دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 The Position of the Body in Perception from the Point of View of Ibn-Sina and Maurice Merleau-Ponty جایگاه بدن در امر ادراک از منظر ابن‌سینا و موریس مرلوپونتی 1 22 27123 10.22108/coth.2022.131115.1655 FA راضیه شفیعی دانشجوی دکتری گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران سحر کاوندی دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران Journal Article 1970 01 01 In the history of western and eastern philosophy, the discussion of science and perception has been centered on the soul, and the body has been on the sidelines. Islamic philosophers, especially Masha'is, consider science and perception to be the function of the soul and not the body. In this research, we try to analyze the views of Ibn-Sina and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's thoughts about bodily perception using an analytical-descriptive method and a comparative approach. In this regard, first Ibn-Sina's views on the principles of psychology and then the role of the body in perception are analyzed. Then, the phenomenology of perception and the role of the body in it are examined from the perspective of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Believing in the duality of soul and body, Ibn-Sina considers the soul as the basis of perception, but at the same time, he is not oblivious to the role of the body in the matter of perception. He sees the soul as a rider that uses its compound, the body, in actions and perception. On the other hand, according to Merleau-Ponty, the soul and the body are united and the body has a more prominent role in perception; in other words, the body is considered the only way to perceive existence. در تاریخ اندیشۀ فلسفی، بحث از علم و ادراک همواره بر محور نفس بوده و بدن به‌منزلۀ امری ثانوی دائماً در حاشیه قرار گرفته است. فیلسوفان اسلامی به‌ویژه مشائیان، علم و ادراک را فعل نفس و نه بدن می‌دانند. در این پژوهش سعی بر آن است تا با روش تحلیلی‌توصیفی و با رویکرد تطبیقی، آرای علم‌النفس ابن‌سینا و اندیشه موریس مرلوپونتی دربارۀ ادراک بدن‌مند بررسی شوند. در این راستا ابتدا آرای ابن‌سینا در باب اصول علم‌النفسی و سپس نقش بدن در ادراک، واکاوی و در ادامه پدیدارشناسی ادراک و نقش بدن در آن از منظر موریس مرلوپونتی بررسی می‌شوند. ابن‌سینا با اعتقاد به دوگانگی نفس و بدن، نفس را مبنای ادراک دانسته است؛ اما در عین حال، از نقش بدن – اعم از تأثیر مستقیم و غیرمستقیم – در امر ادراک نیز غافل نیست. او نفس را همچون راکبی می‌داند که از مرکب خود یعنی بدن، در افعال و همچنین ادراک بهره می‌گیرد. درمقابل، نفس و بدن نزد مرلوپونتی با هم اتحاد دارند و بدن در امر ادراک دارای نقشی پررنگ‌تر و برجسته‌تر است و به عبارتی، بدن، یگانه راه ادراک هستی است و آگاهی در بدن جاسازی می‌شود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27123_cb933e5a00238e7f29744d78b0d4e211.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 An Examination and Critique of Process Knowledge of Innate Inclinations and Religion with an Emphasis on Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s Views بررسی و نقد فطرت‌شناسی پویشی و ارتباط آن با دین، با تأکید بر آرای آیت‌الله جوادی آملی 23 42 27236 10.22108/coth.2023.134648.1738 FA مهدی دانائی فرد دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد، دانشکده معارف و اندیشه اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران حسین حجت‌خواه استادیار گروه مبانی نظری اسلام، دانشکده معارف و اندیشه اسلامی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2022 08 15 As religious and philosophical thought is informed by natural sciences, process theology considers ‘spirit’ and its features to be derived from nature, and, therefore, has a naturalistic interpretation of innate inclinations (fiṭrat) as a fundamental concept in the knowledge of human beings. According to this view, human nature develops against the background of evolution and takes different forms depending on the position of each individual in society. Therefore, it would be absurd to talk about fixed innate inclinations in all human beings. Process theologians see religion as human nature’s response to the quest for God. Thus, based on the axiom that human essence is evolving and dynamic, they see religion as evolving in step with man’s innate inclinations and nature. In the present study, we examine the thought of process theology about knowledge of innate inclinations and its relation with religion, and, with an emphasis on the thoughts of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, assess and critique the theology’s viewpoint. Introduction The problem of innate inclinations (fiṭrat) is a major one to be noted in knowing human beings. In relation to this problem, various questions come up, the most fundamental of which is the question of constancy and change of innate inclinations and their bearing on religion. Of the thinkers who have theorized the question are Alfred North Whitehead and his followers whose work is subsumed under ‘process philosophy’. In this regard, this study aims to investigate the process knowledge of innate inclinations and religion with an emphasis on Ayatollah Javadi Amoli’s perspectives. Materials and Methods The present study was conducted using the analytic-critical method and benefiting from library research. Through a rational and logical analysis of the existing data has come to significant conclusions about innate inclinations and their relation to religion in the thoughts of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli and in the process thinking. Research Findings This study shows the non-existence of the evolution process in innate inclinations and the constancy of religion and its decrees, because the existence of innate inclinations (inclinations could be constantly, universally, beyond mental abstractions, and objectively observable) such as perfectionism challenges the view of the process theology. Furthermore, by proving the constancy of the innate inclinations and therefore the existence of universal and unchanging principles in religion and scriptures, the claim for the inconstancy of religion in the process thinking is fundamentally debated and criticized. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli considers innate inclinations as universal, not requiring education, and unaffected by external factors, thus securing innate inclinations against the process of purported evolution in theology. Furthermore, he regards evolution as proceeding from human beings’ sense of perfectionism, which per se implies the existence of innate inclinations independent of nature and evolution. He deems God ‘the Absolute Perfection’ into whom ignorance can find no way. Against the process thinkers’ view on scriptures, he regards the Holy Qur’an as divine words and immune to errors. He thus presents transmitted knowledge (naql) as the best and the only authentic way to know innate inclinations, though other ways are considered to be confirming the transmitted knowledge. Furthermore, he sees religion and its decrees as a detailed explanation of humans’ innate inclinations, thereby steering religion out of the domain of the evolution process. To him, religion springs from constant innate inclinations and therefore must remain immune to change. Discussion of Results and Conclusions A naturalistic thought predicated upon the principle of nature’s constant change, process philosophy regards being and all existents as natural and, based on the principle of evolution, changing and renewing at every moment. Accordingly, process theologians consider features of the spirit, including its innate inclinations, as a product of its interaction with the body, and constantly changing. It must be noticed that while in the process theology as well as in the religious-philosophical thoughts of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, almost the same definition has been presented of innate inclinations (which implies features specific to human beings), the truth of innate inclinations in the process theology is grounded in natural sciences, particularly biology and the theory of evolution, according to which the human being’s innate inclinations have reached their current growth and evolution due to historical and genetic factors. Thus, in this thinking, there are no constant innate inclinations based upon which one could attain a universal, unchanging, and objective knowledge about problems such as religious and moral problems. It is only within the confines of abstraction and subjective impressions that one could gain knowledge about problems of that kind, and even this knowledge is of the empirical type rather than derived from scriptures. Process theologians see scriptures as the work of authors who were ignorant of scientific problems, unable to go beyond the common ways in their own times of explaining different problems. Furthermore, refusing to distinguish ‘innate inclinations’ and ‘nature’, believing in constant transformation and dynamics of innate inclinations throughout history, and defining religion as ‘the reaction of human nature to its search for God’, Alfred North Whitehead and his kindred spirits regard the nature of religion as an area of the being of human stemming from human experience. Hence, process theologians consider religion as having its origins in the evolving human nature and as evolving with human nature. In contrast, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli differentiates innate inclinations and nature. He presents nature as bearing on human physical aspects that change with the transformation and dynamics of the body. However, according to him, innate inclinations are a characteristic of the abstract human spirit and of the way human beings are created, blocked to any change or transformation, and, unlike nature, tending solely towards doing good deeds. الهیات پویشی به‌عنوان تفکر دینی و فلسفیِ متأثر از علوم طبیعی، برداشتی طبیعت‌گرایانه از «فطرت» دارد. مطابق این دیدگاه، سرشت انسان در بستر تکامل، رشد و نمو می‌یابد و براساس موقعیت هر شخص در جامعه خویش، شکلی متفاوت به خود می‌گیرد؛ بنابراین، سخن از فطرت ثابت در همه افراد بشر، امری بیهوده خواهد بود. همچنین، دین واکنش طبیعت انسان به جستجوی خدا است و بر این اساس، دین نیز همگام با فطرت و سرشت انسان در حال تغییر و تحول و تکامل است. این پژوهش، با روش توصیفی‌‌تحلیلی و انتقادی، براساس دیدگاه فلسفی و دینی آیت‌الله جوادی آملی، نشان می‌دهد نخست، فطرت انسانی برخلاف دیدگاه اندیشمندان پویشی، امری مجرد و ثابت است و دوم، ادعای تغییرپذیری و تکامل دین به علت تغییر و تحول در فطرت، دارای اشکال‌های اساسی است و دلایل گوناگونی چون ثبات فطرت و نیز وجود اصول کلی و تغییر‌ناپذیر در دین، خلاف آن ادعا را ثابت می‌کند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27236_dd90150ff64c48e3153f4d340c01f825.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Study of Linda Zagzebski's Theological Approach to Moral Saints بررسی رویکرد الهیاتی لیندا زگزبسکی در باب قدیسان اخلاقی 43 62 27323 10.22108/coth.2023.135534.1767 FA سیدعلی اصغر هاشم ‌زاده استادیار گروه معارف اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل بیت، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2022 10 27 Linda Zagzebski is one of the philosophers working on the emotions and motivating dispositions of the saints. By expanding her theory of divine motivation, she tried to fill in an important gap in previous accounts about saintly life and show why thinking of the saints only as moral exemplars is insufficient. She argues that the saints’ connection to God is what makes them morally good. Zagzebski focuses rightly on the emotions of the saints and provides valuable insights into their moral psychology. In the present study, we first discuss the etymology of the word "saint" and examine its historical background in Christian culture, and then, through the explanation of Zagszebski's important theories of Exemplarism and Divine Motivation, we criticize her most important arguments about the saintly life. Although her attractive viewpoint makes some important advances toward understanding and justifying moral saintliness, it remains deficient insofar as she cannot accurately clarify the limits of imitating saints and the nature of their connection to God. Also, she neglects the role of religious institutions, communities, and spiritual disciplines in helping the saints come to share God’s motives; and she either does not give due attention to the specific virtues and gifts the saints- especially in non-Christian cultures- possess. So, her account is not comprehensive enough in this regard. Introduction Linda Zagzebski, a contemporary moral philosopher and theoretician of Moral Exemplarism, in analyzing and explaining the distinction of different moral theories, points to three concepts of goodness, virtue, and right action. She believes that an effective moral theory should motivate people to live morally and drive them to moral excellence. Zagzebski defends a virtue-based approach to explain a compelling and attractive moral theory that can drive people to goodness without obligation. However, her considered virtue is not a mere cognitive and mental concept. Rather, it is closely related to emotional motivation, which arises from reference to imitable ideals called moral saints. In fact, the saints are the starting point of her exemplarism account of virtue ethics. Zagzebski considers the goodness of saints because they share divine motives with others. In this study, we first explore the historical roots and usage of the word saint, and then, while briefly explaining the function of Zagszebski's theory of moral exemplarism, we discuss the divine motivation of saints and the components of saintly life from her point of view. Finally, we criticize the sufficiency of these arguments. Materials and Methods We tried to provide a correct understanding of the word "saint" by reviewing numerous articles and entries in religious encyclopedias. Also, we reviewed the interesting essays which have been written about the acceptance, application, or rejection of the saintly lifestyle in western philosophical literature and theology. We examined Linda Zagzebski's moral and theological views and her exemplarism approach, which have good references to the role models of saints, the discussion of God's imitation, and the doctrine of the incarnation of Christ as a model of moral virtues. In sum, the present research is a new and distinctive work in terms of applying and analyzing the two theories of Zegzebski's exemplarism and divine motivation, drawing the face of the moral saints considered by her and criticizing this view. Research Findings By placing God as the source of all valuable attributes, Zagzebski describes the similarities of the saints in their moral and religious dimensions and justifies their differences based on their life narratives, emotional reactions in different situations, and their motivations in response to those situations. Her view affirms the existence of certain characteristics in saints which are best known as strong emotional dispositions; Desires that are somehow related to their relationship with God. Zagzebski's recent explanation of saints is important because she rightly tries to connect their religious and moral aspects. Focusing properly on the emotions of the saints, she provides valuable insights into their motivations for performing supererogation and highly humanitarian behaviors, the good cause of their emotions, and why they should be imitated. In short, Zagzebski’s final view on saints can be summarized in three main components: a) Being moral and religious ideal: Zagszebski's explanation of saintliness, with the right emphasis on the relationship of saints with God and their moral ideal and trying to understand the nature of the relationship between these two aspects, is outstanding among the philosophical descriptions of saints. Zagzebski considers the moral goodness of the saints because of their imitation of Christ and then developing motives like his. So, the sacrifice and supererogatory actions of the saints can be justified from the point of view of religious imitation. b) Having developed emotions: Saints are known for communicating from the heart with people, loving real goodness, and not being fascinated by the external appearance of people, looking at phenomena as they really are, and providing valuable and efficient advice even to strangers, and all these abilities are due to their developed emotions. c) Imitability: According to Zagzebski, we should imitate the emotions, motivations, and virtues of the saints and perform actions that produce the same results that the saints are motivated to achieve. She introduces the saints as role models in life, who appear good in almost any situation, and referring to their life narrations inspires admiration for all of us. Discussion of Results and Conclusion In general, it is possible to evaluate Zagszebs’s effort in explaining her moral theory in the direction of emphasizing the lives of saints as effective and captivating moral models. Using the theory of direct reference, she describes the process of imitating virtues from virtuous people and further points out the common characteristics of moral saints. By claiming to discover the good nature of moral models, Zagzebski tries to reduce the main foundations of moral theories, including attention to the character of the agent in virtue ethics and attention to actions and consequences in deontological and utilitarian ethics, to the concept of emotions. From her point of view, the value of virtue depends on its connection with emotions that are really good. By referring all moral values to God as the source of goodness, she aims to get rid of the charge of relativism regarding her considered moral models to the extent that she considers the condition of being a saint to be shared by others in divine motives and virtues, as embodied in her character, Jesus Christ. In summing up her view on saints, we find these people as moral and religious ideals, with developed emotions and worthy of imitation. But with all the positive points in Zagsbeski’s account, there are also criticisms: The inability to discover the nature of the relationship of saints with God, the uncertainty of the extent of the devotion to saints, not comprehensive in drawing out the characteristics of saintly life, generalizing the examples of Christian culture to other cultures and religions, ignoring the role of religious communities and spiritual teachings in the development of moral ideals. In any case, it seems that part of the doubts and criticisms about Zagzebski’s view is due to the newness of her theory, which could become clear with more research. لیندا زگزبسکی، ازجمله فیلسوفانی است که با بسط نظریة انگیزش الهی خود در زمینة عواطف و انگیزه‌های قدیسان، کوشید خلأ مهم تبیین‌های پیش از خود دربارۀ حیات قدیسانه را پر کند و نشان دهد چرا توجه به قدیسان نباید صرفاً محدود به جایگاه آنان به‌مثابة الگوهای اخلاقی باشد. ازنظر او، ارتباط قدیسان با خدا همان چیزی است که آنها را در بلندای قلل اخلاق جای می‌دهد. او به‌درستی بر عواطف قدیسان، تمرکز و بینش‌های ارزشمندی در رابطه با روانشناسی اخلاقی آنها ارائه می‌کند. در این مقاله ضمن پرداختن به مفهوم قداست و ریشه‌های تاریخی آن در فرهنگ مسیحیت، کوشیده شده است از رهگذر تبیین دو نظریة مهم سرمشق‌گرایی و انگیزش الهی زگزبسکی، مهم‌ترین ادلة او در باب سبک زندگی قدیسانه به بوته نقد گذاشته شود. با اینکه دیدگاه جذاب او پیشرفت مهمی در جهت درک و توجیه مفهوم قداست اخلاقی به حساب می‌آید، از این حیث که هنوز نمی‌تواند حد و مرز تقلید از قدیسان و نیز ماهیت ارتباط آنها را با خدا به‌طور دقیق روشن کند، ناقص است. همچنین، زگزبسکی از نقش جوامع و نهادهای مذهبی و تربیت معنوی در زیست قدیسانه غفلت کرده است و توجه چندانی به فضایل و موهبت‌های خاصی که قدیسان به‌ویژه در فرهنگ‌های غیرمسیحی از آنها برخوردارند، نداشته است؛ بنابراین، از این نظر، تبیین او جامعیت کافی ندارد.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27323_6f15a47d13865ac8d38aa62da29533c9.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Typology of Religiosity from the Perspective of Seyyed Heidar Amoli and Abdolkarim Soroush گونه‌شناسی دین‌ورزی از دیدگاه سیدحیدر آملی و عبدالکریم سروش 63 80 27304 10.22108/coth.2023.135044.1749 FA عطیه زندیه استادیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکده فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران معصومه عامری دانش آموخته دکتری کلام اسلامی، گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه شهید مطهری، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2022 09 10 The typology of religiosity is one of the topics that has been considered by theologians. Seyyed Heidar Amoli and Abdolkarim Soroush are among the thinkers who have made such efforts. Our purpose in the present fundamental-theoretical study is to compare their viewpoints on this issue. Seyyed Heidar enumerates three levels of ‘Sharia (the Way)’, ‘Tariqah (the Procedure)’, and ‘Haghighah (the Truth)’ for religiosity. Soroush also suggests a typical typology of religiosity that has distinctions and interferences with the mentioned divisions. The three types of religiosity are: ‘thoughtful to expediency’, ‘thoughtful to knowledge’, and ‘thoughtful to experience’. Although Seyyed Heidar and Soroush have a common policy in many religious, intellectual, and cultural characteristics, their intellectual atmosphere and time have caused their principles and approach to become different. Seyyed Heidar deals with the typology of religiosity in accordance with the traditional and mystical approach while Soroush focuses on a social approach based on the modern world. The most important result, which distinguishes these two approaches, is Soroush’s attention to epistemology as one of the components of modern thought, and Seyyed Heidar’s attention to traditional ontology. Introduction One of the mystical issues discussed by Abdulkarim Soroush under the influence of Seyyed Haidar Amoli is the typology of kinds (types) of religiosity. According to the hadith ‘Al-Shari'a Aqawali wa Tariqah Aqwali Wal Haqiqah Ahwali’, Seyyed Haidar believes that there are three levels for religion and religiosity, which are: Shariat (religion), Tariqat (method), and Haqiqat (truth). His definition of these three terms is as follows: What is meant by Shariat is the heartfelt acknowledgment of the words of the prophets and doing (executing) them. The meaning of tariqat is to investigate the deeds and ethics of prophets and to attribute them to their traits. The truth is the intuition of the states and positions of prophets through detection. Soroush also believes in three types of religiosity under the issues of expediency thinking, epistemological thinking, and experiential thinking. According to his definition, dealing with the emotional face of religion will bring about expedient religiosity. Epistemological thinking religiosity will be created as a result of the reflections of theoretical intellect in the field of religion, and experiential thinking religiosity will come to fruition through the heart, conscience, and the power of intuition. In this regard, the aim of this study is to compare and conform the typology of religiosity based on the viewpoints of Seyyed Haider Amoli and Abdulkarim Soroush to determine the thoughts differentiation raised on a subject for several centuries, and to clarify the effect of the periods on the way of thinking of thinkers. Materials and Methods This paper is the result of a comparative study of one of the theological-mystic subjects between the two thinkers of the Islamic world, in which we have compared their opinions with an analytical approach and we have used the documentation method in collecting the materials. The research approach in this paper is fundamental and theoretical in that it deals with the subject of thought and epistemology and uses the rational analysis and reasoning method. Research Findings Types of religiosity in the viewpoint of Seyyed Haidar and Soroush are similar to each other in some cases while different in some aspects. The commonalities of Seyyed Haidar and Soroush's viewpoints include the following: They have paid attention to the types of religiosity in a macro way and have dealt with its sub-divisions. They have spoken on the levels of religiosity. According to Seyyed Haidar’s criteria, this level is related to the talents and capabilities of religious people, and according to Soroush, it is related to the perceptive capacity of people and the sincerity of the right word. According to them, religious people are divided into common and special people. According to Seyyed Haidar, the levels of religious people have a one-to-one correspondence with the levels of religion, but Soroush has not established such a correspondence. Seyyed Haidar and Soroush have taken help from some religious issues in raising this discussion. Seyyed Haidar uses the issues of religious principles and five branches (corollaries) of the religion branches (minutiae), and Soroush also presents his discussions about the issues of God and the Prophet, worship in general, disbelief and faith, happiness and misery, heaven and hell. Seyyed Haider and Soroush have taken help from some religious categories in this discussion. Seyyed Haidar uses the topics of the principles of religion and the five branches of religion, and Soroush also presents his topics around the topics of God and the Prophet, worship in general, disbelief and faith, happiness and misery, heaven and hell. Each of them divides the first type, i.e. Shariat and expedient approach, into two types, i.e. popular and scholarly. They divide the position of religious scholars into three categories: jurists, sages and theologians, and mystics. They attach a special status and dignity to the third level, that is, the people of truth-seeking and experiential religiosity, and consider this level to deserve the certitude position. Seyyed Haidar and Soroush believe in an equivocal relationship between the levels of religiosity and believe that all the three levels are valid (right), the higher levels are complementary to the lower ones, and commitment to following the Prophet (PBUH) and implementation of Shariat are among the conditions of all the levels. The differences between Seyyed Haidar’s and Soroush’s viewpoints include the following: They belong to two completely-distinct intellectual eras. Seyyed Haidar is a traditional mystic and Soroush is a modern theologian. The priorities are different in the division submitted by these two thinkers. Seyyed Haidar forms his division based on the levels of religion, while Soroush makes religious people the center of his division. They have different goals of typology of religion and religiosity. Seyyed Haidar’s goal is to create harmony between jurisprudential, theological, and mystical thoughts, but Soroush’s goal is to pay attention to spiritual issues and modern wisdom. While Seyyed Haider and Soroush believe in the intellect (wisdom), each of them values it differently. According to Seyyed Haidar, intellect is one of the sources of knowledge (cognition) after narration and heart, but in Soroush's viewpoint, the intellect takes the first place in knowledge (cognition). Discussion of Results and Conclusions Considering the commonalities and differences existing between the thought of these two thinkers, in this study, we have concluded that although the viewpoints of Seyyed Haider and Soroush have the same religious, cultural, and intellectual support, and even the mystical spirit is a prominent common point between them, what has caused their thoughts on this particular issue, i.e. the typology of religion and religiosity, to differ from each other, is their lifetime, scientific and epistemological atmosphere, and their tastes. These issues have caused them to adopt different foundations in their own thought and to think about issues with two different traditional and modern approaches. Although the triple types they believe in have more similarities than differences, they have created a great distinction in their thoughts. In the comparison of the divisions submitted by Seyyed Haider and Soroush, the first two types overlap with expedient religiosity in Seyyed Haider's opinion. The third type is also compatible with experiential religiosity. What is missing in Seyyed Haider's thought and Soroush’s great efforts to stabilize it is the epistemological religiosity that was formed under the influence of modern epistemology. This has caused the biggest difference between them. Seyyed Haider's thought belongs to the ontological paradigm, and he thinks based on traditional ontological foundations. Soroush’s thought is indebted to the epistemological paradigm, and modern ontological components guide his thought. گونه‌شناسی دین‌ورزی یکی از مباحثی است که الهی‌دانان به آن توجه داشته‌اند. سید‌حیدر آملی و عبدالکریم سروش ازجمله اندیشمندانی هستند که به این امر همت گماشته‌اند. هدف ما در این مقاله، مقایسه و تطبیق دیدگاه‌های ایشان دربارۀ این موضوع است. سید‌حیدر برای دین‌ورزی، مراتب سه‌گانۀ «شریعت»، «طریقت» و «حقیقت» را بر می‌شمرد. سروش نیز نوعی گونه‌شناسی دین‌ورزی را عرضه می‌کند که با تقسیمات یادشده، تمایزها و تداخل‌هایی دارد. این سه‌گونه دین‌ورزی عبارت‌اند از: «مصلحت‌‌اندیش»، «معرفت‌اندیش» و «تجربت‌‌اندیش». سیدحیدر و سروش با آنکه در بسیاری از خصوصیات دینی، فکری و فرهنگی خط‌مشی واحدی دارند، فضای‌ فکری و زمانۀ‌ آنان باعث شده است تا مبانی و رویکردشان متفاوت شود. سید‌حیدر به‌مقتضای رویکرد سنتی و عرفانی به گونه‌شناسی دین‌ورزی می‌پردازد؛ در حالی ‌‌که سروش رویکرد اجتماعی مبتنی بر دنیای مدرن را محور قرار می‌دهد. مهم‌ترین نتیجه‌ای که این دو رویکرد را از هم متمایز می‌کند، توجه سروش به شناخت‌شناسی به‌عنوان یکی از مؤلفه‌های تفکر مدرن، و التفات سید‌حیدر به وجودشناسی سنتی است. روش تحقیق در این مقاله، از این نظر که به موضوعی اندیشه‌ای و معرفتی می‌پردازد و به روش استدلال و تحلیل عقلانی مبادرت می‌ورزد، بنیادین و نظری است و از‌ این ‌نظر که آرای دو متفکر را مقایسه می‌کند و تطبیق می‌دهد، مقایسه‌ای و تطبیقی است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27304_1ede7e33fcddf532890c8b88e49a63c3.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 An Evaluation of Allameh Tabatabai's Argument of Reality from the Viewpoint of Swinburne's Simplicity Principle ارزیابی برهان واقعیت علامه طباطبایی از منظر اصل سادگی سویینبرن 81 98 27300 10.22108/coth.2023.123409.1414 FA سعید بشاش دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران حسن فتح زاده دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه زنجان، زنجان، ایران Journal Article 2020 07 06 Philosophers, especially at the beginning of the era of philosophy, have made various arguments to explain the origin of existence. Allameh Tabatabai's argument of reality is among them. In this study, Swinburne's account of the simplicity principle is analyzed. Then, the principles and concepts postulated in the argument of reality are analyzed and examined based on the facets. What seems impressive in the argument of reality is brevity. In this research, an attempt has been made to answer two research questions: 1) Is it rational to consider the simplicity criterion in assessing the truth of a theory and its probability? Also, is the argument of reality in the viewpoint of Swinburne's simplicity principle, simpler than other arguments? Swinburne positively agrees with this view. He considers simplicity to be a fundamental a priori truth, and the criterion of the probability of an explanation. ‘Simplicity’ is one of the fundamental concepts of epistemology. ‘Syntactic simplicity’ measures the number and brevity of the basic principles of a theory and its formulation, and ‘ontological simplicity’ measures the number of kinds of concepts postulated in a theory. William Ockham did not explicitly mention the principle of simplicity, but he is known for the famous term "Ockham's Razor". He does not consider the assumption of plurality without the necessity to be rational. Popper argued that a simple theory is easier to be falsified. According to Eliot Sober, simplicity is meaningful only if it is placed in a particular context. So, he proposes the principle of ‘parsimony’. According to David Lewis, the predicates and concepts that formulated a simple theory should refer to perfectly natural properties. Quine considers the tendency to prefer simple theories to be caused by ‘translogical features of human thought’ that tend the world to be simple. Swinburne argues it is an a priori ultimate epistemological principle that simplicity is evidence of truth. He considers simplicity to be the criterion of the probability of a theory and the evidence of the truth of that theory and suggests six facets in his account. Philosophically, the factors are 1) the number of concepts and principles postulated, 2) the number of kinds of concepts, 3) understanding the concepts postulated in a theory not to be entailed in understanding other concepts and principles, 4) a theory consisting of a few principles is simpler than one consisting of many principles, 5) a formulation of a theory in which principles relate to a few concepts is simpler rather than many concepts, and 6) a mathematical formulation is simpler. The principles and concepts postulated in the argument of reality are general and obvious in that their definition is literal, and they consist of the concept of eternal necessity and the concept of reality. The concept of reality takes precedence over the concept of the authenticity of existence and nature. In Allameh’s argument, from the beginning, the external reality is considered, regardless of whether that reality is an example of existence based on the authenticity of existence, or based on the authenticity of nature, it is an example of a contingent nature or a necessity nature, which does not make a difference in the completeness of the argument. Because it is enough to be clear that absolute reality exists unconditionally. This argument relies on the inviolable truth of the proposition that absolute reality necessarily exists. This brevity in the principles and concepts of the argument of reality makes it very compatible with the principle of simplicity and the facets that Swinburne enumerated in his account. According to Swinburne’s account, simplicity is a fundamental a priori truth. The Proposition "absolute reality necessarily exists" is a priori true and never accepts negation, and it always corresponds to a reality, either negatively or positively. The results of the present study show that, according to Swinburne's account, simplicity is the criterion of the probability of an explanation. In other words, if an explanation is a priori true, so the fundamental evidence for its truth is the simplicity of that explanation. Therefore, according to the correspondence theory of truth, it seems to be rational that the argument of reality is simpler and more probable than other arguments. In addition, it seems there is a correspondence in the argument of reality for each of the facets Swinburne enumerated for simplicity making it simpler than other arguments. برای اثبات وجود مبدایی برای عالم، استدلال‌های گوناگونی صورت گرفته است. برهان صدیقین گونه‌ای استدلال است که در آن، با تأمل در حقیقت وجود، مبدأ وجود استنتاج می‌شود. استدلال علامه طباطبایی به سبک برهان صدیقین است که «برهان واقعیت» نام گرفته است و تقریر ساده‌تری به نظر می‌رسد. مفهوم سادگی از آغاز درخشش بر لبۀ تیغ اکام، در دستگاه‌های فکری، معیار داوری میان تبیین‌های علمی و فلسفی در نظر گرفته و روایت‌های گوناگونی از آن ارائه شده است. در این میان، روایت ریچارد سویینبرن دقیق‌تر و پرمایه‌تر به نظر می‌رسد؛ زیرا او سادگی را هم به معنای نحوی و هم به معنای هستی‌شناختی آن در نظر گرفته و جنبه‌های گوناگونی برای آن بر شمرده است. سویینبرن سادگی را معیار محتمل‌بودن یک نظریه و دلیل صدق آن می‌داند. مقالۀ حاضر، نخست روایت سویینبرن از اصل سادگی را بازگو می‌کند و سپس در پرتو این اصل می‌کوشد نشان دهد تبیین علامه طباطبایی ساده‌ترین و بهترین تبیین دربارۀ مبدأ هستی است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27300_bd4a5cbe2e7eb19cb42e8718d2a47290.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Analysis of the Concept of Confidence and Trust in God from Sadrul Matalhin's Point of View and Its Relationship with the Psychological Concept of Self-confidence تحلیل مفهوم توکل از نگاه صدرالمتألهین و نسبت آن با مفهوم روان‌شناختی اعتمادبه‌نفس 99 116 27272 10.22108/coth.2023.135584.1768 FA محمد جواد پاشایی استادیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران مسعود نورعلیزاده میانجی استادیار گروه روانشناسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه شاهد، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2022 10 31 The doctrine of monotheism is the most important doctrine that sheds light on all areas of religion, i.e. rulings, morals, and beliefs, at the head of Islamic teachings. Moreover, the importance of the doctrines of confidence and trust should also be seen under the importance and dignity of the doctrine of monotheism because the believer, with trust, considers God to be the only effective force in existence and relies on Him alone in the affairs of his life. This research tries to obtain an accurate reading of the psychological concept of self-confidence by using the descriptive-analytical method and benefiting from the techniques and tools available, after studying the doctrine of confidence from the perspective of Sadrul Matalhin. For the accurate interpretation of confidence and trust from Mullah Sadra's point of view, it is necessary to reveal how it is combined with the psychological concept of self-confidence. Although in psychology, self-confidence is presented in a neutral and unvalued way as an important factor in mental health, with a negative perception of this concept, the sum between self-confidence and trust becomes impossible because such a person, in the chain of causes, does not give dignity to God, and without the need to trust God, sometimes he rules over existence and destiny. However, in the positive perception of the concept of self-confidence, which is close to self-esteem and self-efficacy, Mutawakkul (trustee) sees his capabilities as a tool to get rid of pests such as self-deprecation, weakness, and laziness. However, in the way of matching and summing trust and self-confidence according to Sadra's principles, self-confidence should be considered to be combined only with some levels of trust, and in others it is irrelevant. In other words, in explaining the degrees of trust, Mulla Sadra considers the lowest level of trust to be when the person who trusts in it trusts God like others. Therefore, the justified meaning can be considered for self-confidence. According to Mulla Sadra, the highest degree of trust is the moment when the person trusts in God for all causes. Mulla Sadra's conclusion is that on the one hand, many things in the world arise through mediation; on the other hand, all those means are channels of God. Even though the causes are considered to be causal, they are not given independence to become a force within the divine power. Also, in the negative perception of self-confidence, the sum between self-confidence and trust becomes impossible. Because such a person, in the chain of causes, does not give any dignity to God and does not need to trust God. According to Mulla Sadra's view, self-confidence should be considered a low and medium level of collectable trust. At the highest level of trust, it is no longer possible in the sense of longitudinal causality, numerical causality, or any other meaning. با اهمیت آموزه توحید در اندیشه اسلامی، ارجمندی توکل نیز در امتداد آن مطرح می‌شود. از بین حکمای اسلامی، صدرالمتألهین در نگاهی هماهنگ با وحی، سرشت و درجات توکل را به دقت مطالعه کرده است. با توجه به اینکه گاه دربارۀ چگونگی اجتماع توکل (اعتماد به خدا) با مفهوم روان‌شناختی اعتمادبه‌نفس در زیست مؤمنانه، سؤال می‌شود، در این تحقیق کوشیده شده است تا در روی‌آوردی توصیفی‌تحلیلی به آرای ملاصدرا دربارۀ توکل و با بهره‌مندی از تکنیک‌ها و ابزارهای موجود در روش‌های تحلیل اسنادی، به این مهم پاسخ داده شود و در پرتو آن با بازسازی مفهوم اعتمادبه‌نفس، ابعاد توکل را نیز نمایان‌تر سازد؛ بنابراین، پرسش اصلی این نوشتار آن است که مختصات توکل در اندیشه ملاصدرا چیست و نسبت آن با مفهوم روان‌شناختی اعتمادبه‌نفس کدام است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهند با نظر به اندیشه‌های ملاصدرا، اعتمادبه‌نفس را باید با مراتب نازل و متوسط توکل اجتماع‌پذیر و با مرتبه عالی توکل اجتماع‌ناپذیر دانست. تبیین درجات توکل، نسبت توکل با کار و تلاش و نیز نسبتش با نظام سبب مسببی، از نتایج دیگر این تحقیق به‌شمار می‌رود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27272_4d59e2e68238a4bc6e6d8dc81b32b0d4.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Epistemology of Saadia Gaon معرفت شناسی سعدیا گائون 117 136 27432 10.22108/coth.2023.130365.1634 FA قربان علمی دانشیار گروه ادیان و عرفان، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران محسن رحمانی نژاد دکترای تخصصی گروه ادیان و عرفان، دانشکده الهیات، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2021 09 06 Epistemology is a science that discusses human knowledge, including its nature, possibility, ways, types, territory, etc. of knowledge. It is a field that philosophers, theologians, and religious scholars have taken more effective steps in deepening and developing it. Jewish thinkers have also paid special attention to this issue. Sadia bin yusuf al-fayoumi, nicknamed Sadia Gaon, the father of Jewish philosophy and the head of the Rabbinical religious school "Sura", is considered one of the most important theologians in the history of the tradition of Rabbinical Judaism. He is known as the first Jewish philosopher and exegete in the middle centuries due to his innovative and systematic ideas. He is the first person who, in addition to his detailed views on theology and cosmology, has also raised important opinions on epistemology in two works ‘Kitab Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat (the Book of Beliefs and Opinions)’ and ‘Tafsir Sefer Yetsira (Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira)’. The two works suggest two different structures of epistemology. Sadia points out that the human mind is able to explain reality in two ways: one is based on empirical rationalism and the other is based on divine illumination and self-revelation in the mind. In other words, the human mind can act in two modes like the act of dialogue (i.e. arguing and reasoning or being silent, meditating, listening, and seeing). Considering the unique role of knowledge arising from reflection and revelation, in reaching the complete truth, Sadia plans and examines it from various angles in his important works. Along with Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, he makes a detailed discussion in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira about epistemology. Its study helps a lot to understand his thought. Sadia's thinking in religions and beliefs has a controversial nature. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he has relatively deep and esoteric thinking. This study, using the analytical comparative method, investigates the topics related to epistemology raised in the two mentioned works of Sadia. In his works, knowledge has different meanings: in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, it is shown as the correspondence between external reality and its concept in the human mind, while in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge is related to the origin and nature of creation. In ‘the Book of Beliefs and Opinions’, Sadia, in a positive answer regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, considers his goal to be certain and removes all doubts. In this book, while proving the same validity of knowledge and results that can be achieved through revelation and rational reasoning, he cites verses from the Bible to prove the foundations of his epistemological teachings. He considers the factor of knowledge to be the intellectual power of the soul, which only God has rightly placed in the person's existence. Despite the fact that the cognitive process relies on sensory perception, the intellect includes a system of principles and generalities that exist independently of sensory data. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira considers the goal of the author of the book to be the representation (portrait) of how things come into being and find their existence so that the knower can understand them and the wise beings can learn them. Therefore, while confirming the possibility of acquiring knowledge, this work emphasizes the role of revelation in this connection. Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat presents the elements of the ‘cognition process’ in the form of a hierarchical model in three steps: 1) a complex and vague idea that is only a vague and confused idea of the nature of the research subject, 2) an analysis of this idea, and 3) accepting the ultimate truth by a belief freed from doubts. Here we witness a process of gradual internalization of knowledge that occurs in the mind, a process during which sensory perception turns into belief. In this process, reason gradually removes the factors that cause doubt and error, and then reaches the understanding of the truth by refining and classifying the mixed information of the external world. This is Saadia's model to reach the correct belief. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira does not include regular epistemological statements that describe the process of cognition in detail. But it associates three necessary factors (knowing, thinking, and believing) with the three corresponding faculties of the soul. He attributes knowledge to the power of collecting data (al-Qowwah al-Hashira) of the soul, which collects the discussed data and transmits them to the second power. The second power is the ‘discernment power’ (al-Qowwah al-Momaizah), which recognizes true and false data and verifies the facts by rejecting false data. Then, this power transfers the refined information to ‘Al-Qowwah al-Mu’taqidah’ which preserves it and becomes sure of its authenticity. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, along with the three general sources of knowledge, mentioned in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ (Kal-barq), i.e. illumination, plays a prominent role. In complete contrast to his negative assessment of lightning-like knowledge in Al-Amanat, in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he states that the principles of things appear in the mind like lightning, then they become clear and certain before his eyes. Of course, this duality goes back to different approaches of Sadia's epistemology in these two works as well as the related fields. In Al-Amanat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ refers to sensible reality per se. But in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge has the nature of representation. That is, the mind relies on itself in the complete absence of sensory data. Therefore, it seems that illumination is the only way to understand this ‘other reality’. In al-Amanat and beliefs, knowledge means the correspondence of external reality and its meaning in the human mind, while in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, it is related to the ultimate roots of creation, without considering sensory perception. Wisdom is one of the most controversial epistemological words of Sadia. Saadia's definition of wisdom is based on various biblical passages, and thus it can be seen as the result of Saadia's exegetical activities rather than independent philosophical reflection. In Al-Amanat, al-Hikmat is defined as “kawn al-ashyaʾ ʿala ḥaqaʾiqiha al-maʿluma wa-laysa-l-ḥikma an takun al-ashyaʾ ʿala tamanni mutamanin wa-la shahwa mushtahin” and the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira defines it as “al-ḥikma hiya tartib al-ashyaʾ maratibaha wa-taqdiruha maqadiraha”. In short, according to Sadia, it should be said that reality speaks in two languages. In other words, the human mind is able to understand and express reality in two ways: one is universal and unanimous, and ultimately based on sensory and intellectual perception, and the other is based on God's self-revelation through human intuition. الامانات و الاعتقادات و تفسیر سفر یصیرا دو اثر فلسفی سعدیا گائون، به‌عنوان تبیین‌هایی از دو ساختار متفاوت معرفت‌شناسی مطرح می‌شوند. سعدیا گائون متکلمی نوفیثاغورثی است که به تشریح دو صورت شناخت می‌پردازد. او اشاره می‌کند ذهن انسان قادر است واقعیت را در دو حالت تبیین کند: یکی مبتنی بر عقل‌گرایی تجربی و دیگری براساس اشراق و خودآشکاری الهی بر ذهن است. ذهن انسان توانایی ذاتی دارد تا حقیقت را در بیش از یک روش درک کند: با ادراک حسی یا شهود اشراقی. نزد سعدیا مدل عقلی کلام و تمثیلی نوفیثاغورسی می‌تواند درب‌هایی را به سوی عالم غیب فراسوی قلمرو مشهود باز کند. به عبارت دیگر، ذهن انسان همانند عمل دیالوگ می‌تواند در دو حالت عمل کند: بحث کند و استدلال بیاورد یا اینکه ساکت باشد، مراقبه کند، گوش کند و ببیند. سعدیا این دو مکتب اندیشه را به‌عنوان دو منظر فکری بر پایۀ دو نظام معرفت‌شناسی متفاوت در دو اثر الامانات و الاعتقادات و تفسیر سفر یصیرا به کار گرفته است تا دریچه‌های متفاوتی را به واقعیت باز کند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27432_1a7258600d19ec144532c297ee046f34.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Universals from the Viewpoints of Shahab Al-Din Suhrawardi and Duns Scotus کلیات از دیدگاه شهاب‌الدین سهروردی و دونس اسکوتوس 137 154 27431 10.22108/coth.2023.128561.1585 FA علی‌اصغر شربتی دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران سعید رحیمیان استاد، گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اسلامی، دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران Journal Article 2021 05 31 The philosophical analysis of universals needs to clarify two terms: the world and the mind. If we can understand the relation between these two, it is possible to answer two questions. First, what are universals? And second, how to make universals? The present research aims to compare universals from the viewpoint of Shahab Al-Din Suhrawardi (1154-1191 CE) and Duns Scotus (1266-1308 CE). Both of them follow the Greek legacy and are under Abrahamic religions. They distinguish between common and special features of the world when they describe it. In Islamic philosophy, these features are called "existence" and "quiddity". But Suhrawardi, by the revival of the system of light, recognizes them as the "light" or the "being". He distinguishes between existence (Wojoud) and being (Maujoud). This distinction is linguistic and ontological. Existence is always in the mind while the being is found in the world outside of the mind. He believes that the specific feature of the world is shown by the beings (Maujoudat). But Suhrawardi does not search for the common feature in existence. He explains that feature by the light (Nour) and the layout of the system patterned by the lights (Anwar). This cosmos system includes the longitudinal and widthways orders. The results of the two orders are two versions of universals. The first version (it could be named the Aristotelian version) belongs to the longitudinal dimension. This version is presented by mind functions. Suhrawardi is among a few Muslim Philosophers that highlights the mind’s function. He believes that the mind has an active and a passive role. The passive one is only a place for perceptions and memories, but its activeness or agency is introduced by the intellect-mind relation. The intellect-act (ontological and epistemological) relation is limited by the mind. Suhrawardi discusses platonic ideas in a widthways order. It results from the second version. But it is important to mention that Suhrawardi’s reading is a wider view of the universals. Suhrawardi’s reading of platonic ideas explains upward and downward lights. The upward light is the result of illumination (Ishraq) and the downward light is the result of observation (Mushahadah). The upward one expresses the Aristotelian universals, and the downward one shows the platonic version. On the other hand, in the medieval period, the term “common nature” express a major problem of universals. This term originates from the Natural Universals of Avicena. The Avicenian concept was so ambiguous, i.e, what he describes is not in the world nor the mind. So, medieval philosophers and commentators had a problem with Avicenna’s quote. The problem was how to interpret universals. Avicenna confirms that the term universal is neither in the world nor in the mind, that is, it has no necessity. Scotus confronts such a strange ontological state. He doesn’t make the Natural Universal in the mind or in the world; rather, he tries to go out of it from its contradictional state. At first, Scotus rejects the theories that consider universals only in the mind and only in the world. He stands in the middle of these two. With two ideas, the common nature goes out from its pureness: non-numerical identity and commonness. The first refers to the idea that everything that has a real identity hasn’t a numerical identity. The real identity of nature exists from the pure state, and, at the same time, it is not an objective nature. But it seems to be in the mind while it is a conceptual issue. Thus, Scotus explains commonness as opposed to universality. Considering this idea, he says that commonness belongs to actual quiddity, not to quiddity in the intellect or mind. It is noticed that two interpretations be possible from the actual quiddity; the first is the objective quiddity, and the second is the quiddity Scotus has proved, i.e, the absolute quiddity that has someplace in the world, but not a sensual object. The commonness belongs to the second interpretation. The reason why the quiddity has commonness is the quiddity itself. Scotus represents the Aristotelian version of universals. He believes that human knowledge achieves experience and separation from particulars. Cognition is divided into sensual and intellectual aspects. The beginning of cognition is sensual but it results in an intellectual path. These are the general roles of the mind. But non-numerical identity and commonness are particularly mental acts. The separation of common nature’s features is by seeing the objective order. The non-numerical identity is obtained by considering the numerical identity. Also, commonness is obtained by considering the real quiddity. Concerning the above explanations, Scotus sees the particulars’ features as real or non-numerical identities and the common features as commonness. Both philosophers believe in active and passive roles of the mind. But, the reading of the mind’s activity is different. Scotus thinks like Aristotle, i.e, perceptions are just obtained from particulars. But Suhrawardi confirms that the mind makes some concepts without world interference, which means some of the universals are made only by the mind. While Scotus believes in the Aristotelian version of universals, Suhrawardi expresses both versions of the universals, although he does not make any connection between the two versions. It is to say that their ways for the explanation of universals are different, but they consider theories on the common and special features of the world. Suhrawardi expresses the light as the special feature and the quiddity (i.e, diversity of quiddity) as the common one, and Scotus proves the real identity (or non-numerical) as the special feature and the commonness (in front of pure universality) as the common one. تبیین فلسفیِ کلیات مطالعۀ آنها در نسبت با عالم و ذهن است و از دو پرسش می‌گذرد: کلیات چیستند و چگونه ساخته می‌شوند. پژوهشِ حاضر به این دو پرسش در آرای سهروردی و اسکوتوس می‌پردازد. با به‌کارگیریِ ادبیاتی مشترک، هر دو فیلسوف، ویژگی‌هایی اشتراکی و اختصاصی برای عالم قائل‌اند. در فلسفۀ اسلامی از این ویژگی‌ها به وجود و ماهیت تعبیر می‌شود؛ اما سهروردی، با تکیه بر نور، آنها را «نور» و «ماهیت یا موجود» معرفی می‌کند. اسکوتوس نیز از کلی طبیعیِ سینوی و طرح دو مسئلۀ «وحدتِ غیرعددی» و «اشتراک» این ویژگی‌ها را تبیین می‌کند. پس از بررسیِ عالم مطالعۀ ذهن ممکن می‌شود؛ زیرا فیلسوفانِ واقع‌باور فلسفه‌شان را از عالم می‌آغازند و سپس به سایر حوزه‌ها سرایت می‌دهند. کلیات با جمع‌بندی برآیندِ نظرات آنها به عالم و ذهن تبیین می‌شود. با در نظر گرفتنِ مناقشۀ افلاطون و ارسطو در مسئلۀ کلیات نتایج زیر به دست آمدند. سهروردی، آگاهانه یا ناآگاهانه، هر دو نسخۀ افلاطونی و ارسطوییِ کلیات را باور دارد؛ در حالی ‌که اسکوتوس تنها نسخۀ ارسطویی را طرح می‌کند. سهروردی این دو نسخه را با هم متصل نمی‌کند. نسخۀ ارسطویی بر عاملیّتِ ذهن تأکید می‌کند و نسخۀ افلاطونی مُثُل افلاطونی را در نظام نوری می‌بیند. همچنین، اسکوتوسِ مشائی ماهیت را در عالمِ خارج از ذهن به شیوۀ ارسطویی، یعنی ادراکِ کلّی از راه جزئیات، اثبات می‌کند. اگرچه هر دو در خوانش از ارسطو هم‌رأی‌اند، از یکدیگر واگرایند. سهروردی بر عاملیّتِ ذهن انگشت می‌نهد. اسکوتوس کلّی را در عالم می‌بیند؛ اگرچه هر دو می‌کوشند نوعی سازگاری بین عالم و ذهن برقرار سازند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27431_8229b286a838af10c7824def7d98f056.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 Typology of the Central Feature of God گونه‌شناسی ویژگی محوری خدا در کتب مقدس ادیان ابراهیمی 155 172 27322 10.22108/coth.2023.112253.1188 FA علی رضا فرهنگ قهفرخی دکتری مطالعات تطبیقی ادیان، گروه ادیان ابراهیمی، دانشکده ادیان، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب قم، قم، ایران احمدرضا مفتاح دانشیار گروه ادیان ابراهیمی،دانشکده ادیان، دانشگاه ادیان و مذاهب قم، قم، ایران سعید بینای مطلق دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2018 09 05 In the sacred books of Abrahamic religions, namely the Testaments and the Qur'an, central features are attributed to God. These features make God identifiable to the audience and create an image of Him in the mind. Each of these holy books has attributed characteristics to the God of their religion that has commonalities and differences with other religions. These characteristics permeate all aspects of religion; therefore, they are considered very important and fundamental and shape the atmosphere of any religion. Normally, one attribute of God is of central importance in every religion among other attributes, and any other attribute is considered a compliment or a ray of it. In this study, an attempt is made to obtain the central characteristics of God in the three religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam through the verses of the Testaments and the Qur'an. Knowing these central features helps us to better understand the specific path of each religion toward its supreme destination and facilitates the dialogue between their followers. The three characteristics of spirit, word, and light are of fundamental importance in these three religions, but each of these three plays a central role in each religion. در کتب مقدس ادیان ابراهیمی، یعنی عهدین و قرآن، ویژگی‌هایی محوری به خدا نسبت داده شده است. این ویژگی‌ها خدا را برای مخاطب قابل شناسایی می‌کند و تصویری از او در ذهن پدید می‌آورد. هر یک از این کتب مقدس، به خدای دین خود ویژگی‌هایی نسبت داده‌اند که با دیگر ادیان، وجوه اشتراک و افتراقی دارد. این ویژگی‌ها در همۀ ابعاد دین نفوذ می‌کنند و از این رو، بسیار مهم و اساسی تلقی می‌شوند و فضای دیانت را شکل می‌دهند. به‌طور معمول، یک ویژگی خدا در هر دین از بین سایر ویژگی‌ها دارای اهمیت محوری است و هر ویژگی دیگری مکمل یا پرتویی از آن محسوب می‌شود. در این مقاله تلاش می‌شود ویژگی‌های محوری خدای متشخص در سه دین یهودیت، مسیحیت و اسلام از خلال آیات عهدین و قرآن به دست آید. دانستن این ویژگی‌های محوری، ما را در فهم بهتر راه خاص هر دین به سوی مقصد متعالی خویش یاری می‌کند و گفتگو بین پیروان آنها را تسهیل می‌کند. سه ویژگی روح، کلمه و نور در این سه دین اهمیتی اساسی دارند؛ اما هر یک از این سه، در هر دین نقشی مرکزی ایفا می‌کنند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27322_4d0b0274a93ad2d3b286a4b42afeeac8.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 13 28 2022 12 22 An Analytical Comparison of Ibn Arabi and Aziz Nasafi’s Ontological Views مقایسۀ تحلیلی آرای هستی‌شناختی ابن‌عربی و عزیز نسفی 173 190 27414 10.22108/coth.2023.133353.1705 FA ابراهیم رضایی استادیار گروه معارف اهل‌البیت (ع)، دانشکده الهیات و معارف اهل‌البیت (ع)، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2022 04 19 Unity of existence, arrangement of levels of existence, and perfect man are the significant mystical subjects that have been consistently considered by thinkers and scholars of Islamic mystical tradition. Taking an analytical-descriptive method, the present study aims to draw the ontology of Ibn Arabi and Aziz Nasafi, the two mystics of the first and second traditions, with respect to the creation of the world and its levels and also to present a consistent model based on fundamentals and structures of their thought, the extent Aziz Nasafi have been influenced by Ibn Arabi and his original theories. Explanation and analysis of Aziz Nasafi’s views about existence reveal that he should be regarded among mystics of the second tradition, albeit with his familiarity with the fundamentals of the first tradition. Aziz Nasafi’s ontological views are informed by those of Ibn Arabi and his followers, yet since Nasafi displays originality in mystical subjects, he has likewise novelty in ontological views. Keywords: Aziz Nasafi, Ibn Arabi, Ontology, Ontological Levels, Levels of Existence. Introduction The knowledge of existence and its levels in the first and second mystical traditions comprised different models given the transformations in the structure of thought which generally requires further investigation particularly pertaining to differences between existence and its levels in both mystical traditions. In his ‘Five Realms of Existence’ (Ḥaḍarāt-i Khams) brought forth in the first mystical tradition and adapted from Qunawi, Ibn Arabi has explicated the levels of existence, and the relation of existence with God. In the second tradition, though, Nasafi has drawn out models on being, the world, and its levels. As a mystic of the second tradition, Nasafi has proposed original models which have been partly influenced by Ibn Arabi’s ‘Five Realms of Existence’ while they are thoroughly original. Considering differences between the first and second mystical traditions in terms of their 1) understanding and approach to knowledge (ma’rifat), and 2) mystical language, the present study scrutinizes perspectives and ontological orders of Ibn Arabi and Nasafi with respect to 1) reasons for the manifestation of existence and 2) levels of existence. Materials and Methods The study uses library research and takes an analytical-descriptive method to carry out the analysis. Taking Ibn Arabi’s ‘Five Realms of Existence’ and Nasafi’s quad model for the levels of existence, comparison is carried out in three aspects: 1) Five Realms of Existence/ Essence (dhāt), Soul (nafs), Sense (wajh), Societal Form and Miscellaneous Form, 2) Five Realms of Existence/ World of Power (Quwwat) and World of Act (fi'l), and 3) Five Realms of Existence/ Magnificence (jabarūt), Invisible World (malakūt), and Visible World (mulk). Research Findings Investigating pillars of knowledge, means of cognition, mystical language, and basis of the spiritual journey in the first and second mystical traditions, it is observed that 1) God and humans are pillars of knowledge in the first mystical tradition and it is characterized by meditative unveiling and multidimensional language, and features anthropology and theology in the spiritual journey. In the second mystical tradition, however, God, humans, and existence are pillars of knowledge, while the tradition is characterized by meditative unveiling, reasoning, deduction, and knowledge from tradition, uses unprecedented language, and its spiritual journey is based on the recognition of microcosm and macrocosm; 2) Nasafi’s quad model for the levels of existence is influenced by Ibn Arabi’s ‘Five Realms of Existence’; 3) Essence, Soul, and Sense align with ‘Five Realms of Existence’: Essence parallels the first realm, Sense is consistent with the second and fifth levels, and Soul conforms to all levels (first model); 4) The three levels of existence are in two forms (second model); 5) World of Power aligns with the first realm, and the World of Act with the second to fifth realms (third model); 6) The second, fourth, and fifth realms of existence have been influential in the development of Magnificence, Invisible World, and Visible World (fourth model). Discussion of Results and Conclusion Comparing Ibn Arabi and Nasafi’s ontological views reveals that Nasafi has been informed by Ibn Arabi and his followers. It is perceived that Nasafi’s innovative ideas (which holistically align with Ibn Arabi’s ontology but vary in detail) in later decades have been the result of the expansion of Ibn Arabi’s views. It is also significant that each of them provides us with new worlds ('awālam). An in-depth analysis demonstrates that what the brevity of Ibn Arabi’s opinions brought forth in his ‘Five Realms of Existence’ (Ḥaḍarāt-i Khams) has been further expanded by Nasafi. Also, Ibn Arabi’s five levels have turned to be three levels in Nasafi’s view. In comparing and contrasting these views, more specifically, the five realms belonging to Ibn Arabi are equal to Essence (dhāt), Soul (nafs), Sense (wajh), Societal Form, and Miscellaneous Form which belong to Nasafi. Similar to Ibn Arabi, moreover, Nasafi realizes that unity of existence (waḥdat-i wujūd) is the basis of existence (hastī), yet Nasafi’s view is of a novelty in detail in that Nasafi proposes four models for the levels of existence. وحدت وجود، چینش مراتب هستی و انسان کامل از عمده‌ترین مباحث مطرح در عرفان بوده‌اند که همواره متفکران و صاحبان اندیشه در سنت عرفان اسلامی به آن توجه داشته‌اند. این نوشتار در پی آن است با بهره‌گیری از روش تحلیلی‌توصیفی، هستی‌شناسی ابن‌عربی و عزیز نسفی، دو عارف سنت‌های عرفانی اول و دوم را از دو جهت آفرینش هستی و مراتب آن ترسیم کند و طرحی منسجم از مقایسۀ مبانی فکری و ساختار اندیشۀ ایشان، میزان تأثیر پذیری نسفی از ابن‌عربی و نیز نظریات نوآورانۀ نسفی ارائه دهد. تبیین و تحلیل دیدگاه‌های عزیز نسفی دربارۀ هستی آشکار می‌سازد که هرچند او با مبانی سنت اول آشنا بوده و از ابن‌عربی نیز تأثیر پذیرفته است، در موضوعات هستی‌شناختی باید او را از عرفای سنت دوم به شمار آورد. آرای هستی‌شناختی عزیز نسفی بر مبنای دیدگاه‌های ابن‌عربی و پیروان او پایه‌ریزی شده‌اند؛ اما چنانکه نسفی در دیگر مباحث عرفانی نظریات مبتکرانه‌ای ارائه کرده، در مباحث هستی‌شناختی نیز آرای تازه‌ای به دست داده است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_27414_ff3e089826c848d23b7b5012e75f58bb.pdf