دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 A Critical Investigation of the Relationship between Death and Sin in the Works of St. Augustine بررسی و نقد ارتباط مرگ و گناه در آثار آگوستین قدیس 1 18 20766 10.22108/coth.2016.20766 FA قاسم کاکائی استاد گروه الهیات دانشگاه شیراز، شیراز، ایران محبوبه جباره ناصرو دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Death has been an everlasting human question. It has been regarded as one of the existential and human epistemic concerns both in religions and various philosophical and theological schools. The question of death in the works of Saint Augustine has been largely dismissed by scholars. Scrutinizing his oeuvre indicates that compared to his predecessors and based on his approach to Christianity, specifically to St. Paul’s doctrines, Augustine is more attentive to the relation between death and sin. In his works, he justifies death based on the original sin as well as those everyday sins that committed by human being throughout her life, identifying sin as the cause of death. Accordingly, he prefers moral causes rather than natural causes resulting in death. Augustine contends that there are three types of death, i.e. corporeal death (the separation of soul and body), spiritual death (separation of human being and God due to sin), and the eternal death (in which soul remains in body, bearing the burden of eternal corporeal punishment away from God.) He believes that God created a human being in a way according to which she would have benefited from eternal life if she had not sinned. However, now not only corporeal death but also the eternal death of soul are the consequences of sins. He opines that all human race, Except Jesus and his mother are the heirs of the original sin committed by Adam and Eve. In this way, every human being is born sinful, contaminated by the original. According to this viewpoint, the human race cannot be perceived as naturally innocent or away from intellectual mistake and deviation. Rather, human being and her thoughts and deeds can be understood only based on the doctrine of fall. In addition, the Adam’s original sin in not merely an event but it is a complicated circumstance imposed by God as a punishment of Adam and Eve due to their disobedience which is followed by different types of death as well as such consequences as the supremacy of body over soul, suffering from old age and senility, struggling with carnal soul, and suffering from various pains, calamities, and illnesses. Critique: Augustine believes that the human race shares the original sin with Adam since they have been in his semen except they are saved by divine grace, becoming able to do the good. Divine grace, however, is not granted to all. Even human’s eligibility is not considered, even though it is not fair. Such figures as Pelagius criticize his extremist approach regarding the original sin, proposing salvation by eligibility. Accordingly, sin cannot be considered as inherited. Rather, everybody, including Adam, will be responsible for his deed. Thus, there is no Original Sin or Fall, but it is only the culprit who bears punishment. Plus, neither paradise nor hell is predestined, but a human being will be the master of his destiny. In addition, death is regarded as a natural phenomenon rather than punishment. Adam was mortal, with or without committing sin, and he was individually responsible for his deeds. مسئلة مرگ، مسئلة همیشگی بشر بوده است و ادیان و مکاتب فلسفی و کلامی، آن را ازجمله دغدغه‌های وجودی و معرفتی انسان می‌دانند. توجه به موضوع مرگ در آثار آگوستین و ارتباط آن با مقولة گناه کمتر مطرح شده است. بررسی آثار آگوستین نشان می‌دهد که وی با توجه به آیین مسیحیت، به‌ویژه تعالیم پولس، بیش از پیشینیان به ارتباط مرگ و گناه توجه دارد. او مرگ را بر مبنای گناه نخستین و دیگر گناهان توجیه می‌کند و حتی گناه را علت مرگ می‌داند. به باور آگوستین، خداوند انسان را به‌گونهای آفریده است که اگر گناه نمیکرد، از زندگی جاودانه برخوردار میشد. اقسام مرگ اعم از مرگ جسم، مرگ نفس و مرگ ابدی در اثر نافرمانی به سراغ انسان میآید. وی تأکید میکند که اولین زوج بشری بر اثر عصیان و بر مبنای داوری عادلانة خداوند مجازات شدند. همچنین نسل بشر در اولین انسان، حاضر بود؛ بنابراین، مجازاتِ گناه دربردارندة همة انسان‌هاست؛ ازاینرو، هر انسانی درحالی متولد می‌شود که ذات او آلوده به گناه نخستین است. وی درمورد گناه نخستین و پیامدهای آن به افراط میگراید و هیچ‌کسی را به‌جز حضرت عیسی و مادرش از گناه مبرّا نمیداند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20766_488cef69f2472dff50eec46e8035ea28.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 Existential Aspect of Evil in the Works of Mani: Explanation and Evaluation وجه وجودیِ« شرّ» در آثار مانی: تبیین و سنجش 19 36 20767 10.22108/coth.2016.20767 FA مژگان خلیلی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه غرب، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران حسین کلباسی اشتری استاد گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Since the old times, resolving and justifying the issue of "Evil" has been among humankind’s perpetual and difficult questions in the path towards making sense of the universe. The background and history of "Evil" in the literature and religion indicates its role in humankind's worldview towards its Existential roots, and this is among the important reasons why theological-philosophical traditions pay great attention to it. Philosophers and theologians have always been aware that justifying Evil in terms of religious beliefs is a huge task; therefore, their endeavors did not always lead to success. Justifying this issue has sometimes lead to duality and polytheism and sometimes it has actually caused theoretical conflicts. According to Mani - whose viewpoint is grounded in some Iranian ancient religious and ceremonial traditions - evil (darkness) resides in the nature of terrestrial creatures. The aforesaid religion claims it wants to discover the rules governing this Being which is composed of Good and Evil and the procedure of liberation and purification from it. Mani’s thoughts had an impact on some Iranian and non-Iranian ancient religions in India, Africa and Middle East. For many years, Augustine believed that Mani’s religion offers the only acceptable rational interpretation of how the world is formed, because, it properly explains the source of Evil. Some scholars believe that Evil is an outcome of abulia and some other – like philosophical and theological traditions of Islamic world – believe that Evil is an outcome of lack of perfection and the absence of good; therefore, they think that Evil is devoid of any originality. The crucial point in this essay is to explain the existential aspect of Evil according to Mani; its real existence and its obvious opposition to good throughout the world; we also want to pay attention to the reasons behind this duality which opens its way out of Mani's works; as he claims, this duality will resolve and become unified in upper levels. If, regardless of the origin that Mani considers for the reality of Evil, we consider Evil a living creature unified with good, because of its being mixed with it, we will need a phenomenological viewpoint towards Evil; from an existential perspective and not from the point of its privation; however, to decide whether this image can withstand theoretical and rational criticism is another point and we have tried to present some of this method's – which theoretically tries to explain Evil cognitively - shortcomings briefly. It should be said that the reason behind difficulties in explaining Evil throughout the history of philosophy lies in assuming it an object we can gain knowledge of. The subject of Evil, before being an issue related to theory and cognition as an individual object, appears in natural life and people can experience it; thus, above all other things, it’s the general and beforehand understanding of Evil’s various phenomenological possibilities from an existential point of view in the field of ontological experience which opens the way for cognitive explanations, which also happens through the help of metaphors and allegories. From a Kantian perspective it’s as if having no access to the essence and Noumenon of Evil causes old and traditional efforts that try to justify the explanations about phenomenological presence of Evil in a cognitive belief system, which, through relying on analogical abilities of pure reason, on the one hand, results in assuming an origin for Evil, and on the other hand, the way out of it and the only way to donate life a purpose will only happen through denying and rejecting the current existence of Evil; a purpose which sums up as paving the way towards death and the supernatural purpose in the afterlife. This is exactly the same thing Mani tries to do through relying on the purpose of absolute good and how to join it in the course of humankind’s religious and ethical life. From an ontological and phenomenological perspective, Evil, with its permanent non-independent presence, benefits from the ability to appear in different shapes in the context of various possibilities of existence and is intertwined with life in a way that on the one hand, because of having no access to it as an independent constant Being we are unable to explain Evil cognitively prior to explaining its existential flow; on the other hand, because Evil appears in different forms, we can only explain the way it is experienced in different possibilities according to a cognitive system, only through relying on allegory or assuming that Evil possesses an unknown essence, as purpose, - a purpose like what Kant explains in his third criticism as teleological reflective verdict -. Meanwhile, allegory plays an important role and it’s exactly what Kant uses in order to explain the relationship between the unknowns’ Noumenon or essence and their appearance. Different experiences of various appearances of Evil has attracted many intellectuals and artists; however, according to this respect, this explanation, will be only accessible after gaining a concise glimpse of Evil’s way of being and appearing, through an aesthetical and teleological reflection and through relying on symbolic metaphors. Mani’s conscious or unconscious efforts to integrate and consolidate his belief system and everything he knew of Evil – according to the natural desire of human or Kantian intellect – results in assuming the existence of an unknown essence behind the veil. An assumption without which, Mani’s basis of aesthetical cognition of this “existence’s genuine issue” will not be organized. It’s exactly because of this that Mani’s cognitive justification of fundamentals of his religion only happens through allegorical tales and in the form of images. از گذشتة دور، حل و توجیه مسئلة «شرّ» ازجمله پرسش‌های همیشگی و دشوار بشر در مسیر فهم هستی بوده است. سابقه و دیرینة‌ این مسئله در عرصه دین و نیز ادبیات، نشانة نقش آن در جهان‌بینی بشر نسبت به ریشه‌های وجودیِ آن ‌است و این یکی از دلایل مهمِ توجه ویژة سنت‌های کلامی‌فلسفی به این مسئله است. فیلسوفان و متالهین آگاه بوده‌اند که توجیه شرّ در زمینة باور و اعتقاد دینی کاری است سترگ؛ بنابراین تلاش آنان همواره موفقیت‌آمیز نبوده است. توجیه این مسئله گاهی به ثنویت و چندخدایی انجامیده و گاهی نیز عملاً به بروز تعارضات نظری منجر شده است. از دیدگاه مانی - که برخاسته از برخی سنت‌های کهن دینی و آیینی ایران زمین است - شرّ (تاریکی)، داخل در سرشت موجودات زمینی و این‌جهانی است. آیین مذکور مدعی است در پی تحقیق کشف قوانین حاکم بر این هستیِ مرکب از خیر و شرّ و روند رهایی و تطهیر از آن است. اندیشه‌های مانی در برخی مذاهبِ‌ کهن ایرانی و غیرایرانی، در پهنة هند و آفریقا و آسیای میانه تأثیر گذاشت. آگوستینوس سال‌ها معتقد بود دین مانی تنها تفسیر عقلانی پذیرفتنی از نحوه شکل‌گیری جهان است؛ زیرا منشأ شرّ را به درستی تبیین کرده است. برخی شرّ را حاصل نقص و ضعف در اراده دانسته‌اند و برخی دیگر - ازجمله در بسیاری از سنت‌های فلسفی و کلامی عالم اسلام- شرّ را نتیجة فقدان کمال و غیبت خیر می‌دانند و برای آن اصالتی قائل نیستند. مسئله مهم در این نوشتار، تبیین وجه وجودی شرّ به طریقی است که در مذهب مانی تدارک شده است؛ نوعی حضور واقعی شرّ و در عین حال ضدیتِ آشکارِ آن با خیر در پهنة گیتی و نیز توجه به علل ثنویتی که از درون آثار مانی راه به بیرون باز می‌کند و بنا بر ادعا، در مراحلی بالاتر به وحدت و یگانگی می‌رسد. اگر صرف‌نظر از مبدایی که مانی برای واقعیت شرّ در نظر گرفته است، آن را‌ در اثر درآمیختگی با خیر، مخلوقی زنده و یگانه با خیر ببینیم، نیازمند نگاهی پدیدارشناسانه به شرّ هستیم؛ آن هم از جنبه وجودی و نه از حیث عدمیِ آن؛ اما در اینکه این تصویر بتواند در برابر نقد عقلی و نظری تاب بیاورد یا خیر، نکته دیگری است که به اجمال تلاش شده است برخی از کاستی‌های این شیوة نقد و بررسی – که به دنبال تبیینِ شناختی شرّ در حوزة نظری است – ارائه شود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20767_1931dedd1910de1767fe64c5767d1b72.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 Mullah Mohammad Mehdi Naraqi and analysis of pantheism theories ملا محمدمهدی نراقی و نقد و ارزیابی نظریات وحدت وجود 37 48 20768 10.22108/coth.2016.20768 FA کورش آسمند دانشجوی دکتری رشته فلسفه و کلام اسلامی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی واحد اصفهان (خوراسگان)، اصفهان، ایران هاشم گلستانی استاد گروه علوم تربیتی و روانشناسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران فتحعلی اکبری دانشیار گروه فلسفه، دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Unity of Existence is one of the key issues of human knowledge that has been discussed by great thinkers in various forms since long time ago. Some have dealt with this issue in pure rational or intuitive terms while some others have tried to combine the two elements of reason and intuition in their discussions. This issue has been discussed by ancient Greeks, neo-Platonists and Persian sages under a variety of titles that range from Intuitive Unity and Gradational Unity to Personal Unity and this shows the importance of this issue. Muhammad Mahdi Naraqi better known as Muhaqiq-e Naraqi is a Muslim mystic, philosopher and theologian who has discussed this issue at various points of his works and critically assessed the ideas of te mystics and philosophers. We can outline his key ideas and critical remarks as follows: -Mystics believe that Divine Presence reveals itself in contingent beings by way of immanence and occurrence. This is indeed to say that God is not independent and is in need of the contingent beings for its realization. -The idea of absolute indetermination of Divine Essence as propounded by mystics is baseless from a logical point of view and is a sign of confusing concept with extension. -No diversity is perceivable in Divine Existence and accordingly believing in divine incarnations in this world is tantamount to express blasphemy. -The objectification of Divine Presence through contingent beings is not acceptable as the latter is equal to endorsing the descent of Divinity to the sphere of corporeal entities. -The reality of contingent beings as conceived by the proponents of the doctrine of taste of sapience has nothing to do with the Essence of Divine Existence. -Divine Presence is of concrete reality regardless of its mental representation and the abstract mode of contingent beings has no rational basis. Although the author believes that Naraqi is right in a number of his remarks some of them are still critically flawed and need to be revised.In fact, Naraqi’s analyses are based on gradational unity and conceptualperspective not personal unity nor extensional perspective. To put it otherwise, he has thought that mystics deny every type of diversity while this is far from being correct as the mystics ground their arguments mainly on Quran and prophetic traditions. Then one cannot negligently attribute such baseless doctrines as immanence, occurrence, apostasy and blasphemy to mystics. After critical assessment of the ideas ofmystics, Naraqi turns to Mulla Sadra’s views of Unity of Existence and reviews him as we have summarized hereunder: -The maxim of Simple Reality in the discussions of unity of existence is concerned with the modes of existence and gradational unity not personal unity. -Mulla Sadra’s depiction of the world as the shadow of Divine Presence is blasphemous because this implies attribution of the flaws of the worldly objects to divinity. -The essential difference between the generator and the generated is an expression of the inconsistency between the mode and the owner of the mode. -Gradationhappens in the concept of existence not in its reality. In other word, weakness and intensity and priority and posteriority occurs in the concept. It seems that the majority of Naraqi’s objections to Mulla Sadra have their origin in Naraqi’ssubjective notion of unity of existence while Mulla Sadras’s point of view of the gradation of existence is objective and his perspective of personal unity of existence is subjective. To put the matter differently, Naraqi speaks of both notions in subjective terms and his idea that there are a number of similarities and differences between the true unity and the untrue one endorses the author’s latter remark. Generally speaking, Naraqi’s objections to the mystics and philosophers show that he is definitely agree with the idea of unity of existence but he does not have a unified approach in this regard and this is why there are various strands of thought within his corpus on the subject that range from Peripateticism and Inutionism to Transcendent Theosophy. Though on surface this might appear to be methodological flaw Naraqi’s attentiveness to various schools of thought is valuable as such. مسئله وحدت وجود ازجمله مهم‌ترین و پیچیده‌ترین مطالب فلسفی و عرفانی است. این مسئله همواره محل بحث و تأمل اندیشمندان بسیاری بوده است. برخی چون ابن‌عربی، قونوی، عبدالرازق کاشانی با رویکرد شهودی و کسانی چون ملاصدرا با رویکرد عقلی و صبغه فلسفی آن را اثبات کرده‌اند و کسانی همچون علاءالدوله سمنانی، این مسئله را به چالش کشیده‌ و نقد کرده است. در این نوشتار، تلاش شده است دیدگاه ملا محمدمهدی نراقی در مسئله وحدت وجود، بررسی و موضع نقادانهاش بر آراء اندیشمندان این مسئله به‌ویژه نظریه ملاصدرا و عرفا تبیین شود. ابتدا، دیدگاه اجمالی ایشان درمورد وحدت وجود، مطرح و درنهایت، انتقادات این حکیم بزرگوار نسبت به نظریات مربوط به آن بیان شده است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20768_d7f81a092456722c3b2ddcbf655bb53d.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 A Study Concerning the Maimonides’ Viewpoint on the Role of Reason and The Law in Human’s perfection, on the Basis of Sadraei’s Approach بررسی دیدگاه ابن میمون درباره نقش عقل و شرع در استکمال انسان، بر مبنای رویکرد صدرایی 49 68 20769 10.22108/coth.2016.20769 FA حجت ابراهیم نجف آبادی دانشجوی دکتری فلسفه تطبیقی دانشگاه قم، قم، ایران جعفر شانظری دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Discussion on the reason and the law, and their functions and relationship in the theoretical and practical field, as well as their role in human understanding of the facts and directing the man in the course towards perfection, are issues that have preoccupied theologians, Philosophers and mystics in centuries, and is still subject of review and reflection for many thinkers. Throughout the history of Islamic civilization and wisdom, in addition to Muslim scholars, among believers in other religions we encounter prominent and well-known philosophers that alongside Muslim scholars, have tried to discuss and comment on these important issues; for example, Maimonides that was a prominent rabbi and sage in the sixth century AD, like the majority of sages regardes “human” as “rational soul” ,and considers the reason as the most important distinguishing factor of mankind that God has made human a gift of it. He believes that by benefitting from the reason and in the light of the commands of the Law of Moses (PBUH), everyone can achieve the highest degrees of perfection. Therefore, he suggests various levels for perfection that start from the low degree and end in point that prophets and saints have achieved. He emphasizes that other people as much as their attempt can travel through the grades of perfection and makes it clear that just reaching the final stage, which includes knowledge of the facts, and especially the knowledge of God and his actions can bring true happiness for man. Also, according to his opinion the usage of reason and knowledge in arena of society causes social promotion and better interactions among people. Nevertheless, dispute of his empathetic view about the place and ability of man qua man, unlike some group of mystics and philosophers, this Jewish thinker believes that among the creatures, some of them have their own purposes; so it is not correct to say that all of them have created for human. Close to above ideas can be found in philosophy of Mulla Sadra who is one of the most prominent Muslim philosophers that have serious concerns about "rationality" as the main censor of human from other animals. he believes that paying right of reason in both theoretical and practical aspects would provide genuine happiness and perfection for human. Actually, according to his mastery in rational and traditional knowledge, and in his intellectual framework, he makes effort to show the function of reason and religion and their mutual role for persons who desire attaining the ultimate perfection . In this approach, compliance with religious laws in the realm of the individual and society, is the most important factor for human felicity. So, for this purpose ,he raises issues that has some similarities and differences with the views of Maimonides .Also, despite the latent abilities in reason, Mulla Sadra, like Maimonides, accept the belief in human centrality among the beings in material world, not in whole of possible world. Accordingly ,In this paper the author tries to study these two thinker’s approach on the levels of prosperity, the role of law and reason in reaching ultimate human happiness and the man position among the other creatures. ابن میمون آندلسی «عقل» را مهمترین ممیّزه انسان از سایر حیوانات و نعمتی از جانب خداوند برای بشر می داند که مهمترین عامل پیونددهنده بین او و حق تعالی می باشد. به باور این متفکر، میزان بهره گیری از این گوهر است که مراتب افراد در قرب و بُعد نسبت به باری تعالی را تعیین نموده و بکارگیری و بهره گیری ازعقل و علم در عرصه اجتماعی را نیز موجب رشد جامعه و تعاملات حسنه در میان مردم می داند. ابن میمون به عنوان یک خاخام برجسته یهودی، پیروی ازفرامین شریعت حضرت موسی را راهی می داند که می تواند انسان را به کمالات مادی و معنوی نائل نموده و زمینه شکوفایی عقلی و خُلقی جامعه را فراهم آورد. در همین راستا وی مراتبی را برای سیر تکاملی انسان برشمرده و معتقد است که صرفاً وصول به مرتبه پایانی که دربرگیرنده معرفت به حقایق و خصوصاً معرفت به خداوند و افعال اوست می تواند سعادت حقیقی را برای انسان فراهم آورد. با این حال به عقیده ابن میمون، هیچ یک از این محاسن نمی تواند توجیه کننده قول به محوریّت انسان در میان جمیع مخلوقات و اینکه او غایت خلقت ممکنات است، محسوب گردد. قریب به دیدگاه های فوق را در آراء صدرالمتألهین شیرازی نیز می توان یافت. نزد او «ناطقیّت»، به عنوان ممیزه اصلی انسان از سایر حیوانات است و ادای حقّ عقل در دو بُعد نظری و عملی آن، موجبات سعادت و کمال حقیقی انسان را فراهم می‌آورد. در این رویکرد،پیروی از قوانینی که در عرصه های فردی و اجتماعی توسط شریعت مصطفی (ص) در قالب عبادات، معاملات و قواعد اخلاقی، مقرّر شده است، به عنوان بهترین دستورالعمل برای شکوفایی انسانیت بر شمرده می شود.با این حال در اندیشه صدرایی نیز کمالات عقل نظری، مرتبه ای والاتر از عقل عملی دارد و مراعات دستورات قوانین شرع در قوالب مزبور، طریقی برای وصول به سعادت نهایی انسان در بُعد نظری که عبارت از مشاهده معقولات و حقایق و اتحاد با حقّ است، به شمار می آید. با وجود توانایی های نهفته در عقل، صدرا نیز مانند ابن میمون، انسان را تنها در میان مخلوقات عالَم ماده دارای محوریّت دانسته و باور به خَلق تمام ممکنات از بهر انسان را نمی پذیرد.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20769_be21dc8edc88873e7a15b5ff42555ede.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah and Allameh Tabataba’i on Immortality in Hell خلود در عذاب جهنم از منظر ابن‌قیم جوزی و علامه طباطبایی 69 86 20770 10.22108/coth.2016.20770 FA جنان ایزدی استادیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران مجید صادقی حسن آبادی دانشیار گروه فلسفه و کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران فاطمه یوسفی کزج دانش آموختة کارشناسی ارشد کلام اسلامی دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 The Immortality of the people of hell and their eternal torment is one of the most important and complex debates, preoccupying religious scholars of different religions and sects. Each of them has taken a different way based on their intellectual principles of belief to solve this problem and the questions thereof, including how the immortality of the inhabitants of hell hellions and their eternal torment is consistent with the mercy and justice of God. How is it reasonable to endure infinite torment for limited and finite sins? Does a Merciful God, born a sinful slave forever in the fire of the hereafter? Or is this not the case and He punishes the sinful people for a limited period of time, whether it is short or long, and then releases them from torture and provides them with comfort. There is a difference of opinions on these problems in the works of Ibn Qayyim Al- Jawziyyah Al-Ash͑ari and Allameh Tabataba’i, the Shiite philosopher and commentator.Ibn Qayyim addresses widely and systematically the issue of the immortality of the inhabitants of hell. In fact, he interprets immortality (khulūd) as a long time, so that the long fire and scourge annihilate the evil from the souls that evil has mixed in their being. In his viewpoint God has created human monotheist. If the monotheistic nature of the person is changed by vices, these vices and the corrupted nature can be changed by torment and fire. He quotes in his works the ideas of the believers in immortality in torment and criticizes and rebuts them. Stating so many arguments, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya tries to deny the immortality and eternality in torment. Interpreting the verses of The Holy Quran on immortality of the inhabitants of hell in torment, Allameh Tabataba’i strongly asserts the immortality principle. He relates the happiness and misery, and good and evil among human beings to the development and appearance of the carnal states and habits they gained in the earthly world. He asserts that if disbelief and polytheism reside and take hold over the soul, they result in perpetual torment. Nevertheless, he insists that everlasting torment is destined for the infidels (kuffār) only. He states that immortality in hell has explicit text (naṣṣ) in The Holy Quran and believes that not all religious canons and characteristics of the resurrection can be proved by rational arguments. Because the intellect has no access to these characteristics and details, the unique way to understand and prove them is to confirm what the honest Prophet has said. Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya and Allameh Tabataba’i have provided arguments in explaining the problem of immortality based on their own school and principles of thinking which are different in method and content. However Ibn Qayyim is an Ash’ari theologian, he has a mystical and philosophical approach concerning the explanation of the non-immortality of torment. He has presented twenty five reasons in his book Hādī Al-Arwāḥ Īlā Bilād Al-Arwāḥ. In this paper the authors will only focus on his philosophical arguments. Among his arguments are an argument based on God’s Divine Names and Attributes, an argument based on Wisdom (hikmah) and public benefit (maṣlaḥah), an argument based on the antecedence of God’s Mercy to His Anger, an argument based on human nature (fiṭrah), and an argument based on the theory that there is less evil than good in the world. Whereas Allameh Tabataba’i is a famous philosopher he did not present any philosophical argument to prove immortality. Besides his explanation of khulūd, heanswers the objections to his point of view. One of the objections, for instance, is that infidelity and polytheism lead to one of two possible cases: It may bring a person out of his human nature and transform his/her soul to another species; In this case the person gains a fire nature as a result of infidelity and sin and therefore does not suffer from the fiery devil forms go out from him/her and even enjoys them. The original nature may remain but infidelity is a curtain and constraint (qāsir) that does not let the heavenly forms go out of original nature; In this case one can deduce non-immortality in hell according to the philosophical principle “constraint is not permanent.” Allameh replies that in the first case the fiery devil forms that go out of the soul can be perfection in one aspect and can even be consistent and enjoyable. But when truth if revealed in the hereafter and he becomes aware of the harm and consequences of his sins, it will be a great torment for the soul. He will be exactly like an addict who has enjoyed a drug in ignorance but when he becomes aware of the harms, the same joy becomes pain for him. In the second case Allameh agrees that the torment will not be permanent. In explaining the problem of evil both scholars consider evil unrelated to God and believe that God did not predestine torment and torture for His revenge but each scholar has a different explanation. For Ibn Qayyim torment and torture is Divine Action and the essence of evil in hell is not the creation’s purpose and aim in itself but is an object that is foreordained for a desirable result that is heaven. Allameh Tabataba’i, however, believes in the embodiment (tajassum) of human actions in life in the hereafter and considers the torments as the result of the actions of sinful people, not the result of the actions of God. خلود اهل نار و عذاب ابدی یکی از بحث‌های مهم و پیچیده‌ای است که عالمان دیانت را مشغول کرده است و هریک به‌مقتضای اصول و مبانی فکری خویش روش متفاوتی برای حل این مسئله و سؤالات مطرح دراین‌باره در پیش گرفته‌اند؛ ازجمله اینکه چگونه عذاب ابدی و خلود همیشگی در آتش با رحمت و عدالت خداوند سازگار است و اینکه چگونه ممکن است گناه محدود، عذابی نامحدود داشته باشد. این تفاوت رأی را در نظرات ابن‌قیم اشعری و علامه طباطبایی، فیلسوف و مفسر شیعی به‌خوبی می‌توان مشاهده کرد. ابن‌قیم جوزی ازجمله متکلمانی است که قائل به خلود در عذاب نیست و به‌طور وسیع و روشمند به مسئله خلود اهل نار پرداخته است. وی در بخشی از سخنان خود، آراء قائلین به خلود را بیان کرده است و در بخشی دیگر، آن‌ها را نفی و نقد می‌کند. وی با بیان ادله فراوان عقلی و نقلی، جاودانگی‌نداشتن در آتش را اثبات می‌کند. علامه طباطبایی در تفسیر آیاتی که مربوط به خلود اهل نار است، بر اصل خلود پافشاری کرده است و سعادت و شقاوت، خیر و شر در آدمیان را به ظهور حالات و ملکات نفسانی نسبت می‌دهد که در دنیا کسب کرده‌اند و معتقد است اگر کفر و شرک در نفس رسوخ کند، باعث عذاب دائمی می‌شود؛ اما بر این نکته نیز تأکید می‌کند که خلود در نار به کافران اختصاص دارد. ‌وی در رابطه با خلود اهل نار بر این نکته تأکید دارد که قرآن کریم بر خلود و جاودانگی در آتش، نص صریح دارد و معتقد است نمی‌توان همة احکام شرع و خصوصیات معاد را با مقدمات کلى عقل اثبات کرد؛ زیرا دست عقل به آن خصوصیات و جزئیات نمى‏رسد و تنها راه اثبات آن، تصدیق به نبوت پیامبر صادق است. ابن‌قیم جوزی و علامه طباطبایی هریک با توجه به مشرب و مبانی فکری که داشته‌اند، در تبیین مسئله خلود در عذاب دلایلی بیان کرده‌اند که به لحاظ روشی و محتوایی و تفسیری متفاوت‌اند.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20770_b8f9b2025eb1c60b62436d0b1851a117.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 A Study of the Relationship between Mulla Sadra's " Extra-Intellectual Order" and Kierkegaard's "Sphere of Religion" بررسی ارتباط «طور ورای عقل» ملاصدرا و «سپهر دین» کی‌یرکگور 87 100 20771 10.22108/coth.2016.20771 FA محمودرضا صدرایی دانشجوی دکتری الهیات دانشگاه پیام نور تهران، تهران، ایران عباس حاجیها استادیار گروه الهیات، دانشگاه پیام نور تهران، تهران، ایران اکبر گلی ملک آبادی دانشیار گروه الهیات دانشگاه پیام نور اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران سید علی علم الهدی دانشیار گروه الهیات دانشگاه پیام نور تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Is there a domain beyond the illogical intellect whose statements are antirational? This question has always called gnosticism to encounter rationalism. Thus, gnostics, gnosticologists, and religionologists in both Christian west and Islamic east have always paid attention to intellect and the extraintellectual order, and to the possible relationthip between them. Mulla Sadra believed that neither the statements of the intellect are invalid in the extraintellectual order, nor the statements of the latter in the former. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, in his notion of human life stages, has labeled them as esthetic, ethical, and religious. In his view, the religious domain is extra-rational and extra-ethical. In an analytic process, Mulla Sadra has classified the implications and applications of the word "intellect". In his view, intellect is present in overall human domains and no order of humanity is void of the power of reason. Additionally, in epistemological terms, intellect cannot be in conflict with other components when opining within the domain of its own and its cognitive findings; and does not proscribe its ulterior. In other words, errors emerge in the stage of intellect's decreeing, not in the stage of senses' and intuition's reporting . Now the intellect itself is able to recognize its limits, admit ignorance, and lead the humanity to the boundaries of extra-rational matters. In Mulla Sadra's view, the epistemological and cognitive domain of extraintellectual order and the complexity of knowledge within this domain are not accessible to the intellect, being otherwise (e.g., through heart or revelation) achievable by humans. In Kierkegaard's view, intellect as human capacity of thought is annexative; and experiences and attitudes acquired in relation to the existence have formed human intellect; and the boundary sought by the intellect is, in a sense, the very purpose or objective of the intellect. With his partiality toward faith, Kierkegaard is a known to be a harsh critic of rationalism. He wants to remind his readers of limitations of human reason. Placing faith in the center of Christian thinking, he believed that intellect has no role in religious creed; and that the object of faith has to be paradoxical. Without submission to the paradoxical, the necessary passion and the ground for decision would not be peovided. Submitting to the paradoxical, a passionate human being displays his/her exyreme passion and commitment to the object of his/her faith, which is a paradox, and paradoxical as much as the paradox itself. In Kierkegaard's view, the void arising from the inconsistency of two discrete, and at the same time, subsequent issues (ethical and religious life) is filled by an existential issue, namely deapair. Such a despair, he argues, is an existential process swallowing the entire individual existence and is the result of paradoxes and substantial impasses that an individual faces within the extant conditions of his/her own life, becoming the turning point where a human being is detached fron morality and adjoins religion. Such a despair is deliberaye and chosen. Humans cannot be desperate without spliciting despair. When resolving it correctly, an individual would go beyond it righteously. In Islamic view, however, faith is not an anti rational category. In Mulla Sadra's view, faith is inclusive of instinctive knowledge and intuitive knowledge. Faith has various grades, one being intuitive. Another grade is the knowledge of God through argumentative comparison. Although faith is a matter of heart/instinct, the heartfelt/instinctive faith is not exclusive to exploratory knowledge; and knowledge of God through reasoning and arguments could be considered heartfelt/inatinctive faith. He tries to reconcile intellect and religion; or in other words, gnosticism and argumentation. In his specific semantic analytic method, Mulla Sadra links elements seemingly not directly related to the concept of faith to it, even calling them equivalents. He restructures other concepts such as light, science, wisdom, and intellect into a new superior framework, renarrating the theological concept of faith using Koranic, gnostic, and philosophical literature. That's why he tries to make an aperure between intellect and heart when reaching the topic of extraintellectual order. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, raises the issue of paradox when reaching the third stage of life or the sphere of religion in his methodological model. He concludes that the sphere of religion, and entry to the stage of faith is based on existenz and has no relevance to the conceptual existence and the concept of existence, but some sort of unity is realized between it an the authentic exterior existence; and even, one has to say, faith is the same as the existenz; and what he refers to as "extra-religion" is an extraintellectual order. In his view, the process of faith requires detention of intellect, which, of course, does not imply the omission and negation of intellect. Nulla Sadra, however, with his interpretation of extra intellectual order, accepts the fact that it's statements are not accessible to the intellect and the latter is incapable of fathoming then does not imply that if a human being reaches an understanding of extra intellectual order using other means than rationality, logics, and conceptual, influential methods, the intellect will be deaf and blind toward such an understanding. He believes that the statements of the extra intellectual order are not within the intellect's domain of comprehension but in another domain are known as heartfelt /instinctive knowledge. In fact, he denies the alienation of heart and mind because in his view, psyche has a transcendental essence and a collective unity. Therefore, he does not consider heart and mind as mutually exclusive; and that intellect does not deem impossible the heart's intuitions. His interpretations of extra intellectual order are based on his specific view of intellect and Islamic anthropology. However, when Kierkegaard considers the sphere of religion as irrational, he provides a specific conception of humanity contradicting that of Nulla Sadra because he portrays human beings as completely separate and aliens to one another as an archipelago. In fact, he closes all windows between intellect and heart when stating that in the extra intellectual order, the plunge is relevant, not rationalization. Hence the separation between Mulla Sadra's and Kierkegaard's thoughts. They both accept that intellect is not a complete source of knowledge for fathoming the truth. Faced with the paradox in the sphere of religion, Kierkegaard prescribed the detention of intellect. Mulla Sadra's, on the other hand, considers coordinated and consistent the perceptual realms and knowledge domains in both areas of intellect and the extra intellectual order beyond it. Kierkegaard is a life thinker who has considered the sphere of religion to beyond beyond ethics, intellect, and esthetics in his categorization of life stages. In both their views, the sphere of religion and extra intellectual order have a mysterious and allegorical identity; an allegory which is not a poetic, literary lingo, but a specific way of thinking and a specific method for achieving knowledge. This paper tries to examine the similarities and dissimilarities of those two ways of living, namely, the sphere of religion and the extra intellectual order in the views of the two great thinkers who have developed them. آیا حوزه‌ای فراتر از عقلِ منطق‌ناپذیر وجود دارد که احکامش ضد عقل باشد؟ این پرسش همواره عرفان را به رویارویی در برابر فلسفه فراخوانده است؛ ازاین‌رو، همیشه عرفا، عرفان‌شناسان و دین‌پژوهان در غرب مسیحی و شرق اسلامی به دو حوزه «عقل» و «طور ماورای عقل» و نسبت بین این دو توجه داشته‌اند. ملاصدرا و کی‌یرکگور می‌پذیرند که عقل، منبع معرفتی کامل برای درک حقایق نیست. کی‌یرکگور در مواجه با پارادوکس موجود در سپهر دین به توقف عقل حکم می‌دهد. ملاصدرا قلمروهای ادراکی و حوزه‌های معرفتی را در هر دو حوزه عقل و طور ورای آن، دارای هماهنگی و انسجام می‌داند. کی‌یرکگور زیست‌‌اندیشوری است که در تقسیم‌بندی خویش از مرحله‌های زندگی، سپهر دین را فراتر از اخلاق، عقل و زیبایی‌شناسی برشمرده است. از دیدگاه ملاصدرا و کی‌یرکگور، سپهر دین و طور ورای عقل هویتی رازآلود و تمثیلی دارد؛ تمثیلی که زبان شعری و ساخت‌های ادبی نیست؛ بلکه یک طرز خاص از تفکر و یک روش خاص برای نیل به معرفت است. در این مقاله تلاش شده است همسانی‌ها و ناهمسانی‌های این دو شیوه زیست (سپهر دین و طور وراء عقل) از نگاه این دو بررسی شود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20771_d551f5ea6c303a3e8c3ce762be8236ff.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 The Relationship between Virtue and Happiness in Aristotle and Al-Fārābī’s Views رابطه سعادت و فضیلت از دیدگاه ارسطو و فارابی 101 114 20772 10.22108/coth.2016.20772 FA علی صبری دانش آموخته کارشناسی ارشد فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه حکیم سبزواری، سبزوار، ایران محمد کاظم علوی استادیار گروه فلسفه و حکمت اسلامی، دانشگاه حکیم سبزواری، سبزوار، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 Throughout the history, different schools including both descriptive and non-descriptive ones, have been concerned with revealing relationship between happiness and virtue. As the First and Second teachers, Aristotle and Al-Fārābī can be named as having very important roles in this sense. So, the main tenet of ethics for these two philosophers is happiness, which is mostly derived from virtue. Considering theories of these two philosophers, it became evident that Aristotle had significant effects on Islamic thinkers. In other words, they claim they have been strongly influenced by Aristotle’s ideas. An obvious example for this can be ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ which attracted the attention of both western and eastern thinkers. As the greatest and the most salient commentator, Al-Fārābī could elaborate on Aristotle’s ideas on ethics and so suggest a comprehensive theory of ultimate happiness and Utopia' ('al-madīnat al-fāḍilah'). On the other hand, following Aristotle, Al-Fārābī divided ethics into two theoretical and practical branches. Hence, basis of ethical theories introduced by the two of these philosophers is based on happiness; However, Al-Fārābī added notions of Islam and mysticism to happiness. The most straightforward definition that Aristotle offers for happiness concerns an ultimate goal which humans are eagerly seeking to acquire it. He considers the best life as a happy life which can be reached by reasoning about humans’ actions and reactions and through adopting a viewpoint. In this sense, Aristotle introduced three types of lives, namely life with pleasure, political life, and life with intellect; he knows the third type of life better and more sublime than the other two. In his book on ethics, Aristotle defined happiness as soul’s performance according to perfect virtue. Regarding soul, Aristotle divided virtues into moral and rational ones. He believed that virtue is inasmuch as its genus is a hexis (habit) and regarding to its species is a middle term. All in all, he believed in doctrine of virtue as being a “golden mean” between the extremes of excess and deficiency. Concerning the relationship between happiness and virtue, he believed that these two elements are neither dependent on nor independent of one another. Therefore, to distinguish between these two ends, attention must be paid to rules and goals: happiness is according to goals and virtue is according to rules .He contended that virtue does not guarantee happiness and that happiness requires something more than virtue. As the founder of Islamic philosophy, Al-Fārābī’s definition of happiness is similar to that introduced by Aristotle. That is, he knows happiness as the perfection that appeals to all humans and every in some ways attempt to reach it. In civil science whose aim is to define happiness, Al-Fārābī divides happiness into two categories: true happiness which is gained because of its essence and speculative happiness which is delusive one. The latter can be also named as common shares such as wealth, knowledge, etc. What Al-Fārābī speaks of virtue is mostly like what Greek people conceived of ‘Arête’. He named virtue as a thing with inherent goodness and as a fundamental concept of achieving happiness. He classifies virtues into four classes of theoretical virtues, intentional virtues, moral virtues, and practical arts. Following Plato, Al-Fārābī deems of 'virtuous city' ('al-madīnat al-fāḍilah') as a healthy complete body whose parts would function well. In this view, 'virtuous city' ('al-madīnat al-fāḍilah') is a society where its members know happiness, cooperate to achieve it and ultimate destiny of all members is interweaved. For exemplifying the relationship between happiness and virtue, he presents the allegory of soul and body. In his viewpoint, both happiness and virtue imply perfection in a way that humans can achieve the second perfection (happiness) through acquiring the first perfection (virtue); this type of happiness include humans’ ultimate sublimity and great happiness. Therefore, considering those two as the goals, Al-Fārābī knew these two elements as being dependent on one another and no separate from one another. Moreover, he expressed that happiness is in a higher rank than virtue. تبیین مسئله سعادت و فضیلت در نظام فکری ارسطو، به‌عنوان معلم اول و فارابی، به‌عنوان معلم ثانی، گرهگشای مهم‌ترین مسائل حکمت عملی، یعنی اخلاق و سیاست بوده است. مسئلة اساسی این نوشتار بیان رابطة فضیلت و سعادت است. به‌کاربردن عنوان کمال اول به فضیلت و کمال ثانی به سعادت و به‌دست‌آوردن سعادت ازطریق فضیلت بر مبنای رعایت حدوسط، در نگرش این دو فیلسوف مشایی بهترین رابطة لحاظ‌شده این دو مسئله است. ازطرفی به‌کارگیری طرح مدینه فاضلة فارابی و تأکید بر آن به این دلیل بوده است که تحقق سعادت فردی، منوط به سعادت اجتماع است و این مسئله را بیان میکند که فارابی در نظام اجتماعی هم، به‌صورت کامل، سعادت را به کار برده است. هر دو، فضیلت را برحسب جنس، ملکه و برحسب نوع، حدوسط میدانستند. با وجود این اشتراکات، اختلافاتی در دیدگاه این دو فیلسوف وجود دارد که مهم‌ترین آن‌ها تفاوت در نگرش این دو متفکر بوده است. ارسطو سعادت را مسئله‌ای اخلاقی و نه دینی دانسته است؛ ولی فارابی سعادت را مسئله دینی و اخلاقی قلمداد کرده و اساس هستی‌شناسی خود را بر مبنای توحید بنا نهاده است. نقطه افتراق دیگر این دو فیلسوف در تحقق سعادت است که ارسطو سعادت را به این دنیا محدود می‌داند؛ ولی فارابی علاوه بر سعادت دنیوی به سعادت قصوی معتقد است که همان قرب به کمال خداوند است و در این دنیا محقق و حاصل نمی‌شود. فارابی با این تفکر به سعادت، جنبه و حیثیتی عرفانی بخشیده است. علاوه بر این در مشهورترین تقسیم فضیلت که مشترک بین ارسطو و فارابی است، ارسطو بر نقش فضایل عقلانی در به‌دست‌آوردن سعادت اعتقاد داشته است؛ اما فارابی، هرچند سعادت را در گرو کسب فضایل دانسته است، درعین‌حال مهم‌ترین نقش را به فضایل اخلاقی داده است و به سعادت اجتماعی در قالب مدینة فاضله توجه بیشتری کرده‌ است.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20772_854454d7197084921316be25d83c6603.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 Revisiting of The negative and positive theologies in the Gradation of existence theory بازکاوی مسئله تشبیه و تنزیه در آموزه وحدت تشکیکی وجود 115 124 20773 10.22108/coth.2016.20773 FA حامد ناجی استادیار گروه فلسفه دانشگاه اصفهان، اصفهان، ایران Journal Article 2016 11 26 The negative and positive theologies are two intellectually compaction positions that have attracted most Islamic thinkers since the early Islamic period. Tashbih and tanzih means likening and cleansing or purifying respectively. These two technical words in theology describe human encounter with God. Accordingly Asharites tends towards Positive theology and Mutazale and Shiite tend towards Negative Theology. There are some Shiete thinkers, however, to compromise this situation. Based on different assumptions and presuppositions we can discern the following compromised versions: 1. Mild Anthrophomorphism: based on the communality of God and human attributes and reflections on Human contingency and God's necessity 2. Prevalence of existence and its unity: based on Ibn Arabi's mystical philosophy 3. Gradation of existence: based on Sadra's transcendental philosophy By looking at the most over-looked fundamental principles of Transcendental Philosophy, I will take a look the possible reconciliations of Negative and Positive theology in this paper. At the end, I will argue for its most plausible version آموزة تشبیه و تنزیه یکی از پیچیدهترین آموزههای کلامی است که از دیرباز متفکران اسلامی را به خود مشغول کرده است. ازیک‌سو، اهل حدیث و اشاعره و ازسوی‌دیگر، معتزلیان و گروهی از متلکمان شیعه با قرائت‌های کاملاً متفاوتی بدین آموزه نظاره کرده‌اند. گروه اول به سمت تشبیه و گروه دوم به سمت تنزیه سوق یافته‌اند. و اما در این میان ابن‌عربی و شارحان مکتب او به قرائتی جدید، یعنی تشبیه در عین تنزیه دست یافته‌اند که این نظریه مطابق برخی از آموزه‌های شیعی است. صدرالدین محمد شیرازی، مشهور به ملاصدرا، با بهره‌گیری از همین نظریه اخیر، درصدد عرضه قرائت نوینی از آن برآمد و چنانچه در ادامة مقاله آمده است، این تقریر، عقلیترین بیان در شرح این مسئله است. در این نوشتار تلاش شده است پس از بیان مختصری در توضیح مکاتب مختلف در این موضوع، جایگاه تقریر وحدت تشکیکی وجود در حکمت متعالیه مطرح و نقطة قوت آن را بررسی شود.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20773_51c3cabf88395021165a4fa32b73b037.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 Comparative study of Hadarat-e khams in viewpoints of Gheisari & Imam Khomeini مطالعه تطبیقی حضرات خمس از دیدگاه قیصری و امام خمینی 125 142 20774 10.22108/coth.2016.20774 FA سیدمحمود یوسف‌ثانی استادیار مؤسسة پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران حسین زحمتکش زنجانی دانشجوی دکترای پژوهشکدۀ امام‌خمینی Journal Article 2016 11 26 One of the crucial concepts that was nurtured and coined as a mystical expression in the Ibn Arabi's school of thought is the Five Realms of Existence (Hazarat-e Khams). These realms are general levels of existence, referring to levels and ranks of Absolute Existence, wherein these levels are manifest. These levels are: 1. Lahoot (Realm of Divinity), 2. Jabaroot (Realm of Omnipotency), 3. Malakoot (Angelic Realm), 4.Nasoot (Realm of Humans), which is also called Molk, and 5. Perfect man. The present study comprehensively examines the essential dimensions of this concept and its characteristics in Islamic mysticism, following a comparative approach on the views of two of the most prominent mystics of Islam, namely Davood Gheisari and Imam Khomeini. Like Ibn Arabi and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi whose status in explaining the Five Realms is undeniable, Davood Gheisari plays a key role in explanation and delineation of this concept. As the most famous and prominent exegete of Ibn Arabi's writings, he has authored many books and papers, so good that later commentaries are a mere repetition of Gheisari's interpretations. Thus, studying Ibn Arabi's thought based on the interpretations of Gheisari has made our job easier. In the case of the Quintuple Realms too, Gheisari, more than others, has talked about this subject, expanding Ibn Arabi's thought while staying faithful to him. Therefore, the works of Gheisari about these Realms provides the most comprehensive discussion on the subject. One of the more recent mystic theorist talking extensively about the Quintuple Realms in his works is Imam Khomeini. Although he sees himself following the Ibn Arabi's school of thought, sometimes he introduces new theories around mystical matters, including the Quintuple Realms. This is further corroborated by examining his thoughts in relation to stages of the essence of divinity, divine names, Feiz-e Aghdas (the holier grace), Feiz-e Moghaddas (the holy grace), and etc. All described so far regarding the Quintuple Realms are famous stories among mystics, which were initially recorded by Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi. Many Islamic mystics, including Gheisari, Imam Khomeini, and many others, have accepted this narrative, explaining the Quintuple Realms in the same manner. The first Realm i.e. the Absolute Hidden (Gheybe Motlagh), which is also called Lahoot among mystics, is concerned with the stage of the essence and unity that is the second manifestation of God Almighty, the place of His names and attributes, and the place of Permanent Archetypes (A'yan-e Sa'beteh). Many other mystics agree on this. Thus, the first manifestation and the Unity Essence (Zat-e Ahadiyat) are not a part of the Realms. The reason behind this is clear: this level of essence (Zaat) is characterized by the lack of absolute Divine Manifestation. The names and objects in the Unity Essence are not part of a conceptual and applicable Essence, rather they are, existentially and conceptually, the selfsame Essence. The second Realm is the Added Hidden (Gheyb-e Mozaf), which is close to the Absolute Hidden, and is called Jabaroot in mysticism. It is the inside of the Realm of Nasoot (also, Shahadat) and the purgatory between the bottom Lahoot Realm and top of the realm of Malakoot, which cannot be touched or felt. The third Realm is Malakoot. Malakoot, which is also called the world of Mesal or example, is the Realm of the Added Hidden close to Absolute Hidden and is the place of unseen (Gheibi) examples and meanings. Contrary to the views of some of the mystics, Gheisari believes that this world is not Arazi (i.e. it does not need an object in order to exist, like color), rather it is of essence. The same idea can be found in Imam Khomeini's remarks that Malakoot (Angelic Realm) is devoid of matter and yet belongs to it. All creatures have a Malakoti or Angelic life and Malakoot is life and knowledge all over. The next in line of external worlds is the world of Molk or Shahadat and is called Nasoot (Realm of Humans) in mysticism, which encompasses all planetariums and earth is in its center. Regarding the world of Molk, Gheisari gives special attention to the human world. Describing the stages of Quintuple Realms, Imam Khomeini introduces the world of Molk as the shadow of the Absolute Shahadat Realm. The Perfect Man is the fifth and last of these Realms. In theoretical mysticism, mankind holds an outstanding status, so much so that Gheisari contends Man is the reason for the creation of this world. Imam Khomeini too believes human to be a creature of infinite nature that cannot fit in one description and yet it can take any form. This is what is meant by the saying that a human being is devoid of any specific matter. Explaining the special position of perfect man, he believes that all divine perfections are present and fixed in mankind and all qualities attributed to God can be attributed to a perfect man too. In Islamic mysticism perfect man is usually equated with the Mohammadian Truth. Mohammadian Truth is, in a sense, the Mohammadian Soul, which is the first issuance from the blessings of God Almighty that philosophers call it the First Intelligible, as mentioned my Gheisari. Imam Khomeini follows his master, Imam Shahabadi, when he introduces another truth called the Oloviyeh Truth, which is not inherently different from the Mohammadian Truth. The results of the study can be outlined accordingly: 1. The idea of Quintuple Realms was initially introduced and nurtured by Ibn Arabi's mystical school. 2. There are many similarities and distinctions between mystical interpretations of Gheisari and Imam Khomeini regarding these Realms. It should be taken into account that Imam Khomeini's mysticism is derived from Shia mysticism 3. Keywords used by Gheisari include: the stages of divine essence, absolute hidden, external levels, the world of multiplicity, divine names and attributes, permanent archetypes, worlds of Mesali (the likes or examples), perfect man, Mohammadian truth. 4. Keywords used by Imam Khomeini include: stages of essence, external stages, Feiz-e Aghdas (the holier grace), Feiz-e Moghaddas (the holy grace), world of multiplicity, divine names and attributes, perfect man, Mohammadian truth, Oloviyeh truth, Velayat (guardianship), and Adam Al-oliya. 5. Both Imam Khomeini and Gheisari did not stop at explaining and critiquing mystical paradigms of Ibn Arabi, rather they introduced new concepts that were absent from Ibn Arabi's writings. 6. The reflections of Imam Khomeini of the Quintuple Realms complements the interpretations of Gheisari. حضرات خمس، حقیقتی جامع در عرفان اسلامی است که نخستین‌بار در مکتب ابن‌عربی به شکل مصطلح آن مطرح شد. حضرات خمس ناظر بر درجات و مقامات وجود مطلق و مراتب کلّی هستی است که جایگاه ظهورات و تجلیات حق تعالی است. قیصری و امام خمینی که هر دو متأثر از آموزه‌های مکتب ابن‌عربی هستند، تمایز آرای آشکاری با یکدیگر و با سایر عرفا در این زمینه دارند و در برخی موارد، ابداعاتی را نیز می‌توان در آن‌ها سراغ گرفت. به اعتقاد ایشان، مراتب وجود، منحصر در پنج حضرت است که عبارتند از: لاهوت، جبروت، ملکوت، ملک و انسان کامل. از میان این حضرات، لاهوت، جزء مراتب ذات است و بر مرتبة ذات و احدیت اطلاق می‌شود. سه مرتبة دیگر نیز ازجمله مراتب خارج محسوب می‌شوند. همچنین انسان کامل، جامع حضرات پیشین است و از آن تحت عنوان کون جامع یاد می‌شود. گونةرویکرد قیصری و امام خمینی به موضوعات عرفانی و ازجمله حضرات خمس، تحت تأثیر سنتی است که از آن برخاسته‌اند. بدین لحاظ، عرفان امام خمینی، رنگ و بوی عرفان شیعی دارد. تطبیق آرای قیصری و امام در مواردی نظیر مفهوم وجود، اسماء و صفات الهی، مفاتیح غیب، عماء، مراتب ذات حق، مراتب خارج، انسان کامل و نظایر آن‌ها که همگی داخل در مقولة حضرات خمس هستند، اختلافات مبنایی ایشان را در این زمینه به خوبی تبیین می‌کند. تفاوت تأملات عرفانی این دو عارف برجسته، بویژه در مسئلة حقیقت محمدیه و اضافه‌شدن حقیقت علویه در عرفان امام، جلوة بیشتری می‌یابد.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_20774_de5fd495da4b88fd12b88d03f10fb3f3.pdf

دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 7 16 2016 09 22 The Study of Wilfred Cantwell Smith’Viewpoint on the Problem of Religious Diversity بررسی دیدگاه ویلفرد کنت‌ول اسمیت در مسئلۀ تنوع دینی 143 156 21199 10.22108/coth.2016.21199 FA حامد نظرپور نجف آبادی دانشجوی دکتری ادیان و عرفان دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران قربان علمی دانشیار گروه ادیان و عرفان دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران مجتبی زروانی دانشیار گروه ادیان و عرفان دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2015 06 23 The issue of religious diversity, the religious truth and salvation of the followers of religions is one of the important issues of religious studies, especially philosophy of religion. On this issue there are three viewpoints: religious exclusivism, religious inclusivism and religious pluralism. This study reviews Cantwell Smith's viewpoint about the issue of religious diversity. Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916-2000) is one of the contemporary scholars in religious studies and one of the thinkers of the twentieth century with extensive knowledge in various fields of the humanities. He is one of the best historians of the twentieth century in the comparative study of religion. The Study of Cantwell Smith's works and his views on religious diversity show that he is follower of religious pluralism. Smith's life, personal beliefs and communication with people of other faiths is an influential factor in shaping his pluralistic vision. His experience with other religions, kept him from general thinking about the other religions, and he gradually came to the conclusion that they are not unsaved and without God; but their lives, just like Christians, has religious features and traits. Type of his communication and administrative and social activities in convergence Christian sects and followers of different religions, reflects his pluralistic spirit and thought. According to Smith's personal approach in religious studies, his emphasis on the distinction between internal and external aspects of religion, emphasizing on the inner aspect of religion, i.e. faith, personal faith and incapacity of others in approve or reject faith, his pluralistic view can be inferred. According to Smith, the study of religion is to investigate the meaning of the appearances of religion in the eyes of those who believe in it, study people's faith and survey persons, not study data. Smith believes that the concepts of faith and cumulative tradition should be used instead of the word religion. For him, faith is a personal experience or personal connection with the transcendent. The materials and visible subjects of religion are cumulative tradition. Faith is unique; but since faith has no form, except when expressed in certain forms, it is always diverse and varied. He likens faith to love. Love can be expressed in various forms in words and behavior and is at the heart of people and beyond these expressions. Cantwell Smith explicitly denies the theory of one true religion and believes in plurality of true religion. He also believes in the oneness of God (or the absolute reality) and denies the unbreakable bond between God and religion. Smith's view about the truth and salvation of other religions is also pluralistic. According to Smith, the truth of religion is the quality of one's faith. He believes that the saving truth is in all religious traditions and in every person with pure faith. According to him, all the words, actions, rituals and religious principles are tools pushing people to the sublime. He is opposed to religious exclusivism and put it in conflict with the Christian teachings. Smith also rejects religious inclusivism and believes that no religious tradition can fully know God. He argued that the salvation is in "human heart" and is obtained with "nostalgia and the love of God". In Smith's view, God can be known partially and there is no complete and definitive knowledge about God. Another Cantwell Smith's ideas, is "the unity of humankind’s religious history ", from which the equality of all religions or religious pluralism is inferred. The context of this unique historic process is one reality of faith and beyond this, is one God or the transcendent. The theory of the unity of humankind’s religious history indicates equality of different religious traditions that shape this history. Smith accepts the reality of religious diversity, and never says different religions are the same. He says that different religions (i.e. forms and manifestations of faith) historically linked together. In other words, religious history is unique; because different forms and expressions of faith around the world are linked together. The truth of all religions (i.e. the faith) is the same and the difference is in the cumulative tradition and all religions are equal in truth and salvation. As a result, Cantwell Smith based on the definition of religion, is a religious pluralist in religious truth and salvation. یکی از مسائل مهم دین‌پژوهی، مسئلۀ تنوع دینی است که امروزه اهمیت زیادی دارد. در این پژوهش، دیدگاه کنت‌ول اسمیت، یکی از برجسته‌ترین دین‌پژوهان معاصر، دربارۀ مسئلۀ تنوع دینی بررسی شده است. این بررسی با استفاده از روش تحلیلی‌تبیینی و با مراجعه به آثار وی انجام شده است. به نظر اسمیت، دین‌پژوهی، بررسیِ معنای ظواهر دین در نظر باورمندان به آن، بررسی ایمان در قلب انسان‌ها و مطالعۀ اشخاص است، نه مطالعۀ داده‌ها. او معتقد است باید به جای واژه دین از مفاهیم ایمان و سنت انباشته استفاده کرد. ایمان، پاسخ شخصیِ انسان به امر متعالی است که مشاهده نمی‌شود و متنوع است. سنت انباشته، صورت و تجلی ایمان است که مشاهده می‌شود و امری تاریخی و متنوع است. ایمان واحد است؛ اما ازآنجاکه ایمان هیچ شکلی ندارد، مگر زمانی‌که در شکل‌های خاصی ابراز شود، همواره متکثر و متنوع است. اسمیت به الهیات مسیحی کثرت‌گرایانه معتقد است و مخالف دیدگاه انحصارگرایی و شمول‌گرایی است. نجات از دیدگاه او با دلتنگی و عشق به خدا حاصل می‌شود که در قلب انسان‌هاست. حقانیت نیز در هر شخص با ایمان وجود دارد و دین حق متکثر است؛ درنتیجه، کنت‌ول اسمیت براساس تعریف خاص خود از دین، هم در حوزۀ حقانیت و هم در حوزۀ نجات، یک کثرت‌گرای دینی است. البته میراث دینی شخصی و ارتباط مستقیم او با پیروان ادیان مختلف بر تفکر کثرت‌گرایانۀ او مؤثر بوده است

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_21199_8a7c06a472fbe31a4ef05e6e145e55a0.pdf