Therefore, this study seeks to answer the following research question:&lt;br /&gt;RQ1: In Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s view, which human characteristics are the origin of fear of God?&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The research method is qualitative with the aim of investigating the anthropological features of fear of God from Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s viewpoint. For this purpose, the method of qualitative content analysis of religious texts, focusing on description, explanation, and analysis was used. Based on this, first, the divisions of fear of God were presented from Allameh Tabatabai’s viewpoint. In addition, deeper explanations and analyses of the text were made, focusing on the direction of discovering anthropological features. Then, by identifying the materials related to the anthropology of fear of God, more explanations were presented so that the features of his anthropology can be discovered and analyzed through their connection with the phenomenon of fear of God in humans.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Divisions of Fear from the Perspective of Allameh Tabatabaei&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In Allameh Tabatabai’s perspective, fear is divided into two types: jobn fear [abnormal and morbid fear] and hazm fear [normal and non-morbid fear] (Tabatabaei, 1995, p. 322-323). According to Allameh Tabatabai, absolute fear is not a morbid emotion; rather, it is considered an illness when it leads to the loss of nafs [weakness of will] and has three characteristics: 1) creating a state of confusion in a person, 2) moaning (alfaza), and 3) decreasing the ability to deal with the source of fear (Tabatabai, 1995, p. 321).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Anthropological characteristics of fear of God&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In Allama Tabatabaei’s thought, the emergence of fear of God in humans is based on four characteristics: 1) purposefulness, 2) existential characteristics of humans (dependency and connectedness of humans), 3) motivated human beings to repel harm, and 4) levels of human knowledge of monotheism.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To Allameh Tabatabai, a human is not only a needy being but also a purposeful being. The analysis of behaviors and emotional traits in the thought of Tabatabai is based on the principle of directionality. Although this finding is in line with the positivist psychology perspective on meaning and purpose; however, the focus on transcendental goals versus individual goals is the distinguishing aspect of Allameh Tabatabai’s view. In the phenomenon of fear of God, attaining divine proximity and the benefits of the afterlife is a goal that directs all behaviors towards itself, which is beyond individual goals and basic needs in psychology.&lt;br /&gt;The understanding of poverty and need arises from the weakness of human existence in the face of the Creator and the cause of existence reminds us of the dependence and continuity of humans in connection to God. Based on this, unlike Freud and Russell, the origin of fear of God is not only external natural factors, it is the characteristic of human dependence and connection with God.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The difference in researchers’ attitudes towards human nature is not only the background and foundation of describing and explaining personality traits but also a platform for identifying and introducing new emotional states in humans. The purpose of this study is to identify the features of anthropology from Allameh Tabatabai’s point of view on the emergence of fear of God. The research method is qualitative. The qualitative analysis of the content of religious texts with a focus on description, explanation, and analysis has been used. The findings of the research showed that fear of God is a normal issue. In addition, fear of God has two types, fear in balance with hope and fear of divine position. Moreover, the phenomenon of fear of God is based on four characteristics in humans: 1) purposefulness, 2) the existential characteristics of man, 3) man with the motivation to avoid harm, and 4) the levels of man&#039;s knowledge of monotheism. The results showed that the origin of fear of God is not only external natural factors (such as lightning); rather, it is dependent on some characteristics of the disabled nature of the human being, the principle of orientation, and the lack of independence of an individual.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Fear of God, Purposefulness of Man, Existential Weakness, Motivation to Avoid Harm, Allameh Tabatabai.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In psychology, fear is an avoidance reaction combined with the motivation of protection. Some psychologists (e.g. Freud, 1983) and philosophers (e.g. Russell, 1970) believe that external natural factors (such as thunder and lightning) are the main cause of fear in humans. They introduce fear as a factor in turning to God. On the contrary, in Allameh Tabatabai’s view, the origin of fear is within man. Man is the effect of God and God, as a true being, is the cause of the causes of other beings.&lt;br /&gt;Since the type of philosophical attitude towards human quiddity is the basis for explaining human personality and psychological states (Parvin and John, 2002), considering the difference in the views of Allameh Tabatabai and some Western psychologists and thinkers regarding the origin of fear (the inner essence of man or external natural factors), as well as the difference in the ontological system of Allameh in the analysis of the phenomenon of fear (the real God versus the God created by the mind), the purpose of this study is to explain the anthropology of fear of God based on Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s point of view. The meaning of fear of God is a person&#039;s concern about the threat of the goal, which strengthens the motivation of the person to achieve the goal and prevents him from committing and being close to the source of the threat (Khaliliyan Shalmazari et al., 2018). Therefore, this study seeks to answer the following research question:&lt;br /&gt;RQ1: In Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s view, which human characteristics are the origin of fear of God?&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The research method is qualitative with the aim of investigating the anthropological features of fear of God from Allameh Tabatabai&#039;s viewpoint. For this purpose, the method of qualitative content analysis of religious texts, focusing on description, explanation, and analysis was used. Based on this, first, the divisions of fear of God were presented from Allameh Tabatabai’s viewpoint. In addition, deeper explanations and analyses of the text were made, focusing on the direction of discovering anthropological features. Then, by identifying the materials related to the anthropology of fear of God, more explanations were presented so that the features of his anthropology can be discovered and analyzed through their connection with the phenomenon of fear of God in humans.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Divisions of Fear from the Perspective of Allameh Tabatabaei&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In Allameh Tabatabai’s perspective, fear is divided into two types: jobn fear [abnormal and morbid fear] and hazm fear [normal and non-morbid fear] (Tabatabaei, 1995, p. 322-323). According to Allameh Tabatabai, absolute fear is not a morbid emotion; rather, it is considered an illness when it leads to the loss of nafs [weakness of will] and has three characteristics: 1) creating a state of confusion in a person, 2) moaning (alfaza), and 3) decreasing the ability to deal with the source of fear (Tabatabai, 1995, p. 321).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Anthropological characteristics of fear of God&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In Allama Tabatabaei’s thought, the emergence of fear of God in humans is based on four characteristics: 1) purposefulness, 2) existential characteristics of humans (dependency and connectedness of humans), 3) motivated human beings to repel harm, and 4) levels of human knowledge of monotheism.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To Allameh Tabatabai, a human is not only a needy being but also a purposeful being. The analysis of behaviors and emotional traits in the thought of Tabatabai is based on the principle of directionality. Although this finding is in line with the positivist psychology perspective on meaning and purpose; however, the focus on transcendental goals versus individual goals is the distinguishing aspect of Allameh Tabatabai’s view. In the phenomenon of fear of God, attaining divine proximity and the benefits of the afterlife is a goal that directs all behaviors towards itself, which is beyond individual goals and basic needs in psychology.&lt;br /&gt;The understanding of poverty and need arises from the weakness of human existence in the face of the Creator and the cause of existence reminds us of the dependence and continuity of humans in connection to God. Based on this, unlike Freud and Russell, the origin of fear of God is not only external natural factors, it is the characteristic of human dependence and connection with God.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">Fear of God</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">purposefulness of man</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">existential weakness</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">motivation to avoid harm</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Allameh Tabatabai</Param>
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</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Proving the Innocence of Prophet Noah in Facing His Son Based on the Appearances of the Verses with a Critique on the Theory of Allameh Tabatabai</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Proving the Innocence of Prophet Noah in Facing His Son Based on the Appearances of the Verses with a Critique on the Theory of Allameh Tabatabai</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>77</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>94</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28464</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.134823.1743</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad</FirstName>
					<LastName>Daneshnahad</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Yasuj University, Yasuj, Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0009-0009-0009</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Mohammad Hasan</FirstName>
					<LastName>Vakili</LastName>
<Affiliation>Professor, Department of Theology and Wisdom, the Institute for Strategic Studies of Islamic Sciences and Education, Mashhad,  Mashhad, Iran.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>08</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>One of the doubts about Noah&#039;s innocence is how this Holy Prophet asked to save his child, while God Almighty had previously forbidden him from such a request. Doesn’t such a request contradict the innocence of Prophet Noah, while he knew that his son was a disbeliever? Doesn&#039;t paying attention to relative relationships even in the case of disbelief contrast with the innocence of Prophet Noah? This research, with the method of collecting data, analyzing them, and comparing opinions aims to prove the innocence of Prophet Noah based on the appearances of the verses. In order to defend the innocence of Prophet Noah, Tabatabai as a religious scientist has given interpretations in this regard, including that Prophet Noah did not protest at all, while this is inconsistent with the appearances of the verses, and as long as the appearances of verses do not have any intellectual or narrative problems, it is necessary to rely on the authenticity of appearances.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords: &lt;/strong&gt;Prophet Noah, Scientific and Practical Innocence, Polytheism, Asking for Forgiveness, Tabatabai.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; One of the basic doubts about Noah&#039;s innocence is his conversation with God Almighty regarding his son. Asking for the salvation of his child if he is a disbeliever is not compatible with the dignity of prophethood. The Holy Prophet should not seek the salvation of an unbeliever, even if that person is one of his children. Based on this, how can Noah&#039;s infallibility be summed up with his request to save his child? In order to answer this question, some scientists like Tabatabai tried to prove Noah&#039;s innocence by interpreting the verses, while the authors of this study believe that it is possible to prove Noah’s innocence based on the appearances of the verses without the need for misinterpretation. Interpretation is acceptable when the appearances of the verses are inconsistent with definite rational and narrative proofs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The method of this research is based on collecting data, analyzing them, and comparing the opinions of experts with the aim of proving the innocence of Prophet Noah based on the appearances of the verses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The results of the present study showed that:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;People, during the life span of Noah’s prophethood, in terms of internal characteristics, were afflicted with disbelief, disobedience, sin, misguidance, and cruelty. In terms of external characteristics, they considered Noah to be clearly misguided and insane; they denied and ridiculed him and did not value God Almighty.&lt;br /&gt;The son of Noah, based on the talks of Prophet Noah, had a relationship with unbelieving people, and therefore all their attributes can be transmitted to him, Prophet Noah knew about his son&#039;s disbelief, and based on the appearances of the verses, this cannot be denied.&lt;br /&gt;The selected theory about Noah&#039;s infallibility is based on the fact that Noah tried to save his son due to his unparalleled patience and God&#039;s promise to save his family, and what he did not know about was not his son&#039;s disbelief but not being saved and not being a believer. Such a lack of knowledge does not affect his innocence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the characteristics mentioned for Noah&#039;s people in &lt;em&gt;the Holy Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;, accompanying Noah&#039;s son with such a people that is expressed by Noah, and in addition to this, the answer that the son of Noah gives to Noah, it can be concluded that Prophet Noah was aware of his son&#039;s disbelief. But due to his tolerance and high existence from a position and God&#039;s promise to save his family from divine punishment, this false impression arose for Prophet Noah that his son would be one of the saved, while such an idea was incorrect. This misconception does not cause any disturbance to the infallibility of Prophet Noah, because this notion did not cause Noah to leave the path of worship and monotheism, but based on divine zeal and high tolerance, he sought to save his son in such a way that he first became a Muslim who may be saved from God&#039;s punishment. Otherwise, the dignity of this prophet is higher than a man who only considers relative relationships without considering faith and disbelief and prefers the life of his unbelieving child over other people. In addition, if there was such a view, he would never have publicly asked the Almighty God to destroy all the infidels only because of his unparalleled patience that he makes such a request from Almighty God. As we can see from the requests of Prophet Ibrahim towards his uncle and from the Holy Prophet towards some infidels, we can interpret Noah&#039;s request in this direction. Such requests are only due to the firm determination and existence capacity of these prophets who have sought to attract the maximum number of people to the path of monotheism.&lt;br /&gt; </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">One of the doubts about Noah&#039;s innocence is how this Holy Prophet asked to save his child, while God Almighty had previously forbidden him from such a request. Doesn’t such a request contradict the innocence of Prophet Noah, while he knew that his son was a disbeliever? Doesn&#039;t paying attention to relative relationships even in the case of disbelief contrast with the innocence of Prophet Noah? This research, with the method of collecting data, analyzing them, and comparing opinions aims to prove the innocence of Prophet Noah based on the appearances of the verses. In order to defend the innocence of Prophet Noah, Tabatabai as a religious scientist has given interpretations in this regard, including that Prophet Noah did not protest at all, while this is inconsistent with the appearances of the verses, and as long as the appearances of verses do not have any intellectual or narrative problems, it is necessary to rely on the authenticity of appearances.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords: &lt;/strong&gt;Prophet Noah, Scientific and Practical Innocence, Polytheism, Asking for Forgiveness, Tabatabai.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; One of the basic doubts about Noah&#039;s innocence is his conversation with God Almighty regarding his son. Asking for the salvation of his child if he is a disbeliever is not compatible with the dignity of prophethood. The Holy Prophet should not seek the salvation of an unbeliever, even if that person is one of his children. Based on this, how can Noah&#039;s infallibility be summed up with his request to save his child? In order to answer this question, some scientists like Tabatabai tried to prove Noah&#039;s innocence by interpreting the verses, while the authors of this study believe that it is possible to prove Noah’s innocence based on the appearances of the verses without the need for misinterpretation. Interpretation is acceptable when the appearances of the verses are inconsistent with definite rational and narrative proofs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt; The method of this research is based on collecting data, analyzing them, and comparing the opinions of experts with the aim of proving the innocence of Prophet Noah based on the appearances of the verses.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The results of the present study showed that:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;People, during the life span of Noah’s prophethood, in terms of internal characteristics, were afflicted with disbelief, disobedience, sin, misguidance, and cruelty. In terms of external characteristics, they considered Noah to be clearly misguided and insane; they denied and ridiculed him and did not value God Almighty.&lt;br /&gt;The son of Noah, based on the talks of Prophet Noah, had a relationship with unbelieving people, and therefore all their attributes can be transmitted to him, Prophet Noah knew about his son&#039;s disbelief, and based on the appearances of the verses, this cannot be denied.&lt;br /&gt;The selected theory about Noah&#039;s infallibility is based on the fact that Noah tried to save his son due to his unparalleled patience and God&#039;s promise to save his family, and what he did not know about was not his son&#039;s disbelief but not being saved and not being a believer. Such a lack of knowledge does not affect his innocence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;According to the characteristics mentioned for Noah&#039;s people in &lt;em&gt;the Holy Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;, accompanying Noah&#039;s son with such a people that is expressed by Noah, and in addition to this, the answer that the son of Noah gives to Noah, it can be concluded that Prophet Noah was aware of his son&#039;s disbelief. But due to his tolerance and high existence from a position and God&#039;s promise to save his family from divine punishment, this false impression arose for Prophet Noah that his son would be one of the saved, while such an idea was incorrect. This misconception does not cause any disturbance to the infallibility of Prophet Noah, because this notion did not cause Noah to leave the path of worship and monotheism, but based on divine zeal and high tolerance, he sought to save his son in such a way that he first became a Muslim who may be saved from God&#039;s punishment. Otherwise, the dignity of this prophet is higher than a man who only considers relative relationships without considering faith and disbelief and prefers the life of his unbelieving child over other people. In addition, if there was such a view, he would never have publicly asked the Almighty God to destroy all the infidels only because of his unparalleled patience that he makes such a request from Almighty God. As we can see from the requests of Prophet Ibrahim towards his uncle and from the Holy Prophet towards some infidels, we can interpret Noah&#039;s request in this direction. Such requests are only due to the firm determination and existence capacity of these prophets who have sought to attract the maximum number of people to the path of monotheism.&lt;br /&gt; </OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Prophet Noah</Param>
			</Object>
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			<Param Name="value">Scientific and Practical Innocence</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">polytheism</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Asking for Forgiveness</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">Tabatabai</Param>
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</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Analyzing Expressions of the Design Argument and Answering Doubts Attributed to it Based on the Type of Logical Reasoning</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Analyzing Expressions of the Design Argument and Answering Doubts Attributed to it Based on the Type of Logical Reasoning</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>95</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>112</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28689</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.141952.1912</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Shokoh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Monazzam</LastName>
<Affiliation>Ph. D. Student of Islamic Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Tabriz University, Tabriz, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Abbas</FirstName>
					<LastName>Abbaszadeh</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Tabriz University, Tabriz, Iran</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-9802-581X</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Naser</FirstName>
					<LastName>Forouhi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Tabriz University, Tabriz, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>24</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The design argument is one of the simplest and most common arguments that connects humans to the material world. Since a long time ago, humans have acknowledged the existence of wise and intelligent moderators through thinking about the structure of creatures and their purposiveness. Various expressions of this argument with different degrees of strength and accuracy are seen in the talk of Islamic and Western thinkers who through argument, analogy, or induction and with dependence on partial or general instances of design in nature are trying to prove an intelligent moderator. Correct perception of this argument and a correct analysis of its preliminaries based on intellect can increase its validity and reliability in proving divine moderator and help us to answer the main part of doubts attributed to it. This descriptive-analytical study considers doubts attributed to this argument from an epistemology viewpoint and tries to eliminate and answer them by explaining the position and role of intellect in this argument relying on conditions of various logical reasons, and defending its validity and reliability in proving meta-matter moderator and abrogating materialists’ opinion.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords: &lt;/strong&gt;Order; Intellect; Purposiveness; Science; Divine Moderator.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The current research has assessed the design argument and doubts attributed to it. Understanding the position of intellect in this argument and basing its preliminaries on intellectual principles and fundamentals can help us reach a correct perception of this argument and answer doubts propounded by critics. The most important aspect of this study is answering some doubts propounded as a result of the incorrect perception of this design with its various expressions. What distinguishes the current study from other works related to this subject is that it separates doubts attributed to its major and minor aspects by focusing on logical reasoning in terms of argument, induction, and analogy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study analyzes the design argument and its expressions and tries to answer doubts attributed to this argument relying on conditions of logical reasoning. In the past, two expressions based on similarity and replication in talks of Western philosophers were common and these expressions have received a lot of critiques according to their weakness. While these expressions mainly differ from the design argument in terms of rational reasoning. From an epistemology viewpoint, order isn’t from sensory concepts and human senses cannot perceive order directly, but it is an empirical concept, and order of nature can be induced based on experience and by getting help from some intellectual preliminaries. In addition, an intellectual movement from the purposive order of nature toward aware creatures is performed not in terms of analogy and replication with human artifacts but based on intellectual principles like cause-effect suitability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The most important aspect of the design argument is that the purposive order of the world indicates the intervention of awareness and intelligence in its creation and such an order cannot be explained through unconscious factors including intrinsic characteristics of matter. In this argument, it is claimed that order, harmony, and purposiveness indicate the intervention of intelligence in the combination of the world, nature, and matter and components of the world cannot explain the final order while accepting the natural and intrinsic nature of matter. Therefore, design order should prove that the existence of purpose in the world of nature, and its random emergence refusal indicates that the world moderator has characteristics of science and power. In other words, an intelligent and powerful actor has created the world. Therefore, proving sanity and or god of religions, especially Islam, with all perfection attributes, is not in the scope of this argument. In addition, its validity cannot be questioned; empirical scientific validity is based on the hidden analogy that has accompanied and supported it. Therefore, the design argument has intellectual preliminaries (directly or indirectly).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The design argument connects the human mind with beyond physical world relying on relation and logical correlation between purposive order and intellect intervention. On the one hand, the interaction existed between intellect and experience in the design argument, and on the other hand, disability for correct analysis of this relation has caused the creation of expressions of this argument that differ with what is the main purpose of this reasoning under the title of “design order”. The design argument is not a sensory argument with all preliminaries originating from sense nor an empirical argument in which induction is performed based on analogy. However, it is an intellectual argument that a person infers the intervention of intellect and intelligence by studying the order of nature in natural creatures. Therefore, real believers would not conclude the existence of a contriver creature in the design argument based on knowing the world as a mechanical one but perceive an intelligent cause based on definite and obvious rules like causality and cause-effect suitability.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The design argument is one of the simplest and most common arguments that connects humans to the material world. Since a long time ago, humans have acknowledged the existence of wise and intelligent moderators through thinking about the structure of creatures and their purposiveness. Various expressions of this argument with different degrees of strength and accuracy are seen in the talk of Islamic and Western thinkers who through argument, analogy, or induction and with dependence on partial or general instances of design in nature are trying to prove an intelligent moderator. Correct perception of this argument and a correct analysis of its preliminaries based on intellect can increase its validity and reliability in proving divine moderator and help us to answer the main part of doubts attributed to it. This descriptive-analytical study considers doubts attributed to this argument from an epistemology viewpoint and tries to eliminate and answer them by explaining the position and role of intellect in this argument relying on conditions of various logical reasons, and defending its validity and reliability in proving meta-matter moderator and abrogating materialists’ opinion.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords: &lt;/strong&gt;Order; Intellect; Purposiveness; Science; Divine Moderator.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The current research has assessed the design argument and doubts attributed to it. Understanding the position of intellect in this argument and basing its preliminaries on intellectual principles and fundamentals can help us reach a correct perception of this argument and answer doubts propounded by critics. The most important aspect of this study is answering some doubts propounded as a result of the incorrect perception of this design with its various expressions. What distinguishes the current study from other works related to this subject is that it separates doubts attributed to its major and minor aspects by focusing on logical reasoning in terms of argument, induction, and analogy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study analyzes the design argument and its expressions and tries to answer doubts attributed to this argument relying on conditions of logical reasoning. In the past, two expressions based on similarity and replication in talks of Western philosophers were common and these expressions have received a lot of critiques according to their weakness. While these expressions mainly differ from the design argument in terms of rational reasoning. From an epistemology viewpoint, order isn’t from sensory concepts and human senses cannot perceive order directly, but it is an empirical concept, and order of nature can be induced based on experience and by getting help from some intellectual preliminaries. In addition, an intellectual movement from the purposive order of nature toward aware creatures is performed not in terms of analogy and replication with human artifacts but based on intellectual principles like cause-effect suitability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The most important aspect of the design argument is that the purposive order of the world indicates the intervention of awareness and intelligence in its creation and such an order cannot be explained through unconscious factors including intrinsic characteristics of matter. In this argument, it is claimed that order, harmony, and purposiveness indicate the intervention of intelligence in the combination of the world, nature, and matter and components of the world cannot explain the final order while accepting the natural and intrinsic nature of matter. Therefore, design order should prove that the existence of purpose in the world of nature, and its random emergence refusal indicates that the world moderator has characteristics of science and power. In other words, an intelligent and powerful actor has created the world. Therefore, proving sanity and or god of religions, especially Islam, with all perfection attributes, is not in the scope of this argument. In addition, its validity cannot be questioned; empirical scientific validity is based on the hidden analogy that has accompanied and supported it. Therefore, the design argument has intellectual preliminaries (directly or indirectly).&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusion &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The design argument connects the human mind with beyond physical world relying on relation and logical correlation between purposive order and intellect intervention. On the one hand, the interaction existed between intellect and experience in the design argument, and on the other hand, disability for correct analysis of this relation has caused the creation of expressions of this argument that differ with what is the main purpose of this reasoning under the title of “design order”. The design argument is not a sensory argument with all preliminaries originating from sense nor an empirical argument in which induction is performed based on analogy. However, it is an intellectual argument that a person infers the intervention of intellect and intelligence by studying the order of nature in natural creatures. Therefore, real believers would not conclude the existence of a contriver creature in the design argument based on knowing the world as a mechanical one but perceive an intelligent cause based on definite and obvious rules like causality and cause-effect suitability.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Order</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Intellect</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">purposiveness</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Science</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">Divine Moderator</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_28689_7e3d4008f5e7bbbd2ecc5eda74055fdb.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga’s Views on the Issue of Evil</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga’s Views on the Issue of Evil</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>113</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>128</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28691</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.138947.1845</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Masoumeh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Ameri</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of Theology, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Farida</FirstName>
					<LastName>Rezaei</LastName>
<Affiliation>Lecturer, Department of Theology, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>10</Month>
					<Day>16</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra, one of the mystical philosophers, and in Western philosophical thought, Alvin Plantinga, a theistic philosopher, have both explored the issue of evil with distinct foundations and solutions. Mulla Sadra’s primary basis lies in the existence of essence, and his solutions adhere to the model of the non-existence of evil and its being contingently willed. Plantinga, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate the non-contradiction of the logical issue of evil in light of God’s absolute power by using possible worlds and the relationship between human free will and divine omnipotence. These two thinkers share common ground in their belief in God as knowledgeable, powerful, and benevolent, but they differ in their approach to inherent sinfulness, defense of theodicy, and overcoming logical challenges. The objective of this study is not merely to explain and compare the intellectual foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga regarding the issue of evil; rather, it aims to critically examine their premises and proposed solutions, ultimately presenting a comparative approach to resolving the issue of evil. The research methodology employed in this study is fundamentally theoretical and rational, analyzing the arguments of both philosophers and providing a comparative assessment.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Mulla Sadra, Plantinga, Good and Evil, Non-existence of Evil, Free Will Defense.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Since we have accepted the existence of God based on revelatory foundations and rational arguments, and considering that the essence of God is identical with complete existence and existence is synonymous with goodness, and that God possesses perfect attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and pure goodness, it is, therefore, appropriate to question and investigate the reason for the existence of evil in the world and to reflect upon it. In the Islamic domain, Mulla Sadra has endeavored to address the issue of evil in a way that does not harm religious beliefs, and in modern Christian theology, Alvin Plantinga has responded to this issue. Regarding the research background, one can refer to the article ‘A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s Approaches to the Issue of Evil’ (Khademi &amp; Abbasi Kia, 2012), which merely explains the foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga and mentions the commonalities and differences in their views. However, it does not critique and review the foundations and solutions of each. Moreover, the conclusion of the article only states that the foundations of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga can address the issue of evil, but it does not provide a comparative solution to the issue of evil by comparing their foundations and solutions. Therefore, the innovation of the present research is that in addition to explaining and comparing the views of two Muslim and Christian thinkers, it also critiques and reviews their views, and as a result, considering the totality of Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s foundations and solutions, it provides a comparative answer in which no contradiction or inconsistency is seen between evils and the existence of God and His perfect attributes.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study is the result of a comparative study of one of the theological-philosophical topics between two thinkers from the Islamic and Christian worlds, in which the views of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga on the issue of evil are compared using an analytical method. In addition, the library method has been used to collect the materials.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mulla Sadra faced the issue of dualism, which promoted duality and polytheism. Mulla Sadra’s foundations in solving the issue of evil include the primacy of existence, belief in divine wisdom, the best possible world, God’s omnipotence, the goodness of existence, and a general perspective on the universe.&lt;br /&gt;Mulla Sadra’s solutions to the issue of evil include the non-existence of evil, the incidental nature of evils, the predominance of good over evil, the removal of anthropocentric views on the issue of evil, and the wisdom and purpose of the creation of beings.&lt;br /&gt;Perceptual evil is an issue that the theory of the non-existence of evil faces.&lt;br /&gt;From Plantinga’s perspective, belief in God is entirely rational and correct even without evidence or proof. He believes that a real justification for evils cannot be found, thus he tries to prove the possibility or probability of rational justification by God for the existence of evils.&lt;br /&gt;Plantinga’s solutions to the issue of evil include explaining possible worlds and free will defense.&lt;br /&gt;In some of the new terms that form the basis of Plantinga’s arguments, there are fallacies or errors, which include pervasive evil and the critique of the realization of possible worlds and not their actuality.&lt;br /&gt;Similarities between Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s views include belief in the existence of God, the absolute and unlimited knowledge of God, and belief in God’s absolute power and benevolence.&lt;br /&gt;Differences between Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s views include the difference in the type of approach and the predominance of a logical view of the issue of evil by Plantinga as opposed to Mulla Sadra, the inherent nature of sin and pervasive evil, and Mulla Sadra’s defense of the theory of divine justice and Plantinga’s lack of defense in this regard.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By comparing the foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga, the following solutions can be offered for the issue of evil:&lt;br /&gt;Denial of the proposition “evil exists”: Based on the principles of transcendent wisdom, good is synonymous with existence, and thus evil returns to a non-existent matter.&lt;br /&gt;Free will defense: Plantinga’s answer is that for God to create a world in which humans freely perform moral good, it may be necessary to allow some evils to enter. Plantinga’s response focuses more on moral evils and only addresses the issue of moral evils, whereas Mulla Sadra’s answer includes both moral and natural evils.&lt;br /&gt;In response to Plantinga’s defense, it is argued that if God knew that by creating humans, they would commit evil acts to such an extent voluntarily, it might have been better to refrain from creating humans. To address this inconsistency, we have no choice but to go beyond the free will defense and rely on a defense based on the purpose and wisdom of human creation. This issue indicates that, at best, the free will defense is incomplete, and it is necessary to specify the possible reason for God to create humans who voluntarily commit evil to such an extent. If it is proven from the beginning that each of the evils seen in the world is compatible with the overall design of creation, no one will ever criticize the existence of evils; because evils are in harmony with the best possible system.&lt;br /&gt; </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">In the tradition of Islamic philosophy, Mulla Sadra, one of the mystical philosophers, and in Western philosophical thought, Alvin Plantinga, a theistic philosopher, have both explored the issue of evil with distinct foundations and solutions. Mulla Sadra’s primary basis lies in the existence of essence, and his solutions adhere to the model of the non-existence of evil and its being contingently willed. Plantinga, on the other hand, seeks to demonstrate the non-contradiction of the logical issue of evil in light of God’s absolute power by using possible worlds and the relationship between human free will and divine omnipotence. These two thinkers share common ground in their belief in God as knowledgeable, powerful, and benevolent, but they differ in their approach to inherent sinfulness, defense of theodicy, and overcoming logical challenges. The objective of this study is not merely to explain and compare the intellectual foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga regarding the issue of evil; rather, it aims to critically examine their premises and proposed solutions, ultimately presenting a comparative approach to resolving the issue of evil. The research methodology employed in this study is fundamentally theoretical and rational, analyzing the arguments of both philosophers and providing a comparative assessment.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Mulla Sadra, Plantinga, Good and Evil, Non-existence of Evil, Free Will Defense.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Since we have accepted the existence of God based on revelatory foundations and rational arguments, and considering that the essence of God is identical with complete existence and existence is synonymous with goodness, and that God possesses perfect attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and pure goodness, it is, therefore, appropriate to question and investigate the reason for the existence of evil in the world and to reflect upon it. In the Islamic domain, Mulla Sadra has endeavored to address the issue of evil in a way that does not harm religious beliefs, and in modern Christian theology, Alvin Plantinga has responded to this issue. Regarding the research background, one can refer to the article ‘A Comparative Study of Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s Approaches to the Issue of Evil’ (Khademi &amp; Abbasi Kia, 2012), which merely explains the foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga and mentions the commonalities and differences in their views. However, it does not critique and review the foundations and solutions of each. Moreover, the conclusion of the article only states that the foundations of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga can address the issue of evil, but it does not provide a comparative solution to the issue of evil by comparing their foundations and solutions. Therefore, the innovation of the present research is that in addition to explaining and comparing the views of two Muslim and Christian thinkers, it also critiques and reviews their views, and as a result, considering the totality of Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s foundations and solutions, it provides a comparative answer in which no contradiction or inconsistency is seen between evils and the existence of God and His perfect attributes.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This study is the result of a comparative study of one of the theological-philosophical topics between two thinkers from the Islamic and Christian worlds, in which the views of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga on the issue of evil are compared using an analytical method. In addition, the library method has been used to collect the materials.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Mulla Sadra faced the issue of dualism, which promoted duality and polytheism. Mulla Sadra’s foundations in solving the issue of evil include the primacy of existence, belief in divine wisdom, the best possible world, God’s omnipotence, the goodness of existence, and a general perspective on the universe.&lt;br /&gt;Mulla Sadra’s solutions to the issue of evil include the non-existence of evil, the incidental nature of evils, the predominance of good over evil, the removal of anthropocentric views on the issue of evil, and the wisdom and purpose of the creation of beings.&lt;br /&gt;Perceptual evil is an issue that the theory of the non-existence of evil faces.&lt;br /&gt;From Plantinga’s perspective, belief in God is entirely rational and correct even without evidence or proof. He believes that a real justification for evils cannot be found, thus he tries to prove the possibility or probability of rational justification by God for the existence of evils.&lt;br /&gt;Plantinga’s solutions to the issue of evil include explaining possible worlds and free will defense.&lt;br /&gt;In some of the new terms that form the basis of Plantinga’s arguments, there are fallacies or errors, which include pervasive evil and the critique of the realization of possible worlds and not their actuality.&lt;br /&gt;Similarities between Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s views include belief in the existence of God, the absolute and unlimited knowledge of God, and belief in God’s absolute power and benevolence.&lt;br /&gt;Differences between Mulla Sadra’s and Plantinga’s views include the difference in the type of approach and the predominance of a logical view of the issue of evil by Plantinga as opposed to Mulla Sadra, the inherent nature of sin and pervasive evil, and Mulla Sadra’s defense of the theory of divine justice and Plantinga’s lack of defense in this regard.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;By comparing the foundations and solutions of Mulla Sadra and Plantinga, the following solutions can be offered for the issue of evil:&lt;br /&gt;Denial of the proposition “evil exists”: Based on the principles of transcendent wisdom, good is synonymous with existence, and thus evil returns to a non-existent matter.&lt;br /&gt;Free will defense: Plantinga’s answer is that for God to create a world in which humans freely perform moral good, it may be necessary to allow some evils to enter. Plantinga’s response focuses more on moral evils and only addresses the issue of moral evils, whereas Mulla Sadra’s answer includes both moral and natural evils.&lt;br /&gt;In response to Plantinga’s defense, it is argued that if God knew that by creating humans, they would commit evil acts to such an extent voluntarily, it might have been better to refrain from creating humans. To address this inconsistency, we have no choice but to go beyond the free will defense and rely on a defense based on the purpose and wisdom of human creation. This issue indicates that, at best, the free will defense is incomplete, and it is necessary to specify the possible reason for God to create humans who voluntarily commit evil to such an extent. If it is proven from the beginning that each of the evils seen in the world is compatible with the overall design of creation, no one will ever criticize the existence of evils; because evils are in harmony with the best possible system.&lt;br /&gt; </OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Comparing Motahari and Allameh Asgari's Views on the Meaning and Examples of ‘Affair’</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>Comparing Motahari and Allameh Asgari&#039;s Views on the Meaning and Examples of ‘Affair’</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>129</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>146</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28529</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.135176.1753</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Masomeh</FirstName>
					<LastName>Esmaeili</LastName>
<Affiliation>Department of Philosophy and Shia Studies. Hoda College (belonging to Al-Zahra community). Qom. Iran
Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Shia Studies, Hoda University, Qom, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2022</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>18</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The word affair has not been given due attention in the books of advanced theologians, but its related topics have been discussed as the nature, benefit, philosophy, or necessity of prophecy and Imamate. However, contemporary theologians have recently paid attention to this term. Motahari and Asgari have defined affairs and mentioned their examples. Affair means status and great deeds, and in terms of &lt;em&gt;the Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt; and hadiths, it means great things that the Prophet and Imams are responsible for. They are proportional. Motahari has used the term ‘affair’ in close meanings such as great works and merits. Asgari&#039;s view on the meaning of affairs is similar to Motahari&#039;s view. Of course, Askari considers the Prophet&#039;s main duty to preach the religion, which is different from the Prophet&#039;s affairs. Motahari in his various books believes that the affairs of the Prophet include religious authority, judgment, government, and guardianship. But Asgari believes that preaching &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;, caliphate, congregational prayers, implementation of Islamic rules, and the formation of an Islamic society and a just government are the affairs of the Imam. Therefore, both theologians agree on examples such as government and religious authority as the affairs of the Imam.  &lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Affairs, Imam, Prophet, Askari, Motahari. &lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;The word affair has been used for the Prophet and Imam (AS), but there is no specific meaning for it. Therefore, there is no consensus on the cases. The earlier theologians have not had a separate discussion about the affairs of the Imam in their books. Rather, it is one of the modern theological discussions which is extracted from other Imamat topics. This issue has already been discussed in the nature, purpose, philosophy, and necessity of imamate. This term recently has been paid attention to by contemporary researchers. Motahari has mentioned three affairs for the Holy Prophet (PBUH). After that, he has said the affairs of the Imams (peace be upon them). In addition, Askari has defined affairs and has distinguished it from the main duty of a prophet.&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;The Great Affair is an issue that has not been discussed in the books of the past theologians by the same name. Therefore, understanding its examples requires analysis. Motahari and Asgari have paid attention to this issue and have presented its meaning and examples. They analyzed and discovered the Prophet and Imam&#039;s affairs by analyzing the related concepts, philosophy, and duties of the prophet and Imam. They expressed parts of affairs in their different books. This research studied various books by Motahari and Asgari. First, the author has obtained the meaning of Imam&#039;s affairs and has compared the views of the two theologians. Then, it has concluded a common meaning. The author also has studied the examples of Imam&#039;s affairs from the point of view of the two theologians and has compared them. In the third stage, common examples are mentioned. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Almighty God is doing great things in the world, and he has appointed great things for His representatives. His representatives are prophets and imams who are responsible for great works which are called affairs in this study. But the question is, what are the prophet and Imam&#039;s affairs? Motahari has stated the affairs of the Prophet and Imams (AS) in his various books:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 1&lt;/strong&gt;. Prophets’ and Imam’s Affairs in Motahari’s View &lt;br /&gt;Then, Motahari has stated the affairs of the Imam in the continuity of prophethood:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 2&lt;/strong&gt;. Affairs of the Imam in the Continuity of Prophethood in Motahari’s View As a result, Imam&#039;s affairs from the point of view of Motahari include four affairs:1.    Government2.    Religious authority3.    Judgment4.    Wilayah&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;From Asgari&#039;s point of view, it can be said that the position of Imamate, which has been gifted to the Imam as the Caliph of God, has created some affairs for him. These affairs include the following examples:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Promoting &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Caliphate&lt;br /&gt;Establishing congregation&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4.    Implementation of Islamic rules&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Creating an Islamic society and a just government&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Therefore, Askari and Motahari agree with each other in some cases and disagree in others. But the way they have expressed them is such that it can be said that all the examples mentioned by both of them are examples of affairs.&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Great Affair means the great deeds and works of the Prophet or Imam (AS). This topic is studied from the point of view of two theologians. Motahari and Asgari agree with each other on examples such as Islamic government, and religious authority, but Asgari has also specified other matters such as the propagation of &lt;em&gt;the Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;, caliphate, implementation of Islamic rules and congregational prayers, while Motahari has also mentioned judgment and guardianship. Therefore, all these concepts can be considered as Imam&#039;s affairs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 3&lt;/strong&gt;. Comparison of Affairs in Views of Motahari and Asgari&lt;br /&gt; </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The word affair has not been given due attention in the books of advanced theologians, but its related topics have been discussed as the nature, benefit, philosophy, or necessity of prophecy and Imamate. However, contemporary theologians have recently paid attention to this term. Motahari and Asgari have defined affairs and mentioned their examples. Affair means status and great deeds, and in terms of &lt;em&gt;the Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt; and hadiths, it means great things that the Prophet and Imams are responsible for. They are proportional. Motahari has used the term ‘affair’ in close meanings such as great works and merits. Asgari&#039;s view on the meaning of affairs is similar to Motahari&#039;s view. Of course, Askari considers the Prophet&#039;s main duty to preach the religion, which is different from the Prophet&#039;s affairs. Motahari in his various books believes that the affairs of the Prophet include religious authority, judgment, government, and guardianship. But Asgari believes that preaching &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;, caliphate, congregational prayers, implementation of Islamic rules, and the formation of an Islamic society and a just government are the affairs of the Imam. Therefore, both theologians agree on examples such as government and religious authority as the affairs of the Imam.  &lt;strong&gt;Keywords:&lt;/strong&gt; Affairs, Imam, Prophet, Askari, Motahari. &lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;The word affair has been used for the Prophet and Imam (AS), but there is no specific meaning for it. Therefore, there is no consensus on the cases. The earlier theologians have not had a separate discussion about the affairs of the Imam in their books. Rather, it is one of the modern theological discussions which is extracted from other Imamat topics. This issue has already been discussed in the nature, purpose, philosophy, and necessity of imamate. This term recently has been paid attention to by contemporary researchers. Motahari has mentioned three affairs for the Holy Prophet (PBUH). After that, he has said the affairs of the Imams (peace be upon them). In addition, Askari has defined affairs and has distinguished it from the main duty of a prophet.&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;The Great Affair is an issue that has not been discussed in the books of the past theologians by the same name. Therefore, understanding its examples requires analysis. Motahari and Asgari have paid attention to this issue and have presented its meaning and examples. They analyzed and discovered the Prophet and Imam&#039;s affairs by analyzing the related concepts, philosophy, and duties of the prophet and Imam. They expressed parts of affairs in their different books. This research studied various books by Motahari and Asgari. First, the author has obtained the meaning of Imam&#039;s affairs and has compared the views of the two theologians. Then, it has concluded a common meaning. The author also has studied the examples of Imam&#039;s affairs from the point of view of the two theologians and has compared them. In the third stage, common examples are mentioned. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Almighty God is doing great things in the world, and he has appointed great things for His representatives. His representatives are prophets and imams who are responsible for great works which are called affairs in this study. But the question is, what are the prophet and Imam&#039;s affairs? Motahari has stated the affairs of the Prophet and Imams (AS) in his various books:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 1&lt;/strong&gt;. Prophets’ and Imam’s Affairs in Motahari’s View &lt;br /&gt;Then, Motahari has stated the affairs of the Imam in the continuity of prophethood:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 2&lt;/strong&gt;. Affairs of the Imam in the Continuity of Prophethood in Motahari’s View As a result, Imam&#039;s affairs from the point of view of Motahari include four affairs:1.    Government2.    Religious authority3.    Judgment4.    Wilayah&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;From Asgari&#039;s point of view, it can be said that the position of Imamate, which has been gifted to the Imam as the Caliph of God, has created some affairs for him. These affairs include the following examples:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Promoting &lt;em&gt;the Quran&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Caliphate&lt;br /&gt;Establishing congregation&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;4.    Implementation of Islamic rules&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Creating an Islamic society and a just government&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt; Therefore, Askari and Motahari agree with each other in some cases and disagree in others. But the way they have expressed them is such that it can be said that all the examples mentioned by both of them are examples of affairs.&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Great Affair means the great deeds and works of the Prophet or Imam (AS). This topic is studied from the point of view of two theologians. Motahari and Asgari agree with each other on examples such as Islamic government, and religious authority, but Asgari has also specified other matters such as the propagation of &lt;em&gt;the Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;, caliphate, implementation of Islamic rules and congregational prayers, while Motahari has also mentioned judgment and guardianship. Therefore, all these concepts can be considered as Imam&#039;s affairs.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Figure 3&lt;/strong&gt;. Comparison of Affairs in Views of Motahari and Asgari&lt;br /&gt; </OtherAbstract>
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</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>A Comparative Study of the Reasons for the Persistence of Buddhism and the Decline of Zoroastrianism in Ancient China</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>A Comparative Study of the Reasons for the Persistence of Buddhism and the Decline of Zoroastrianism in Ancient China</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>147</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>164</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28725</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.140558.1883</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Amin</FirstName>
					<LastName>Yazdkhasti</LastName>
<Affiliation>M. A. Student, Department of History and Iranian Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Hamidreza</FirstName>
					<LastName>Pashazanous</LastName>
<Affiliation>Assistant Professor, Department of History and Iranian Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>03</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The topic of religion in the history of relations between the two civilizations of Iran and China is an issue that has not been addressed much. According to Chinese sources and other documents, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism were introduced to China by Iranians. So far, some studies have been conducted on Buddhism and Zoroastrianism in China, but these works have only explained how these religions entered China, but the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism from the middle of the 9th century onwards in China have not been considered. Therefore, the present study, relying on the library method and the comparative analysis of the historical data obtained from China, tries for the first time to address the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism in ancient China. The claim of the authors is that Buddhism has survived until today due to its compatibility and assimilation with Chinese thought and society and not having a political approach, especially from the 9th century onwards; on the other hand, due to the heterogeneity of its teachings and religious rituals in China, the Zoroastrianism could not adapt to this land and the cultural characteristics of its people.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: China, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Permanence, Decline.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;During the Parthian and Sasanid periods, Iran influenced many Eastern cultures and was influenced by them in return. It is possible to understand this trend by examining the political, economic, and cultural relations between Iran and the Central Asian countries, along with China. One of the most important methods of exchanging cultural elements from Iran to China has been the transfer of various religions to this land. This process continued during the reign of Han (202 BC-220 AD) until the middle of Tang (618-907 AD). The arrival of Buddhism in China during the reign of the Han took place almost simultaneously with the rule of the Parthians (247 BC-224 AD) in Iran. During the Parthian period, Buddhism entered China through translators, aristocrats, and the Parthian elite class, and for the first time, a Parthian prince called An Shigao.&lt;br /&gt; Zoroastrianism entered China in the 6th century AD and during the Sassanid period. Despite the fact that in some regions of China, especially in the North of China, the influence of Zoroastrianism can be seen, this religion, which was mostly transmitted through cultural interactions, was not successful in China for various reasons.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The present study was conducted using the library method and comparative analysis of historical data obtained from China.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Various factors and contexts caused Buddhism to open its place among the Chinese people in China, despite the various obstacles it faced in the history of its presence in this land, and alongside the indigenous religions of Confucianism and Tao, as a religion to be known as important, popular and respected in this land. Even today, Buddhism is considered one of the most important and popular religions in China and compared to Zoroastrianism, which disappeared in China centuries ago, it has gained much more popularity in the Chinese society.&lt;br /&gt;The Zoroastrian religion could not gain much popularity among the Chinese people compared to the Buddhist religion. It seems that most of the followers of the Zoroastrian religion in China were non-Chinese. The main claim of this study is that Buddhism adopted a non-political approach, especially since 845 AD. Later, compared to Iranian religions and especially Zoroastrianism, it was not widely suppressed by the Tang government. Buddhism with its pacifist and conservative approach, institutionalized the principle of accepting the concept of suffering as a reality in the world and offered the Chinese people what they wanted and remained in this land.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Considering the results of the present study, the factors that caused the popularity and longevity of Buddhism in China can be summarized in four cases in order of importance: 1) Reign support, 2) Compatibility with local customs and traditions, 3) Mixing with Chinese religions, and 4) Effective propaganda and education.&lt;br /&gt;The approach of Buddhism, especially in the school of Mahayana, caused these values to have positive spiritual and social effects on the Chinese people and they viewed this religion as a solution to end the long-term political and social violence in their land. The comparative study of these factors showed that all of these issues are true in a negative way about the failure and decline of Zoroastrianism in China.</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">The topic of religion in the history of relations between the two civilizations of Iran and China is an issue that has not been addressed much. According to Chinese sources and other documents, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism were introduced to China by Iranians. So far, some studies have been conducted on Buddhism and Zoroastrianism in China, but these works have only explained how these religions entered China, but the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism from the middle of the 9th century onwards in China have not been considered. Therefore, the present study, relying on the library method and the comparative analysis of the historical data obtained from China, tries for the first time to address the reasons for the persistence of Buddhism and the decline of Zoroastrianism in ancient China. The claim of the authors is that Buddhism has survived until today due to its compatibility and assimilation with Chinese thought and society and not having a political approach, especially from the 9th century onwards; on the other hand, due to the heterogeneity of its teachings and religious rituals in China, the Zoroastrianism could not adapt to this land and the cultural characteristics of its people.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: China, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Permanence, Decline.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;During the Parthian and Sasanid periods, Iran influenced many Eastern cultures and was influenced by them in return. It is possible to understand this trend by examining the political, economic, and cultural relations between Iran and the Central Asian countries, along with China. One of the most important methods of exchanging cultural elements from Iran to China has been the transfer of various religions to this land. This process continued during the reign of Han (202 BC-220 AD) until the middle of Tang (618-907 AD). The arrival of Buddhism in China during the reign of the Han took place almost simultaneously with the rule of the Parthians (247 BC-224 AD) in Iran. During the Parthian period, Buddhism entered China through translators, aristocrats, and the Parthian elite class, and for the first time, a Parthian prince called An Shigao.&lt;br /&gt; Zoroastrianism entered China in the 6th century AD and during the Sassanid period. Despite the fact that in some regions of China, especially in the North of China, the influence of Zoroastrianism can be seen, this religion, which was mostly transmitted through cultural interactions, was not successful in China for various reasons.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The present study was conducted using the library method and comparative analysis of historical data obtained from China.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Various factors and contexts caused Buddhism to open its place among the Chinese people in China, despite the various obstacles it faced in the history of its presence in this land, and alongside the indigenous religions of Confucianism and Tao, as a religion to be known as important, popular and respected in this land. Even today, Buddhism is considered one of the most important and popular religions in China and compared to Zoroastrianism, which disappeared in China centuries ago, it has gained much more popularity in the Chinese society.&lt;br /&gt;The Zoroastrian religion could not gain much popularity among the Chinese people compared to the Buddhist religion. It seems that most of the followers of the Zoroastrian religion in China were non-Chinese. The main claim of this study is that Buddhism adopted a non-political approach, especially since 845 AD. Later, compared to Iranian religions and especially Zoroastrianism, it was not widely suppressed by the Tang government. Buddhism with its pacifist and conservative approach, institutionalized the principle of accepting the concept of suffering as a reality in the world and offered the Chinese people what they wanted and remained in this land.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Considering the results of the present study, the factors that caused the popularity and longevity of Buddhism in China can be summarized in four cases in order of importance: 1) Reign support, 2) Compatibility with local customs and traditions, 3) Mixing with Chinese religions, and 4) Effective propaganda and education.&lt;br /&gt;The approach of Buddhism, especially in the school of Mahayana, caused these values to have positive spiritual and social effects on the Chinese people and they viewed this religion as a solution to end the long-term political and social violence in their land. The comparative study of these factors showed that all of these issues are true in a negative way about the failure and decline of Zoroastrianism in China.</OtherAbstract>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>University of Isfahan</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>Comparative Theology</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2008-9651</Issn>
				<Volume>15</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>21</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Objectivity of Nonexistent in the View of Mu'tazila and an Analysis of Received Criticisms on it</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>The Objectivity of Nonexistent in the View of Mu&#039;tazila and an Analysis of Received Criticisms on it</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>165</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>182</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">28999</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22108/coth.2024.138220.1831</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>Aflatoon</FirstName>
					<LastName>Sadeghi</LastName>
<Affiliation>Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology and Islamic Sciences, Department of Theology and Philosophy, Payam Noor University, Tehran, Iran</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>06</Month>
					<Day>28</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Mu&#039;tazila put forward the theory of the objectivity of nonexistent to prove God&#039;s eternal knowledge of possible beings before creation. The criticisms of Ash&#039;arites and Islamic philosophers are the eternity of the world, denying the contradiction and its ineffectiveness in proving God&#039;s eternal knowledge of creatures. According to the semantics of objectivity and non-existent, there is no criticism in Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s point of view of the denying of contradiction and the eternity of the world. In this theory, objectivity means a constant that can be reported. The non-existent in this theory is something that does not exist on the outside. Therefore, objectivity of non-existent is the stability of things that do not exist outside, but exist in God&#039;s eternal knowledge, and this does not mean the eternality of objective beings. Similarly, stability is external existence and is not in contradiction with the negation of external existence. Therefore, the principle of this opinion is rationally acceptable. On the other hand, the requirement of this theory is the contradiction between existence and essence, mental existence and the belonging of counterfeit to the existence. This study examines this theory and its criticisms using a descriptive-analytical method.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Mu&#039;tazila, Objectivity, Nonexistent, Eternity of the World, Eternal Knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The attribute of divine knowledge appears in the theological and even philosophical works of Muslim thinkers more than other attributes. There are more than 350 verses of this attribute in &lt;em&gt;the Holy Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;. In the theological, philosophical, and mystical fields, in the discussion of God&#039;s knowledge, God&#039;s knowledge of other beings before creation has been a complicated issue. How can things that do not have a reality become known to divine knowledge? One of the opinions put forward in this context and attributed to the Mu&#039;tazila is the theory of objectivity of nonexistent. Ash&#039;ari and Imamiyyah theologians, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra and other Islamic philosophers have proposed and criticized this theory in their works. In addition, in recent years, some works have been published in this field. The importance of examining this theory in Islamic theology goes back to solving the important issue of divine knowledge of beings before creation. The research questions of this study are: 1) What does Mu&#039;tazila mean by objectivity, nonexistent, and the objectivity of nonexistent? 2) What is the effectiveness of the objectivity of nonexistent theory in proving God&#039;s eternal knowledge? 3) What is the effectiveness of incoming criticisms? This research hypothesizes that, with a thorough analysis, it can be said that these criticisms do not apply to the group that emphasizes the originality of reason.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Based on the methodology of religious and scientific studies, in this research, the topic has been discussed first. Then, since there are many theoretical differences in the definition of fundamental concepts, an effort has been made to clearly express the definition of these concepts in this theory using the semantic method. Then, according to the descriptive-analytical method, the description of those concepts, the principle of the theory, and the received criticisms have been presented. Then, with a final analysis, it has been shown that the effectiveness of this theory can be determined by the semantics of its keywords in the works of Mu&#039;tazila. Considering the centrality of analysis of the main concepts in data collection, this research relies on the library method and the main texts.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The theory of eternal Shiism from Mu&#039;tazila’s point of view means that things are fixed in divine knowledge that do not exist outside of eternity. Therefore, God&#039;s knowledge of creatures before creation is justifiable, without any change in His essence. Their critics claim that the Mu&#039;tazila have placed something called stability between the two opposites of existence and non-existence, which is against reason. On the other hand, theologians emphasize that this theory will lead to the acceptance of the eternity of the world, which is not acceptable from a religious point of view. In addition, it does not have the necessary efficiency to realize its goal, which is to prove the eternal knowledge of God before creation. According to the works of Mu&#039;tazila, it can be said that objectivity in this theory has a fixed meaning that can be reported. On the other hand, when the Mu&#039;tazila talk about non-existence and non-existence objects, they not only mean external non-existence as opposed to external existence and being but also both external non-existence and non-existence. Therefore, one of the examples of non-existence in this theory is a known issue that does not have an external real existence, and non-existence is the stability of things that do not exist outside the object, but exist in God&#039;s eternal knowledge. This does not mean the eternality of objective beings. Similarly, what inferred from Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s statements is that stability is both an external existence and not in contradiction with the negation of external existence. Therefore, according to the semantics of the object and the non-existence in the works of the Mu&#039;tazila, the criticism of the contradiction and the eternity of the world will be rejected. By referring to the works of Mu&#039;tazila and explaining the meaning of the object and the non-existence, the criticisms are rejected, and the effectiveness of this point of view in proving its goal, which is to prove God&#039;s eternal knowledge of creatures, is accepted based on its foundations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In spite of minor differences, the theory of objectivity of nonexistent to solve the problem of divine knowledge is attributed to Mu&#039;tazila. Mu&#039;tazila believe that things are fixed in divine knowledge before they are created, and based on them, beings are realized outside. They have no difference in correspondence with external objects after creation. Therefore, objects are non-existent before their creation, but they exist as objects in divine knowledge. This theory has been criticized and rejected by Ash&#039;ari theologians and Islamic philosophers. According to the Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s meaning of objectivity, it means something that is fixed in some way and can be reported, and the meaning of non-existent means something that does not exist outside. Based on the meaning that the Mu&#039;tazila define as knowledge, which is a belief that takes place in the soul of a person, and the meaning they have of the term &quot;fixed&quot; in the sense of external existence, the theory of objectivity of nonexistent can be justified in itself. This theory is effectively based on principles such as the contradiction between existence and essence, mental existence, and the belonging creation to existence, which are philosophical principles. Of course, in terms of the principle of essence, this theory is not efficient because it leads to the eternity of the possible beings or the multiplicity of divine nature.&lt;br /&gt; </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">Mu&#039;tazila put forward the theory of the objectivity of nonexistent to prove God&#039;s eternal knowledge of possible beings before creation. The criticisms of Ash&#039;arites and Islamic philosophers are the eternity of the world, denying the contradiction and its ineffectiveness in proving God&#039;s eternal knowledge of creatures. According to the semantics of objectivity and non-existent, there is no criticism in Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s point of view of the denying of contradiction and the eternity of the world. In this theory, objectivity means a constant that can be reported. The non-existent in this theory is something that does not exist on the outside. Therefore, objectivity of non-existent is the stability of things that do not exist outside, but exist in God&#039;s eternal knowledge, and this does not mean the eternality of objective beings. Similarly, stability is external existence and is not in contradiction with the negation of external existence. Therefore, the principle of this opinion is rationally acceptable. On the other hand, the requirement of this theory is the contradiction between existence and essence, mental existence and the belonging of counterfeit to the existence. This study examines this theory and its criticisms using a descriptive-analytical method.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Keywords&lt;/strong&gt;: Mu&#039;tazila, Objectivity, Nonexistent, Eternity of the World, Eternal Knowledge.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The attribute of divine knowledge appears in the theological and even philosophical works of Muslim thinkers more than other attributes. There are more than 350 verses of this attribute in &lt;em&gt;the Holy Qur&#039;an&lt;/em&gt;. In the theological, philosophical, and mystical fields, in the discussion of God&#039;s knowledge, God&#039;s knowledge of other beings before creation has been a complicated issue. How can things that do not have a reality become known to divine knowledge? One of the opinions put forward in this context and attributed to the Mu&#039;tazila is the theory of objectivity of nonexistent. Ash&#039;ari and Imamiyyah theologians, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra and other Islamic philosophers have proposed and criticized this theory in their works. In addition, in recent years, some works have been published in this field. The importance of examining this theory in Islamic theology goes back to solving the important issue of divine knowledge of beings before creation. The research questions of this study are: 1) What does Mu&#039;tazila mean by objectivity, nonexistent, and the objectivity of nonexistent? 2) What is the effectiveness of the objectivity of nonexistent theory in proving God&#039;s eternal knowledge? 3) What is the effectiveness of incoming criticisms? This research hypothesizes that, with a thorough analysis, it can be said that these criticisms do not apply to the group that emphasizes the originality of reason.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Materials and Methods&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Based on the methodology of religious and scientific studies, in this research, the topic has been discussed first. Then, since there are many theoretical differences in the definition of fundamental concepts, an effort has been made to clearly express the definition of these concepts in this theory using the semantic method. Then, according to the descriptive-analytical method, the description of those concepts, the principle of the theory, and the received criticisms have been presented. Then, with a final analysis, it has been shown that the effectiveness of this theory can be determined by the semantics of its keywords in the works of Mu&#039;tazila. Considering the centrality of analysis of the main concepts in data collection, this research relies on the library method and the main texts.&lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Findings&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The theory of eternal Shiism from Mu&#039;tazila’s point of view means that things are fixed in divine knowledge that do not exist outside of eternity. Therefore, God&#039;s knowledge of creatures before creation is justifiable, without any change in His essence. Their critics claim that the Mu&#039;tazila have placed something called stability between the two opposites of existence and non-existence, which is against reason. On the other hand, theologians emphasize that this theory will lead to the acceptance of the eternity of the world, which is not acceptable from a religious point of view. In addition, it does not have the necessary efficiency to realize its goal, which is to prove the eternal knowledge of God before creation. According to the works of Mu&#039;tazila, it can be said that objectivity in this theory has a fixed meaning that can be reported. On the other hand, when the Mu&#039;tazila talk about non-existence and non-existence objects, they not only mean external non-existence as opposed to external existence and being but also both external non-existence and non-existence. Therefore, one of the examples of non-existence in this theory is a known issue that does not have an external real existence, and non-existence is the stability of things that do not exist outside the object, but exist in God&#039;s eternal knowledge. This does not mean the eternality of objective beings. Similarly, what inferred from Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s statements is that stability is both an external existence and not in contradiction with the negation of external existence. Therefore, according to the semantics of the object and the non-existence in the works of the Mu&#039;tazila, the criticism of the contradiction and the eternity of the world will be rejected. By referring to the works of Mu&#039;tazila and explaining the meaning of the object and the non-existence, the criticisms are rejected, and the effectiveness of this point of view in proving its goal, which is to prove God&#039;s eternal knowledge of creatures, is accepted based on its foundations.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Discussion of Results and Conclusions&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In spite of minor differences, the theory of objectivity of nonexistent to solve the problem of divine knowledge is attributed to Mu&#039;tazila. Mu&#039;tazila believe that things are fixed in divine knowledge before they are created, and based on them, beings are realized outside. They have no difference in correspondence with external objects after creation. Therefore, objects are non-existent before their creation, but they exist as objects in divine knowledge. This theory has been criticized and rejected by Ash&#039;ari theologians and Islamic philosophers. According to the Mu&#039;tazila&#039;s meaning of objectivity, it means something that is fixed in some way and can be reported, and the meaning of non-existent means something that does not exist outside. Based on the meaning that the Mu&#039;tazila define as knowledge, which is a belief that takes place in the soul of a person, and the meaning they have of the term &quot;fixed&quot; in the sense of external existence, the theory of objectivity of nonexistent can be justified in itself. This theory is effectively based on principles such as the contradiction between existence and essence, mental existence, and the belonging creation to existence, which are philosophical principles. Of course, in terms of the principle of essence, this theory is not efficient because it leads to the eternity of the possible beings or the multiplicity of divine nature.&lt;br /&gt; </OtherAbstract>
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