دانشگاه اصفهان الهیات تطبیقی 2008-9651 17 3 2026 09 23 The Role of Private Evidence in Avoiding Epistemic Suspension of Judgment (Agnosticism) Regarding the Existence of God نقش شواهد خصوصی در گریز از توقف داوری معرفتی (لاادری‌گرایی) در رابطه با وجود خدا 61 76 29978 10.22108/coth.2025.146370.2023 FA غلامحسین جوادپور استادیار گروه کلام، مؤسسه پژوهشی حکمت و فلسفه ایران، تهران، ایران Journal Article 2025 08 18 According to the evidentialist approach, one’s final position on a proposition emerges from the balance between supporting and opposing evidence, and justifying that proposition requires considering (or weighing) all available evidence. Unlike theists and atheists—who interpret evidence to favor their own beliefs — the agnostic regards the evidence as neutral, whether due to ambiguity about what counts as evidence, the failure of individual items to establish the claim, or the equal weight of opposing evidence. In this context, “evidence” typically refers to public evidence accessible to all. Occasionally, however, private and non-shareable evidence may arise in favor of one side. The key question is whether such private evidence can challenge or outweigh public evidence and thereby lift the suspension of judgment. Based on this study’s findings, private evidence can be valid and effective in epistemic dilemmas that incline toward agnosticism, provided two conditions are met: it possesses independent epistemic grounding (evidence supporting evidence), and the opposing public evidence is not so overwhelmingly strong as to create a perfect symmetry. Keywords: Private Evidence; Agnosticism; Suspension of Epistemic Judgment; Theism; Atheism; Religious Experience. Introduction The dominant approach in religious epistemology holds that evidence ultimately determines the outcome of debates, with justification resting on the evidence one possesses while rejecting contrary evidence. Theists and atheists both claim that evidence conclusively supports their own stance. In contrast, the epistemic agnostic suspends judgment—often because of uncertainty about what qualifies as evidence, flaws in individual evidential items, or balanced weights among conflicting evidence. Although “evidence” normally denotes public, widely accessible proof, certain private evidence may persuade only a single individual or a limited circle of epistemic agents. This study explores whether and how private evidence can break the stalemate caused by evenly balanced public evidence. While agnosticism has been addressed in recent epistemological debates in the West and has seen limited discussion in Iran, the role of private evidence has not received systematic attention as a central focus. By examining the assumptions underlying agnosticism, the present research clarifies how private evidence may help one escape epistemic skepticism about God’s existence. It analyzes the types of evidence and their roles in two contexts—epistemic disagreement and suspension of judgment—and then establishes the conditions under which private evidence attains validity when it conflicts with public evidence. Materials and Methods The current study employs an analytical research methodology, examining arguments for the epistemic validity of private evidence both under ordinary conditions and in cases of conflict with public evidence. Research Findings The findings of the study show that four possibilities arise regarding the epistemic warrant of private evidence: Valid in ordinary circumstances but invalid in conflict. Valid in both ordinary and conflict situations. Invalid in both ordinary and conflict scenarios. Invalid in ordinary circumstances but valid when in conflict. These scenarios are theoretically conceivable, though not all have clear proponents among religious epistemologists. Various proposals have been made to address these possibilities. On the one hand, agnosticism produces no decisive conclusion and leaves us in epistemic indecision, which we ought to escape. On the other hand, privatizing epistemic structures and processes —grounding belief on factors beyond public scrutiny—undermines the accuracy of our epistemic representations. A balanced approach must reconcile these concerns. This study demonstrates that private evidence can resolve the problem of epistemic suspension if it meets two conditions: It enjoys its own independent epistemic support, ensuring it is not merely subjective. Competing public evidence is not so compelling as to undermine confidence in one’s private deliverances. Discussion of Results and Conclusions Considering the results of the present study, private evidence consists of data or testimony that is not publicly accessible and derives from an individual’s personal epistemic faculties. Its legitimacy is contested both under normal conditions and when it clashes with public evidence. Ordinarily, private testimony may be deemed valid if it can be reconciled with established public epistemic channels, for example, interpreting religious experience as a form of sensory or emotional perception. When public evidence for and against God’s existence is evenly balanced, the debate can slide into suspension of judgment—an agnostic impasse that is epistemically unsatisfactory. Introducing private evidence reshapes this impasse: evidence can no longer be regarded as wholly neutral, and the agent becomes fully justified in acting based on their private conviction. This position is defensible. Beyond the general warrant for private evidence like religious experience, such evidence is especially valuable in an epistemic stalemate. Individuals may legitimately rely on private evidence when two conditions hold: it has its own epistemic grounding, and the opposing public evidence is not overwhelmingly strong. In the specific case of belief in God, objections to theism are not so decisive as to weaken both public and private supports for belief. Moreover, the imperative to avoid unbelief—and its attendant epistemic shortcomings—further underscores the prudence of crediting private evidence when public and private testimonies diverge. بنا بر رویکرد قرینه‌گرایانه، موضع نهایی در برابر گزاره‌ها حاصل هم‌آوردی قرائن موافق و مخالف است و توجیه گزاره از مسیر تعیین تکلیف همۀ قرائنِ در دسترس می‌گذرد. برخلاف خداباور و خداناباور که قرینه را در نهایت به سود باور خود می‌دانند، لاادری‌گرا قرینه را بی‌طرف می‌انگارد که این امر یا ناشی از ابهام در اصل چیستی قرینه، ناکامی تک‌تک قرینه‌های در دسترس در فرایند اثبات مدعا، یا تکافؤ و هم‌وزنی آنهاست که این عوامل، داوری معرفتی دربارۀ این مسأله را متوقف می‌کنند. مقصود از قرینه در این مسأله معمولاً قرینۀ عمومی است که همگان امکان دسترسی به آن را دارند. گاه اتفاق می‌افتد که قرینه‌ای خصوصی و غیرقابل اشتراک‌گذاری به نفع یک طرف گزاره محقق می‌شود. حال باید دید آیا این قرینه توان مقابله با قرینۀ عمومی و برتری بر آن را دارد و توقف داوری معرفتی را برطرف می‌کند یا خیر. اعتبار شواهد خصوصی هم در حالت عادی و هم در حالت تعارضِ با شواهد عمومی محل اختلاف است. طبق یافتۀ این پژوهش، این شواهد در معضلات معرفتی که فرد به سمت لاادری‌گرا شدن پیش می‌رود، معتبر و کارآمد هستند؛ اما به دو شرط: (1) بر اعتبار معرفتیِ آنها دلایلی اقامه شده باشند (وجود شاهد بر شاهد)؛ (2) قوت شواهد عمومیِ معارض به حدی نباشد که تقارن نامأنوسی بین آنها شکل گیرد. آنگاه برای گریز از توقف داوری معرفتی که ـ جایگاهی استوار و حالتی پسندیده در معرفت‌شناسی نیست ـ این شواهد مؤثر خواهند بود و باور متعلق خود را اثبات خواهند کرد.

https://coth.ui.ac.ir/article_29978_0651a54a157022e288985fb28cff7df7.pdf